scholarly journals The Causal Role of Attentional Bias in a Cognitive Component of Depression

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 343-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca McDermott ◽  
David J. A. Dozois
2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 512-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandre Heeren ◽  
Virginie Peschard ◽  
Pierre Philippot

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 169-169
Author(s):  
D. Nelson ◽  
M. Lopian ◽  
N. Bratt

IntroductionIndividuals with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) have an attentional bias towards threatening information. It is not known whether this results from facilitated engagement (faster orientation) or delayed disengagement (shifting attention away) from threat. Recent research has developed a new methodology designed to modify attentional disengagement from threat.ObjectivesUsing this paradigm, the present study assessed the causal role of attentional disengagement from threat and its impact on worry.MethodTwenty-four university students scoring below 56 on the Penn-State-Worry-Questionnaire were randomly assigned to either threat disengagement training, or non-threat disengagement training. Training was assessed using threat and non-threat test-trials. All participants then completed a novel worry task, assessing tendency, ability and persistency of worry. The hypothesis was that training to disengage from threat rather than non-threat stimuli would affect tendency, ability or persistence of worry.ResultsAccuracy and test-trial reaction-time data indicated disengagement training was successful; compared to the non-threat disengagement group, the threat disengagement group had faster reaction-times for non-threat valence test-trials, experienced marginally non-significantly more negative intrusions during active worry, and found it significantly more difficult to worry, when required to engage solely with worry without interruption in the worry task.ConclusionIt is possible to manipulate attentional bias to disengage from threat information, leading to fewer negative thought intrusions during active worry and increased difficulty in engaging solely with worry, thus suggesting that impaired disengagement has a causal role in the ability to worry.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 173-184
Author(s):  
Wenxing Yang ◽  
Ying Sun

Abstract. The causal role of a unidirectional orthography in shaping speakers’ mental representations of time seems to be well established by many psychological experiments. However, the question of whether bidirectional writing systems in some languages can also produce such an impact on temporal cognition remains unresolved. To address this issue, the present study focused on Japanese and Taiwanese, both of which have a similar mix of texts written horizontally from left to right (HLR) and vertically from top to bottom (VTB). Two experiments were performed which recruited Japanese and Taiwanese speakers as participants. Experiment 1 used an explicit temporal arrangement design, and Experiment 2 measured implicit space-time associations in participants along the horizontal (left/right) and the vertical (up/down) axis. Converging evidence gathered from the two experiments demonstrate that neither Japanese speakers nor Taiwanese speakers aligned their vertical representations of time with the VTB writing orientation. Along the horizontal axis, only Japanese speakers encoded elapsing time into a left-to-right linear layout, which was commensurate with the HLR writing direction. Therefore, two distinct writing orientations of a language could not bring about two coexisting mental time lines. Possible theoretical implications underlying the findings are discussed.


Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.


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