scholarly journals Ricœur’s Affirmation of Life in this World and his Journey to Ethics

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Morny Joy

Although Paul Ricœur never wrote a book on acting and suffering, the essay focuses on Ricœur’s engagement with this topic. It was one of Ricœur’s abiding interests that consistently appeared over the years in a number of his works. Given his compassionate affirmation of life in this world, he was vitally concerned about human beings’ inhumanity, in the form of inflicting unmerited suffering on their fellow beings. His distress on this issue was clearly evident. This essay is an overview of Ricœur’s endeavors to try and alleviate such injustice by a commitment to an ethically grounded approach that aimed at “the good life with and for others, in just institutions.”

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien Tissot

In this paper, I read Paul Ricoeur in dialogue with Judith Butler, Emmanuel Levinas and Annie Léchenet. I suggest that Ricoeur’s philosophy provides interesting tools to articulate two simultaneous feminist claims, that is, a claim for recognition and a claim of justice. This article particularly highlights how the Ricoeurian hermeneutics of the subject, which puts self-esteem at the centre of the good life with and for others within just institutions, can provide an interesting frame for feminist research. Through my reading of Ricoeur, by linking more precisely the notions of promise and self-esteem, I argue that Ricoeur’s philosophy allows us to develop a theory of faithfulness to oneself, which, I suggest, is an implicit claim of feminist discourse.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-32
Author(s):  
Marie-France Begué

The intention of this work is to trace in the most archaic human condition the anthropological roots that justify the foundation of an ethics, as conceived by Paul Ricœur in his book Oneself as Another. To do this, first I will try to expose the route that the creative image follows from its genesis in drives to its full semantics in the symbol, according to the dialogue that the author engaged with Freud in his work Freud and Philosophy based on his hermeneutic concerns. Second, considering a critical remark that Ricœur makes about Freud, I will explore the intentional orientation towards “the good life”, whose reflexive sense, “self-esteem”, integrates the symbolic dimension of action and sets the basis for the realization (épanouissement) of the human person.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Charles Reagan

This article deals with recognition, justice, and the good life separately, then as tied together in a web of interdependence. I begin with the multiple meanings of “recognition” and “to recognize.” I follow the order that Paul Ricoeur has in established in The Course of Recognition. Ricoeur groups these definitions into three kinds: epistemological definitions, recognition of oneself, and recognition of others. Next, I describe two kinds of justice, that of the judiciary and courts, both civil and criminal. Finally, I point out the many systems that must function to have a good life in a modern society. These include systems of transportation, communication, commerce, banking, private property, as well as many others. Their importance is brought home when we look at countries in civil war, such as Syria, or ones that have been mostly destroyed by natural forces such as Haiti after the massive earthquake. My conclusion is that the good life requires recognition of one another and of legitimate governments as well as functioning systems of justice.


Magnanimity is a virtue that has led many lives. Foregrounded early on by Plato as the philosophical virtue par excellence, it became one of the crown jewels in Aristotle’s account of human excellence and was accorded an equally salient place by other ancient thinkers. One of the most distinctive elements of the ancient tradition to filter into the medieval Islamic and Christian worlds, it sparked important intellectual engagements there and went on to carve deep tracks through several later philosophies that inherited from this tradition. Under changing names, under reworked forms, it continued to breathe in the thought of Descartes and Hume, Kant and Nietzsche, and their successors. Its many lives have been joined by important continuities. Yet they have also been fragmented by discontinuities—discontinuities reflecting larger shifts in ethical perspectives and competing answers to questions about the nature of the good life, the moral nature of human beings, and their relationship to the social and natural world they inhabit. They have also been punctuated by moments of controversy in which the greatness of this vision of human greatness has itself been called into doubt. This volume provides a window to the complex trajectory of a virtue whose glitter has at times been as heady as it has been divisive. By exploring the many lives it has lived, we will be in a better position to decide whether and why this is a virtue we might still want to make central to our own ethical lives.


Author(s):  
Brad Inwood

Ethics is the part of the Stoics’ legacy that is most prominent and influential today. Their theory of the good life for human beings falls into the family of theories associated with Socrates and his followers. This tradition includes Plato and most Platonists, Xenophon, the Cynics, Aristotle, and later Aristotelians, all of whom share the view that virtue, the excellence of a human being, is the highest value and is its own reward. ‘Ethics’ discusses the Stoics’ views on human nature and rationality; the four basic virtues: justice, courage, wisdom, and moderation or self-control; and the doctrine that the fully rational and wise person will be free of passions.


Good Lives ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
Samuel Clark

Reasoning with autobiography is a way to self-knowledge. We can learn about ourselves, as human beings and as individuals, by reading, thinking through, and arguing about this distinctive kind of text. Reasoning with Edmund Gosse’s Father and Son is a way of learning about the nature of the good life and the roles that pleasure and self-expression can play in it. Reasoning with Siegfried Sassoon’s ...


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Patricia L. Vesely

Abstract In this article, I argue that Job 29 provides an eudaimonic depiction of human happiness whereby virtue, combined with a number of “external goods” is held up as the best possible life for human beings. I compare Job’s vision of the “good life” with an Aristotelian conception of εὐδαιμονία and conclude that there are numerous parallels between Job and Aristotle with respect to their understanding of the “good life.” While the intimate presence of God distinguishes Job’s expectation of happiness with that of Aristotle, Job is unique among other eudaimonic texts in the Hebrew Bible in that expectations of living well are expressed in terms of virtue, rather than Torah piety. In the second portion of the article, I assess Job’s conception of human flourishing from the perspective of the divine speeches, which enlarge Job’s vision of the “good life” by bringing Job face-to-face with the “wild inhabitants” of the cosmos.


MANUSYA ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-38
Author(s):  
Charles Freeland

Aristotle understood ethics to be a practical rather than a theoretical science. It is a pragmatics, if you will, concerned with bringing about a good life . But the problem and the question from which Aristotle’s ethics begins arid to which it constantly returns concerns the relation of the theoretical to the practical: his concern is for the type or mode of discourse one could use in providing an account of the good life (Eudaimonia). Is this a propositional, apophantic discourse, a discourse claiming to represent the truth and what is true and from which one could then go on to prescribe a course of action, or, and this may be closer to Aristotle, is the philosophical discourse on ethics rather a descriptive one which takes humankind for what it is, not what it ought to be? This relation between theory and practice, between description and prescription, between science and action, is a question and a problem for Aristotle. It is my purpose to take up this question in connection with Aristotle’s texts on Eudaimonia. Another question shall be raised here: What is the relevance of Aristotle’s treatment of Eudaimonia to our contemporary, “modern” concern for ethics and the good life? I would assume, naively perhaps, that even today we are not indifferent to this question of what is a good life, and that we are not indifferent to the many ways in which the “good life” has been described. It would seem, then, that Aristotle’s texts have a particularly striking importance for us today insofar as we prolong the philosophical questioning of the possibilities for ethical and political discourse today and continue to ask who and what we are as human beings.


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