scholarly journals Erscheinung, Erscheinen (Manifestation)

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
John McCarthy

The lexeme Erscheinung/Erscheinen (manifestation) is related to the formative process of Werden (becoming) that fascinated Goethe throughout his life and which, in turn, is part and parcel of his understanding of morphology in all its manifestations, from the most elementary chemical processes to the highest products of the human mind. Because he was convinced that every existent thing necessitates interpretation to be grasped in its changefulness, he employed a range of surrogates to express the meanings of Erscheinung/Erscheinen. Thus, the lexeme can be translated in different ways: foremost as manifestation, phenomenon, appearance, or illusion. Moreover, Goethe believed that each manifestation is the result of an unrecognized law in the appearing object that corresponds to an unknown regulating principle in the observing subject and that nothing in living nature is static or occurs in isolation; everything is interconnected. Thus, Goethe’s method of inquiry consisted of close empirical observation that included reflection on the observing subjects themselves—a form of phenomenology. Consequently, Anschauen and Gegenstand also enter into the semantic field. Finally, the following examination highlights a lesser-known signification of Erscheinung in Goethe’s usage, one for which he did not have a specific term: that of emergence. Emergence seems most apt to express Goethe’s “lebendiger Begriff” (living concept), which can be seen as the counterpart to nature’s “lebendiges Fließen” (living flow), which he repeatedly expressed in his literary and scientific writing.

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-106

The article analyzes methodological errors Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, particularly their incorrect use of the concepts of mimicry and mimesis. The author of the article maintains that the leaders of the Frankfurt School made a mistake that threatens to undermine their argument when they juxtaposed mimesis and the attraction to death, which has led philosophers to trace back to mimesis the desire for destruction that is found in a civilization constructed by instrumental reasoning. The author reviews the arguments of the Dialectic of Enlightenment and emphasizes the unsuccessful attempt to fuse Freudian and Hegelian methods, which exposes the instability of opposing scientific reasoning to “living” nature. Some amusing quotations from Roger Caillois, who refused to think of mimesis as something entirely rational, are also brought to bear. As Brassier gradually unfolds Adorno and Horkheimer’s thesis, he indicates the consequences of their mistake, which confined thinkers to the bucolic dungeon of “remembering” the authentic nature that they cannot abandon because they have denied themselves access to both reductionist psychological models and to phenomenological theory as such. Brassier delineates the boundaries of this trap and notes the excessive attachment of the Dialectic of Enlightenment to the human. Brassier goes on to describe the prospects for a civilization of enlightenment: a mimesis of death in both senses (death imitates and is imitated) finds its highest expression in the technological automation of the intellect, which for Adorno and Horkheimer means the final implementation of the self-destructive mind. However, for Brassier it means the rewriting of the history of reason in space. This topological rewriting of history, carried out through an enlightenment, reestablishes the dynamics of horror more than mythical temporality: it will become clear that the human mind appears as the dream of a mimetic insect.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-86
Author(s):  
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer

In order to understand Hegel’s form of philosophical reflection in general, we must read his ‘speculative’ sentences about spirit and nature, rationality and reason, the mind and its embodiment as general remarks about conceptual topics in topographical overviews about our ways of talking about ourselves in the world. The resulting attitude to traditional metaphysics gets ambivalent in view of the insight that Aristotle’s prima philosophia is knowledge of human knowledge, developed in meta-scientific reflections on notions like ‘nature’ and ‘essence’, ‘reality’ (or ‘being’) and ‘truth’, about ‘powers’ and ‘faculties’ – and does not lead by itself to an object-level theory about spiritual things like the soul. We therefore cannot just replace critical metaphysics of the human mind by empirical investigation of human behaviour as empiricist approaches to human cognition in naturalized epistemologies do and neuro-physiological explanations propose. Making transcendental forms and material presuppositions of conceptually informed perception and experience explicit needs some understanding of figurative forms of speech in our logical reflections and leads to other forms of knowledge than empirical observation and theory formation.


1997 ◽  
Vol 101 (39) ◽  
pp. 7277-7282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xénophon Krokidis ◽  
Stéphane Noury ◽  
Bernard Silvi

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (26) ◽  
pp. 14164-14172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaaki Nakamura ◽  
Federico Palazzetti ◽  
Po-Yu Tsai ◽  
Shiun-Jr Yang ◽  
King-Chuen Lin ◽  
...  

Molecular orientation techniques are becoming available in the study of elementary chemical processes, in order to highlight those structural and dynamical properties that would be concealed by random rotational motions.


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