scholarly journals The Taxing Power Of The Federal Government And The General Welfare: What Are The Limits In The Wake Of NFIB V. Sebelius?

2015 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Klock

The Affordable Care Act seeks to remedy the problem of information asymmetry in the health insurance market by mandating that everyone obtain health insurance or pay a penalty, and by requiring the States to expand Medicaid or lose existing federal funds. In NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts held that Congress’ power to regulate under the Commerce Clause could not justify the Individual Mandate to purchase insurance, but that the penalty could be construed as a tax and upheld under the taxing power. Chief Justice Roberts also held the Medicaid Expansion to be an unconstitutional use of spending power, but determined that the Medicaid Expansion could remain with the States having the option to keep existing funding and not expand or expand and take the incremental funding. Eight Justices disagreed with the Chief Justice on the Individual Mandate, and six Justices disagreed with the Chief Justice on the Medicaid Expansion. This creates a paradox in that a supermajority of the Court believes the case was wrongly decided on both main questions. More distressing is the scant analysis given in all of the opinions to the constitutional constraints on taxes.

2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 243-268
Author(s):  
Richard A. Epstein ◽  
Paula M. Stannard

As this Article is being written, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is being besieged with two different types of challenges. The first is a Commerce Clause challenge to the individual mandate on the ground that, although the Commerce Clause allows the government to “regulate” the transactions into which people choose to enter, it does not allow the state to force people to enter into disadvantageous transactions against their own will. The second of these challenges deals with the imposition of the Medicaid expansion provisions requiring a state to forego all of its additional Medicaid support unless it is prepared to extend Medicaid coverage, partially at its own expense, to individuals whose income levels put them at 100% to 133% of the federal poverty level.


Author(s):  
Charles Courtemanche ◽  
Ishtiaque Fazlul ◽  
James Marton ◽  
Benjamin Ukert ◽  
Aaron Yelowitz ◽  
...  

The 2016 US presidential election created uncertainty about the future of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and led to postponed implementation of certain provisions, reduced funding for outreach, and the removal of the individual mandate tax penalty. In this article, we estimate how the causal impact of the ACA on insurance coverage changed during 2017 through 2019, the first 3 years of the Trump administration, compared to 2016. Data come from the 2011–2019 waves of the American Community Survey (ACS), with the sample restricted to non-elderly adults. Our model leverages variation in treatment intensity from state Medicaid expansion decisions and pre-ACA uninsured rates. We find that the coverage gains from the components of the law that took effect nationally—such as the individual mandate and regulations and subsidies in the private non-group market—fell from 5 percentage points in 2016 to 3.6 percentage points in 2019. In contrast, the coverage gains from the Medicaid expansion increased in 2017 (7.0 percentage points) before returning to the 2016 level of coverage gains in 2019 (5.9 percentage points). The net effect of the ACA in expansion states is a combination of these trends, with coverage gains falling from 10.8 percentage points in 2016 to 9.6 percentage points in 2019.


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy E. Parmet

No provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has proven to be more contentious than the so-called “individual mandate.” Starting in 2014, the mandate will impose a penalty on non-exempt individuals who lack health insurance. According to Congress, the mandate is essential to ensuring near universal coverage. Without it, PPACA’s insurance reforms will lead healthy individuals to delay purchasing health insurance until they require medical care, resulting in risk pools with a disproportionate share of high-risk people. The price of insurance will then climb, causing more and more not-so-sick people to forego health insurance. The resulting “death spiral” will make insurance unaffordable to many more Americans.


2013 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-572
Author(s):  
Abigail R. Moncrieff

There was an argument that the Obama Administration's lawyers could have made—but didn't—in defending Obamacare's individual mandate against constitutional attack. That argument would have highlighted the role of comprehensive health insurance in steering individuals' healthcare savings and consumption decisions. Because consumer-directed healthcare, which reaches its apex when individuals self-insure, suffers from several known market failures and because comprehensive health insurance policies play an unusually aggressive regulatory role in attempting to correct those failures, the individual mandate could be seen as an attempt to eliminate inefficiencies in the healthcare market that arise from individual decisions to self-insure. This argument would done a better job than the Obama Administration's of aligning the individual mandate with existing Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause precedent, and it would have done a better job of addressing the conservative Justices' primary concerns with upholding the mandate. This Article lays out this forgone defense of the individual mandate.


2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 624-651 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel T. Grover

Arguably the most controversial change to the U.S. healthcare system written into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or the “Act”) is what has been colorfully termed the Act’s “individual mandate,” the provision that establishes tax penalties for those who do not maintain health insurance in 2014 and beyond. Though the health insurance mandate does not go into effect until 2014, it has already faced numerous constitutional challenges in district and circuit courts, with entirely inconsistent results. Conflicting decisions regarding the Act’s constitutionality at the circuit court level cry out for Supreme Court review. But while the individual mandate’s validity under either the Commerce Clause or Congress’s taxing power has been the focal point of litigation thus far, another aspect of the individual mandate may undermine the goal of establishing universal, affordable healthcare coverage for all Americans. As currently written, the religious conscience exemption from the PPACA’s individual mandate threatens the efficacy of the Act and potentially exposes it to legal challenges under the Constitution’s Religion Clauses.


2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 548-569
Author(s):  
Kyle Thomson

On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law, resulting in the most sweeping reform of the healthcare marketplace and one of the largest expansions in access to healthcare in American history. A key component to both restructuring the healthcare marketplace and improving access are the health insurance exchanges contained in the ACA. Today, individual and small group purchasers have difficulty finding affordable health insurance in the marketplace because they lack the tools to gather information about plans and because they lack the bargaining power to negotiate for affordable rates the way large purchasers can. In conjunction with the individual mandate, the health insurance exchanges aim to solve inefficiencies in the current marketplace by creating a centralized venue to connect insurers with individual and small business purchasers. Thus it both creates a place for insurers to readily find customers, who are now guaranteed to be there because of the individual mandate, and provides a place for customers to shop for insurance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 71-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Cicala ◽  
Ethan M. J. Lieber ◽  
Victoria Marone

A health insurer's Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims, or the inverse markup over average claims cost. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives to increase costs. Using variation created by the rule's introduction as a natural experiment, we find medical claims rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7 percent in the individual market and 2 percent in the group market. Premiums were unaffected. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)


2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongjin Oh ◽  
Frances Stokes Berry

In December 2017, Congress repealed the individual insurance mandate penalty. Given the poor health status of veterans, their higher demands for health insurance, and the substantial number of uninsured veterans, the repeal of the individual mandate should have a significant impact on the veterans. This article investigates how the repeal of the individual mandate effective in January 2019 is likely to affect the number of uninsured veterans and their enrollments in Veterans Affairs (VA) insurance. By analyzing 52,692 nonelderly veterans in Florida and California from 2008 to 2017, the findings suggest that the repeal will lead to a considerable increase in the number of uninsured veterans. Veterans who are unemployed, poor, and suffering disabilities are more likely to sign up for the VA insurance than better-off veterans. Thus, one of the important functions of veteran health care is to serve as a social safety net for vulnerable veterans. Thus, the Veterans Health Administration should establish a policy to minimize the expected negative repercussions of the repeal.


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