The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law

2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy E. Parmet

No provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has proven to be more contentious than the so-called “individual mandate.” Starting in 2014, the mandate will impose a penalty on non-exempt individuals who lack health insurance. According to Congress, the mandate is essential to ensuring near universal coverage. Without it, PPACA’s insurance reforms will lead healthy individuals to delay purchasing health insurance until they require medical care, resulting in risk pools with a disproportionate share of high-risk people. The price of insurance will then climb, causing more and more not-so-sick people to forego health insurance. The resulting “death spiral” will make insurance unaffordable to many more Americans.

2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 548-569
Author(s):  
Kyle Thomson

On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law, resulting in the most sweeping reform of the healthcare marketplace and one of the largest expansions in access to healthcare in American history. A key component to both restructuring the healthcare marketplace and improving access are the health insurance exchanges contained in the ACA. Today, individual and small group purchasers have difficulty finding affordable health insurance in the marketplace because they lack the tools to gather information about plans and because they lack the bargaining power to negotiate for affordable rates the way large purchasers can. In conjunction with the individual mandate, the health insurance exchanges aim to solve inefficiencies in the current marketplace by creating a centralized venue to connect insurers with individual and small business purchasers. Thus it both creates a place for insurers to readily find customers, who are now guaranteed to be there because of the individual mandate, and provides a place for customers to shop for insurance.


2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 624-651 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel T. Grover

Arguably the most controversial change to the U.S. healthcare system written into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or the “Act”) is what has been colorfully termed the Act’s “individual mandate,” the provision that establishes tax penalties for those who do not maintain health insurance in 2014 and beyond. Though the health insurance mandate does not go into effect until 2014, it has already faced numerous constitutional challenges in district and circuit courts, with entirely inconsistent results. Conflicting decisions regarding the Act’s constitutionality at the circuit court level cry out for Supreme Court review. But while the individual mandate’s validity under either the Commerce Clause or Congress’s taxing power has been the focal point of litigation thus far, another aspect of the individual mandate may undermine the goal of establishing universal, affordable healthcare coverage for all Americans. As currently written, the religious conscience exemption from the PPACA’s individual mandate threatens the efficacy of the Act and potentially exposes it to legal challenges under the Constitution’s Religion Clauses.


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 394-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Hodge ◽  
Erin C. Fuse Brown ◽  
Daniel G. Orenstein ◽  
Sarah O'Keefe

Despite historic efforts to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2010, national health reform is threatened by multiple legal challenges grounded in constitutional law. Premier among these claims is the premise that PPACA’s “individual mandate” (requiring all individuals to obtain health insurance by 2014 or face civil penalties) is constitutionally infirm. Attorneys General in Virginia and Florida (joined by 25 other states) allege that Congress’ interstate commerce powers do not authorize federal imposition of the individual mandate because Congress lacks the power to regulate commercial “inactivity.” Stated simply, Congress cannot regulate individuals who choose not to obtain health insurance because they are not engaged in a commercial venture. Several courts initially considering this argument have rejected it, but two federal district courts in Virginia and Florida have concurred, leading to numerous appeals and the near promise of United States Supreme Court review.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 236-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey J. Lee ◽  
Deena Kelly ◽  
Matthew D. McHugh

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 is landmark legislation designed to expand access to health care for virtually all legal U.S. residents. A vital but controversial provision of the ACA requires individuals to maintain health insurance coverage or face a tax penalty—the individual mandate. We examine the constitutionality of the individual mandate by analyzing relevant court decisions. A critical issue has been defining the “activities” Congress is authorized to regulate. Some judges determined that the mandate was constitutional because the decision to go without health insurance, that is, to self-insure, is an activity with substantial economic effects within the overall scheme of the ACA. Opponents suggest that Congress overstepped its authority by regulating “inactivity,” that is, compelling people to purchase insurance when they otherwise would not. The U.S. Supreme Court is set to review the issues and the final ruling will shape the effectiveness of health reform.


2015 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Klock

The Affordable Care Act seeks to remedy the problem of information asymmetry in the health insurance market by mandating that everyone obtain health insurance or pay a penalty, and by requiring the States to expand Medicaid or lose existing federal funds. In NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts held that Congress’ power to regulate under the Commerce Clause could not justify the Individual Mandate to purchase insurance, but that the penalty could be construed as a tax and upheld under the taxing power. Chief Justice Roberts also held the Medicaid Expansion to be an unconstitutional use of spending power, but determined that the Medicaid Expansion could remain with the States having the option to keep existing funding and not expand or expand and take the incremental funding. Eight Justices disagreed with the Chief Justice on the Individual Mandate, and six Justices disagreed with the Chief Justice on the Medicaid Expansion. This creates a paradox in that a supermajority of the Court believes the case was wrongly decided on both main questions. More distressing is the scant analysis given in all of the opinions to the constitutional constraints on taxes.


2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 243-268
Author(s):  
Richard A. Epstein ◽  
Paula M. Stannard

As this Article is being written, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is being besieged with two different types of challenges. The first is a Commerce Clause challenge to the individual mandate on the ground that, although the Commerce Clause allows the government to “regulate” the transactions into which people choose to enter, it does not allow the state to force people to enter into disadvantageous transactions against their own will. The second of these challenges deals with the imposition of the Medicaid expansion provisions requiring a state to forego all of its additional Medicaid support unless it is prepared to extend Medicaid coverage, partially at its own expense, to individuals whose income levels put them at 100% to 133% of the federal poverty level.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 71-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Cicala ◽  
Ethan M. J. Lieber ◽  
Victoria Marone

A health insurer's Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims, or the inverse markup over average claims cost. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives to increase costs. Using variation created by the rule's introduction as a natural experiment, we find medical claims rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7 percent in the individual market and 2 percent in the group market. Premiums were unaffected. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (12) ◽  
pp. 1957-1972
Author(s):  
Donald D. Hackney ◽  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Erica H. Johnson

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the timing associated with the implementation of the health insurance-related provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) altered the presence and distribution of medical/non-medical debts accumulated by different types of bankruptcy filers. Design/methodology/approach Data were drawn from the US Bankruptcy Court’s Eastern Washington District over the years 2009, 2011 and 2014 using interval random sampling. Binary probit and Tobit analyses were used to model the existence, and distribution, of medical debts and total debts, respectively, at the time of filing. The impact of the time frame associated with the ACA was operationalized via a Chow test for structural dynamic change. Findings Chapter 13 filers in 2014 (post-ACA-based health exchange implementation) were more likely to report medical debts than Chapter 7 filers in the pre-intervention period, and were also more likely to report a larger proportion of outstanding debts owed to a single creditor. Filers claiming health insurance premium expenses in 2011 were (at the 10 percent significance level) more likely to report a more skewed distribution of medical debts. Originality/value The time frame associated with the implementation of the ACA impacts the distribution of medical debts among filers who have sufficient net disposable income to fund a Chapter 13 plan. The polarization of outstanding medical debts may indicate coverage gaps in existing health insurance policies, whose costs would be disproportionately borne by patients operating on thin financial margins.


2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongjin Oh ◽  
Frances Stokes Berry

In December 2017, Congress repealed the individual insurance mandate penalty. Given the poor health status of veterans, their higher demands for health insurance, and the substantial number of uninsured veterans, the repeal of the individual mandate should have a significant impact on the veterans. This article investigates how the repeal of the individual mandate effective in January 2019 is likely to affect the number of uninsured veterans and their enrollments in Veterans Affairs (VA) insurance. By analyzing 52,692 nonelderly veterans in Florida and California from 2008 to 2017, the findings suggest that the repeal will lead to a considerable increase in the number of uninsured veterans. Veterans who are unemployed, poor, and suffering disabilities are more likely to sign up for the VA insurance than better-off veterans. Thus, one of the important functions of veteran health care is to serve as a social safety net for vulnerable veterans. Thus, the Veterans Health Administration should establish a policy to minimize the expected negative repercussions of the repeal.


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