Insanity of Kenya’s ‘Guilty but Insane’ Verdict

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-40
Author(s):  
Mitchelle Kang'Ethe

A person may be insane while committing an unlawful act, leading them to raise the defence of insanity in court. This defence argues that the person’s illness prevented them from having the criminal intent needed to satisfy the mens rea requirement for criminal responsibility. The successful establishment of this defence in Kenya leads to the court issuing a special verdict of ‘guilty but insane’ (GBI). This verdict sees that the defendant is incarcerated in a place of safe custody where they can be treated for the illness that contributed to their commission of the offence. While isolation and treatment of the defendant form the primary aims of the verdict, this paper demonstrates that they are barely achieved in Kenya. This is because the conditions crucial to the verdict’s implementation–medication and therapy, a place of custody and the presence of psychiatrists–are wanting in the country. After examining the institutional barriers to the realisation of the verdict’s objectives, the paper studies various responses to these challenges by Kenya and Ghana. It finds solutions that promote the realisation of the verdict’s aims such as the provision of educational opportunities in forensic psychiatry.

2019 ◽  
Vol 83 (6) ◽  
pp. 450-472
Author(s):  
Susan SM Edwards

Anger, its part in human conduct and in crime commission has been much discussed and accorded a privileged status within the law, while the role of fear has been less considered. Notwithstanding, fear and related emotional states have received some recognition as intrinsic elements of the perpetrator’s object integral to the actus reus of certain offences and relevant to the defendant’s mens rea of some defences. The harm caused by deliberately or negligently instilling fear in another is inconsistently considered in law as is its impact on criminal responsibility and mens rea. Fear has been recently acknowledged as a permissible cause of loss of self-control in a partial defence to murder (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 55(3)). It remains a contested emotion and as with anger the male experience of what circumstances trigger fear predominates.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Nurul Sasmita

The aims of this thesis is (1) to investigate andexplain the positions of corporations in conducting banking criminalacts, and (2) also to identify and explain the criminal responsibility ofbank as the perpetrator in banking criminal acts. This research isnormative, conceptual approach and the approach of legislationregarding responsibility principles of the corporation for banking criminalacts.Corporations have chances in committing a crime, especially bankingcriminal acts just by making a corporation recognized as a subject ofexistence apart from human beings, so that in practice there is a criminal offense committed by the corporation. The corporation takespart in the occurrence of a crime. In practice, the determination of acriminal offenseconducted by the corporation is known through two things: first, the works of the committee: they should be constructed as theyuse the principles of the liability of corporation’s criminal actions. Principally, stakeholders and officials or employees of a corporationhave the responsibility for its owncorporate actions; second, errors in the corporation,as long as it is in the science of criminal law, the overview of criminals is still oftenassociated with physical actions performed by the manufacturers(fysieke dader) but this can be overcome by the study of  "functionalactors" (functioneledader). We can prove that the action of committeeor employees of the corporation in the society act traffic concerned,the acts of the corporationerrors in the forms (dolus or culpa) must be regarded ascorporate faults.Towards the corporations that make banking criminal acts we canhave their responsibility with the principles of strict liability. Onthe principle of strict liability, it is known that the responsibility ison them even if they do not have the required mens rea. The substanceof this principle is that the perpetrator has been punished if theperpetrator may have provable conduct prohibited by the criminalprovision (actus reus) withoutsee the inner attitude. In this conception, the corporation is consideredhaving responsibility forphysical acts performed by management. A corporation convicted in principles isintended to develop a sense of justice in the corporation who commitsbanking criminal acts as stated in Article 46 paragraph (2), sothat if a corporation committed criminal acts, we can also have theresponsibility of the corporation. Keywords:Banking Criminal Acts, Corporation, ResponsibilityMenurut peraturan perundang-udangan, korporasi sebagai subyek hukum dapat dikenakan pidana sebagaimana manusia melakuka tindak pidana. Pada praktiknya, penentuan tindak pidana yang dilakukan oleh korporasi diketahui melalui dua hal, yaitu pertama tentang perbuatan pengurus yang harus dikonstruksikan sebagai perbuatan korporasimaka digunakanlah asas pertanggungjawaban pidana. Pada asas tersebut stakeholder maupun pengurus atau pegawai suatu korporasi, bertanggungjawab terhadap perbuatan korporasi itu sendiri. dan kedua tentang kesalahan pada korporasi, memang selama ini dalam ilmu hukum pidana gambaran tentang pelaku tindak pidana masih sering dikaitkan dengan perbuatan yang secara fisik dilakukan oleh pembuat (fysieke dader) namun hal ini dapat diatasi dengan ajaran “pelaku fungsional” (functionele dader). Kita dapat membuktikan bahwa perbuatan pengurus atau pegawai korporasi itu dalam lalu lintas bermasyarakat berlaku sebagai perbuatan korporasi yang bersangkutan maka kesalahan dalam bentuk (dolus atau culpa) mereka harus dianggap sebagai kesalahan korporasi. Terhadap korporasi yang melakukan tindak pidana perbankan dapat dimintai pertanggungjawaban pidana dengan menggunakan asas strict liability.Pada asas strict liability diketahui bahwa pembebanan tanggung jawab pidana kepada pelakunya sekalipun pelakunya tidak memiliki mens rea yang dipersyaratkan. Adapun substansi dari asas ini adalah pelaku sudah dapat dijatuhi pidana apabila pelaku telah dapat dibuktikan melakukan perbuatan yang dilarang oleh ketentuan pidana (actus reus) tanpa melihat sikap batinnya. Dalam konsepsi ini, korporasi dianggap bertanggung jawab atas perbuatan yang secara fisik dilakukan oleh pengurus (direksi dan komisaris). Dipidananya korporasi pada asas ini dimaksudkan dapat menimbulkan rasa keadilan pada korporasi yang melakukan tindak pidana perbankan, sehingga apabila korporasi melakukan tindak pidana maka korporasi juga dapat dimintai pertanggungjawaban.Kata kunci: Korporasi, Pertanggungjawaban, Tindak Pidana Perbankan


Actus Reus is known as the external element of the objective component of Criminal Law. Mens Rea, the guilty intention, determines the criminal responsibility. Mens Rea and Actus Reus both are the components of a criminal activity that determines the liability of the accused person. An action carried out in furtherance of criminal activity doesn’t become an attempted crime unless it is confirmed by the illegality for which it was conducted. An attempted crime is an action that reveals the illegal intention on its face. The aspects of a crime such as the Mens Rea, Actus Reus, intentional crime, unintentional act caused as a result of carelessness, motivates to indulge in violating the provisions of law. The four theories of law such as the rule of proximity, the test of unequivocally, the indispensable element approach and the test of social danger are the elements of a crime.


2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-341
Author(s):  
Claire McDiarmid

In Scotland, the age of criminal responsibility is 8, although children cannot be prosecuted until they are 12. In England and Wales, for all purposes, the age is 10. This article argues that a further mechanism is needed to protect the young who do wrong within the criminal process and it argues for a new, bespoke defence, to be available to young people from the age of criminal responsibility until they attain the age of 18. It looks firstly at criminal capacity – what it is that needs to be understood fairly to hold anyone criminally responsible – and draws on material from developmental psychology and neuro-science, as well as looking at the child’s lived experience, to provide some evidence that the young may, without fault, lack this capacity. It then examines the use of age generally in law, and the age of criminal responsibility within this. Next, it considers existing lack of capacity defences – nonage, diminished responsibility, insanity (or mental disorder) and absence of mens rea – to consider their suitability for use by young and immature defendants. Finally, it presents a proposal for the form of the new defence, taking into account the need for balance with the public interest in conviction of the guilty. Throughout, it notes and analyses the Law Commission’s proposals in this respect.


Author(s):  
David Semple ◽  
Roger Smyth

Covering the role of the psychiatrist in forensic situations, from participation in the criminal justice system and legal definitions of crime (including homicide, violence, and sexual offences) to the relationship between mental disorders and offending, this chapter addresses secure hospitals and units, police and court liaison, and the role of the prison psychiatry. Legal provisions and how to give evidence in court are described, and an overview of pathways through the criminal health and justice system for mentally disordered offenders is provided. Fitness to plead and criminal responsibility are both explained.


Author(s):  
Norbert Nedopil

‘Cognitive disorders’ is a broad and heterogeneous diagnostic category, which includes different disorders, each with a distinct aetiology. They affect individuals in different ways depending on the age in which they occur. The term may be applied to a child, who has experienced perinatal trauma as well as to an older person with a beginning dementia of the Alzheimer type. The scientific literature on offenders with cognitive disorders is sparse. Most authors in forensic psychiatry do not systematically differentiate between the diagnostic subcategories and tend to use broad terms, such as organic disorder, organic psychosis, organic brain syndrome, neuropsychological deficit, dementia, mental handicap, mental retardation to include a number of different disorders in their studies. The number of patients with any kind of brain disorder in forensic hospitals and institutions is comparatively small and ranges from 1 to 10 per cent of all forensic inpatients. The same numbers apply for individuals assessed for criminal responsibility or risk of reoffending. Compared to major mental disorders like schizophrenia or affective disorders or to personality disorders, patients with cognitive disorders account for only a small proportion of individuals seen by forensic psychiatrists. Subdividing this group any further would be statistically irrelevant. The way forensic psychiatry and the law deals with offenders suffering from organic brain disorders is rather derived from case reports and convention than from empirical knowledge.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-458
Author(s):  
GERBEN MEYNEN

AbstractMany legal systems have an insanity defense, which means that although a person has committed a crime, she is not held criminally responsible for the act. A challenge with regard to these assessments is that forensic psychiatrists have to rely to a considerable extent on the defendant's self-report. Could neuroscience be a way to make these evaluations more objective? The current value of neuroimaging in insanity assessments will be examined. The author argues that neuroscience can be valuable for diagnosing neurological illnesses, rather than psychiatric disorders. Next, he discusses to what extent neurotechnological 'mind reading' techniques, if they would become available in the future, could be useful to get beyond self-report in forensic psychiatry.


2016 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 254-263
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Ahadi

The present paper constitutes an attempt towards questioning the adequacy of the prevalent approached employed by Islamic jurisprudence and statute law in dealing with mens rea and its manifestations. It also provides a kind of reinterpretation of the concept since it attaches itself to the perspective that the concepts employed in criminal law need evolution in order to preserve their function and practicality; the conditions appertaining thereto necessitating adaptability of the concepts with the contextual conditions as well as the principles of the criminal law. Under criminal law, mens rea is referred to as ‘criminal intent or the state of mind indicating culpability which is required by statute as an element of a crime’ (see, for example, Staples v United States, 511 US 600 (1994)). Under Islamic jurisprudence it is defined as ‘rebellion intent’. These conceptualisations of the mens rea may be subject to evolution as well as the other concepts. The present paper provides a reformulation of these definitions wherein mens rea is considered to be ‘the culpable linkage of mind with the forbidden conduct’. Through this reformulation the author replaces the ‘state’ with ‘linkage’ presupposing that the interpretation of the term ‘culpable’, as an independent constituent, shall vary according to the provisions of common sense and the contextual conditions.


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