On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert D. Sloane

Necessity, necessità, is Machiavelli’s guiding principle . . . that infringing the moral law is justified when it is necessary.Thus is inaugurated the dualism of modern political culture, which simultaneously upholds absolute and relative standards of value. The modern state appeals to morality, to religion, and to natural law as the ideological foundation for its existence. At the same time it is prepared to infringe any or all of these in the interest of self-preservation.—J. M. CoetzeeRecent jurisprudence in investment arbitration, almost all of which originated in disputes arising out of Argentina’s turn-of-the-century fiscal crisis, has raised difficult questions about the existence, nature, and advisability of necessity as a defense to state responsibility. The jurisprudence has contributed to a sophisticated literature focusing on necessity’s role in the special context of investment arbitration. But the growing prominence of necessity pleas in international law has not been so limited. Nor will its effects be. In the first place, investor-state arbitral jurisprudence contributes to the evolution of general international law. Investment tribunals invoke the latter, for example, to inform their interpretation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or to cure lacunae in the law. More significantly, beyond the realm of investment arbitration, the past few decades have seen a striking growth in necessity pleas in fields ranging widely across the landscape of international law.

Author(s):  
Llamzon Aloysius P

This chapter examines the law on State responsibility for corruption. It argues that the application of the international law on responsibility to transnational corruption issues in investment arbitration should involve bringing States to account for the fulfilment of their national and international anti-corruption obligations, before the issue is allowed to be used for mostly exculpatory reasons. Transnational corruption cannot be combated effectively by focusing and punishing only the foreign investor, which is only one side of the equation. Corruption-plagued states are doomed to repeat the failures of governance that have persisted in their public spheres so long as they are not asked to do more.


Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

The chapter discusses the philosophical foundations of the current regulation of the use of force. The chapter argues that, in correspondence with the emergence of a sphere of substantive rules protecting common interests of humankind, international law is also gradually developing a system of protection against egregious breaches of these interests. This conclusion is reached through an analysis of the law and practice governing the action of the UN Security Council as well as the law of state responsibility concerning individual and collective reactions to serious breaches of common interests. This system is based on positive obligations imposed upon individual states as well as UN organs, and it appears to be still rudimentary and inefficient. However, the chapter suggests that the mere existence of this system, these shortcomings notwithstanding, has the effect of promoting the further development of the law in search for more appropriate mechanisms of protection.


Author(s):  
Luís Duarte d’Almeida

Ongoing discussions among international lawyers on defences in state responsibility have close analogies with debates in two other fields: debates in general legal theory on defeasibility in law, and debates in criminal law theory (and philosophy) on the elements of criminal responsibility. The similarities are not surprising. But it is striking how little cross-fertilization there seems to have been. For jurisprudence and criminal law scholars have developed a number of points and distinctions that international law theorists working on defences should find helpful. This chapter illustrates these claims. Section 2 looks at defences from the point of view of general legal theory, and section 3 does the same from the point of view of criminal law theory, recommending specific solutions to particular problems. Section 4 then shows how these contributions can help to answer some persistent questions surrounding defences in the law of state responsibility.


Author(s):  
Giovanni Distefano ◽  
Robert Kolb

This chapter deals with the contribution of Italian scholarship to public international law. Its approach is two-fold. First, adopting an “external” perspective, the contribution of Italian scholars to the highly esteemed series of Hague Courses of the famous eponymous Academy may shed some light on what the Italian conception brought to international legal scholarship but also on how Italian scholars were perceived by their foreign brethren, and in what context they were quoted. Second, selecting a specific issue, the chapter focuses on the influence of Italian legal thinking on the shaping of doctrines of State responsibility. Among all the many areas of international law, this is one where the Italian school is constantly viewed as pioneering (together with the German school). For example, the writings of Anzilotti or Cavaglieri are often quoted as astonishingly modern exposés of that branch of the law, providing thus a test-case to verify the contribution and influence of the Italian doctrine of international law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eirik Bjorge

This article questions whether the law of the European Union (eu) can impose jurisdictional constraints on so-called intra-eu investment arbitration proceedings. Would an arbitral tribunal hearing an intra-eu case under either a bilateral investment treaty (bit) or under the Energy Charter Treaty (ect) have to declare itself incompetent to conduct the case proceedings owing to the operation of eu law? This article subjects that proposition to criticism, finding that, for a number of reasons, connected either with the drafting of the bit or the ect or the operation of general principles of international law, it does not withstand scrutiny. An arbitral tribunal seized of a treaty claim under a bit or the ect cannot rely on eu law to negate rights expressly granted under the instrument providing for its jurisdiction.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-585 ◽  

The Board of Editors is pleased to announce that the Francis Deák Prize for 2012 was awarded to Robert D. Sloane for his article entitled On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, which appeared in the July 2012 issue.The prize was established by Philip Cohen in memory of Dr. Francis Deák, an international legal scholar and lifelong member of the American Society of International Law, to honor a younger author who has published a meritorious contribution to international legal scholarship in the American Journal of International Law.


Author(s):  
Sabahi Borzu

The modern doctrines of State responsibility and reparation are the result of more than 2,000 years of human thought. This chapter traces the history of some of the most important components of State responsibility and reparation. The origins of these concepts are found in the historical roots of the civil law doctrines of extra-contractual liability and the remedy of restitutio in integrum, from Roman times until their entry into European civil codes. It explains how the private law notions discussed entered into international law and how, from the fusion of these notions and concepts with those supplied through the evolving doctrines of reprisals, denial of justice, and diplomatic protection, the modern doctrines of State responsibility and reparation were born.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-187
Author(s):  
Rosana Garciandia

AbstractThe European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) follows its own rules regarding the responsibility of states, although the international law of state responsibility enshrined in the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) remains, as general international law, relevant to its decisions. However, case law of the ECtHR shows that the Court is departing from certain ARSIWA principles as it adopts a broad interpretation of rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) giving rise to positive obligations.1Exploring those trends in the state responsibility regime of the ECHR, this article argues that, by clarifying certain ARSIWA provisions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) can play an important role by contributing to a higher degree of judicial integration on the law of state responsibility. It is desirable that the ICJ takes any upcoming opportunity to provide greater clarity on the challenges and nuances of the applicability of the law of state responsibility, in particular as it relates to positive obligations. That would contribute to a more systematic use of those rules by regional courts such as the ECtHR, and ultimately to guaranteeing a greater protection of human rights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 117-132
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

The law of international responsibility sets out the legal consequences arising from a breach by a State of its international obligations. It should be distinguished from ‘primary rules’ of international law, which lay down international obligations. International responsibility arises when a certain act or omission is wrongful, ie it is attributed to a State and it amounts to a violation of its ‘primary’ obligations. The international responsibility may be excused under certain strict circumstances, such as consent or necessity. Otherwise, the responsible State should cease the wrongful conduct and, in case of damage, it should provide reparation to the injured State, in the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.


Author(s):  
Mark Toufayan

SummaryDiscussion surrounding the prevention of genocide has focused to a large extent on the appropriate mode(s) of reaction to particularly serious breaches of human rights obligations. In particular, the question arose whether existing UN mechanisms aimed at preserving international peace and security should be regarded as a privileged — or even exclusive — means to enforce compliance by states with their obligations relating to genocide. Drawing extensively on the work of the International Law Commission on the codification of the law of state responsibility, the author argues that the new draft articles, with their emphasis on “serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law” rather than obligations erga omnes, are ill-suited to provide for the taking of preventive measures by “not-directly affected” states. Paradoxically, the institutionalization of mechanisms for preventing gross human rights abuses has been reduced to a minimum in the new draft, with emphasis being laid on the vague requirement that states “cooperate” to bring “serious breaches” to an end. It is suggested, however, that ascribing a subsidiary role to UN organs and procedures is, despite criticisms made as to their adequacy, necessary to supplement state action. The UN has in fact a distinct legal interest that is clearly affected when breaches of obligations relating to genocide occur. More importantly, by acting on behalf of the “organized international community” in matters of international peace and security, the Security Council has itself assumed today a legally binding subsidiary obligation to prevent genocide. The article concludes that in the absence of ineffective decisional institutions for the prevention of genocide, the choice is not between the subjectivism of a decentralized response and the absence of any consequences for the most serious wrongful acts but rather to strengthen the UN’s institutional capacity to react.


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