Her Majesty's Attorney General - v - Akhter & Ors.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Francis

This brief considers the February 2020 judgment of the Court of Appeal of England & Wales in Akhter - v - Khan, an appeal brought by the Attorney General against the decision at first-instance to grant the petitioner wife, Akhter, a decree nisi, or provisional decree of divorce. The decision of the Court of Appeal was against the backdrop of the Law Commission holding a public consultation into the status at law of certain 'religious-only' marriages (including Islamic weddings) and whether, absent a contemporaneous or succeeding civil marriage, they are to be regarded as void (entitling petitioners to ancillary relief, such as spousal support) or 'non-marriages'.

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-96
Author(s):  
Chris Bevan

AbstractThe doctrine of benefit and burden – an indirect method for enforcing the burden of positive freehold covenants – developed as an exception the strict Austerberry rule that the burden of positive covenants cannot bind successors directly at law. Three recent Court of Appeal cases (Davies v Jones; Wilkinson v Kerdene and Elwood v Goodman) confirm the continued existence and application of the doctrine but also reveal its deficiencies and limitations. This article explores the contemporary application of the doctrine, identifies its theoretical, historical and elemental frailty and, drawing on recent reform proposals of the Law Commission, highlights the case for reform. In so doing, this article argues that a vital theoretical issue has been overlooked in the reform debate: the numerus clausus principle.


2011 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
John McCaughran

This article is about the implication of terms into contracts based upon the presumed intention of the parties. It is particularly concerned with the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Limited,1 a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions thereafter, and whether there has been any change in the law. Before getting to Belize, it is necessary to consider, as briefly as possible, what went before.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
BoHao (Steven) Li

The Court of Appeal decision in Official Assignee v Wilson is the leading New Zealand case on "sham trusts". Obiter, O'Regan and Robertson JJ held that for a sham trust to exist, the settlor and trustee must have a common intention to not create a trust. Post-Wilson, debate continues over the precise elements that render a trust a sham. The Law Commission suggested that the sham doctrine, as a means of analysing the validity of an express trust, may not be the best approach. A better starting point would be a return to the certainty of intention requirement. In arguing that the Law Commission's recommendation is correct, this article will discuss three legal issues: whether an express trust is a unilateral or bilateral transaction; whether the excluded evidence has always been part of the objective intention requirement; and whether the legislative and policy factors have made foreign trust law distinct from New Zealand trust law. Finally, this article will expand on the test proposed by the Law Commission.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Mechlem

AbstractThe article discusses the development of international groundwater law from the first codification efforts of modern water law until present and raises relevant issues for the way forward. It first traces international groundwater law from the 1960s until the end of the last century. It then reviews the growing attention groundwater has received during the last decade and third discusses the status quo. It places particular emphasis on the 2008 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers adopted by the International Law Commission and the legal arrangements made for five of the 273 transboundary aquifers. It concludes with thoughts on the way forward in this important and understudied area of international law.


1968 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. G. Collier

The law surrounding the doctrine of act of state is perhaps one of the most confusing parts of constitutional law, for both its meaning and application are susceptible of several different interpretations. In particular the rule that act of state can be no defence against an action by a British subject, or, to put it more precisely, that there can be no act of state between the Crown and a British subject is one whose limits are not entirely clear. The recent case of Naim Nissan v. Attorney-General has brought the matter to the fore in what is thought to be a novel situation, wherein the question arose whether act of state can be a defence to an action by a British subject if the act has been executed by the Crown outside the Crown's dominions. The case gave rise to a difference of opinion between the judge at first instance and the Court of Appeal, and now that leave to appeal has been granted to the House of Lords, there arises an opportunity to examine act of state in several of its aspects.In this discussion it will be argued that the law as it appears now to stand is not necessarily a correct interpretation of the precedents, and that if it is, occasion now presents itself for a fresh formulation of the rules upon a more logical and up-to-date basis.It is first proposed to explain what is meant by the term “act of state” in this context, to try to establish its relationship with the prerogative, and to examine two aspects of it, that is (i) where a claimant is attempting to use an act of state as the foundation of his action, and (ii) where the Crown is attempting to defeat an action by an individual by the plea of act of state.


2021 ◽  
pp. 754-777
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter reviews the statutory protection potentially available to B if he or she has a lease. It is shown that, in some cases, B can be seen as having a lease (at least, in the sense used by a particular statute) even if B has no property right. A lease can give B status: the status of a party qualifying for statutory protection. As the Law Commission has noted, however, it is questionable whether the availability of such protection should continue to turn on whether B has a lease, rather than a licence, and a new approach has recently been taken in Wales.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Cooke

This book is an account of the land law of England and Wales written in the Clarendon style: as a letter to a friend, with a minimum of footnotes and statutory material. It explains the origins of land law in the feudal system, its transformation by the legislation of 1925, and the modern regime in which registration is the key to the validity and enforceability of interests in land. The unique role of the trust in English law is explored, and the many complications that can arise where ownership of land is shared (whether concurrently or consecutively). Themes of the book include the management of complexity in land law, and the tension between dynamic and static security. The law of mortgages, leases, easements, and covenants is explained. Recent decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court are discussed, as are reform proposals by the Law Commission.


1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gardner

The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is much disparaged by today's criminal lawyers. Its provisions have been described as “impenetrable” by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords could not conceal its dissatisfaction with what is called “the irrational result of this piecemeal legislation”. Andrew Ashworth has written of the “antiquated and illogical structure” of an Act which the Law Commission regards as “unsatisfactory in very many respects”. Most recently Brooke J., launching the latest version of the Commission's reform package, lambasted the operation of the 1861 Act as “a disgrace”, and claimed that this hostile view is shared in every corner of the criminal justice system.


2013 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-254
Author(s):  
Michael Stockdale ◽  
Joanne Clough

The admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales is now governed by provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a result of Law Commission reform proposals. The Law Commission's Report left several issues concerning the admissibility of confessions in the context of its proposed hearsay regime unclear, some of which have not yet been clarified by the post-2003 Act jurisprudence. In particular, whilst the authorities have established that confessions made by third parties may be admissible in exceptional circumstances, the courts have not yet engaged with s. 128(2) of the 2003 Act which limits the extent to which confessions made by defendants may be admissible under the 2003 Act's provisions. Moreover, whilst the Court of Appeal has recognised both that certain confessions may exist outside the 2003 Act's statutory framework and that the admissibility of such a confession for the prosecution when made by a defendant is governed by s. 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, other issues concerning the admissibility of such confessions have not yet been resolved.


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