The Supreme Court and the Legal History of Racism in America

2018 ◽  
pp. 17-30
2020 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-249
Author(s):  
Geir Heivoll

AbstractThe first Norwegian Chiefs of Police were appointed in the four main cities during the latter part of the 1600s. The first office was established in Trondheim in 1686, then Bergen in 1692, Christiania in 1744, and finally Christiansand in 1767. This article deals with the establishment of the police in Christiansand, when Christian VII appointed Mauritz Antonius Schweder Chief of Police in the city. Schweder had already been appointed as a bailiff in Christiansand in 1764, and from 1767 he was both bailiff and Chief of Police. But Schweder’s time in office was a turbulent one, and the conflict surrounding his office escalated so much as to finally end in the retraction of his professional appointment by the Supreme  Court in Copenhagen. This article focuses on the trial against Schweder: the many accusations against him, his defense, and the ruling of the Supreme Court, thereby shedding light on a lesser known part of the legal history of the early Norwegian Police.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 473
Author(s):  
Megan Simpson

In 1846, the first breach of promise of marriage case was heard by the Supreme Court of New Zealand. Unlike many other breach of promise cases heard throughout the Empire during the nineteenth century, this case was not publicly reported. Rather, it is a case that exists only within the pages of Justice Chapman's judicial notebook, absent from the newspaper court reports of the time. This action was relatively rare in the colony but the testimonies of witnesses examined enable us to gain an insight into matters of class, courtship, family, reputation and social protocols in the mid-nineteenth century. This paper considers the legal history of the action in New Zealand from 1842-1875, focussing on the case of Fitzgerald v Clifford (1846) to explore how private matters of courtship and romance became matters of legal and sometimes public debate. 


Author(s):  
Bennett Capers

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.


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