Abstract
The paper focuses on two crucial issues that hinder the fiscal sovereignty of developing countries: the reduced level of international tax cooperation, and the lack of appropriate procedures for sovereign debt crisis resolution. The low level of international tax cooperation enables a “race to the bottom” in tax rates among countries, tax avoidance through profit-shifting activities by companies and tax evasion by individuals and companies, based on the existence of non-cooperative jurisdictions. In the last 5 years, the international community has made some improvements in this field, but the situation remains far from satisfactory. On the other hand, the current procedure for sovereign debt resolution, through negotiations at the Paris Club with the support of the IMF, is not only unfair, but also inefficient. The paper explores alternatives in both fields. Appropriate responses to these international problems would have to show benefits in terms of efficiency and welfare at the global level, and establish fundamentals for countries to take full advantage of their resources, which is a necessary condition for funding policies that will not leave (or push) any nation or social sector behind.
The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis