Legal Worlds and Legal Narratives

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Aaron J. Walayat ◽  

More than a simple command of a sovereign, law is a form of moral communication, something that helps constitute the way we conceive of ourselves, our community, and our culture. In this essay, I argue that law is a form of “world projection,” a way for human communities to use law as an aesthetic way to understand themselves. Within this legal world are narratives that present an idealized reflection of our world. Law has two functions, a reflective function, in which it mirrors the actual world and a reflexive function, in which it corrects undesirable aspects of the actual world. It is through these functions that law describes the narratives within legal relationships in order to say something real and important about those corresponding relationships in the actual world.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nils Franzén

Abstract This article discusses why it is the case that we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to go along with other types of absurdities in such contexts. For instance, we would refuse to accept the following statement as true, even in the context of a fiction: (i) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl. This article offers a sensibilist diagnosis of this puzzle, inspired by an observation first made by David Hume. According to sensibilism, the way we feel about things settles their evaluative properties. Thus, when confronted with a fictional scenario where the configuration of non-evaluative facts and properties is relevantly similar to the actual world, we refuse to go along with evaluative properties being instantiated according to a different pattern. It is the attitudes we hold in the actual world that fix the extension of evaluative terms, even in nonactual worlds. When engaging with a fiction, we (to some extent) leave our beliefs about what the world is like behind, while taking our emotional attitudes with us into the fiction. To substantiate this diagnosis, this paper outlines a sensibilist semantics for evaluative terms based on recent discussion regarding predicates of personal taste, and explains how, together with standard assumptions about the nature of fictional discourse, it makes the relevant predictions with respect to engagement with fictions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-273
Author(s):  
Dragana Jeremic-Molnar

Richard Wagner began perceiving the world in terms of decay as early as the mid-1840s and especially during the 1848-49 revolution. He did not critique the contemporary world (and its accompanying reality) as someone who merely understood it in his own way. Wagner actually developed his own version of the world that was meant to become the referential framework for creating an entirely different reality in the future. The most exhaustive source concerning Wagner?s idea of the world and reality is his famous letter to August R?ckel, from 25-26 January 1854. In it Wagner put together his earlier ref lections on reality into a relatively coherent and meaningful whole. He did it by the means of several different concepts: ?the World as a whole?, ?the actual world?, ?reality of the world?/?the modern reality?. In this letter and elsewhere, he failed to elaborate his idea of the world, as well as to explain its relationship with ?the modern reality? that was undergoing change. Instead, he developed another idea: that of the artwork which was supposed to be a sort of mediator between ?the actual world? and ?the world of the future?, as well as between their accompanying realities. Wagner?s version of the ?actual world? (as well as its appropriate reality) comprised two components: ?the actual world? itself and the artwork, which was already changing it. Such a work contained a description of the change, understood in terms of regeneration, and thus also a prediction of the way reality itself should change in the future, as well as the direction of the change.


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73
Author(s):  
Paul Redding

AbstractOne prominent feature of analytic metaphysics in the second half of the twentieth century was the revival of metaphysical debate over modality, and in this paper I suggest that a particular position that emerged within this debate, ‘modal actualism’, bears a striking resemblance to the way that Hegel discusses modal notions in the final chapter of Book 2 of the Science of Logic, ‘Wirklichkeit’ or ‘Actuality’. Modal actualists opposed David Lewis’s counter-intuitive claims about the existence of alternate possible worlds, and aimed to reconcile the reality of alternate possibilities with the common-sense idea of the actual world as all there is. Like Hegel in the chapter ‘Actuality’, they thus argue that possible alternatives to the actual world must, somehow, exist within the actual world. Here I approach these issues via the ideas of John N. Findlay who, in the 1950s, had attempted to reintroduce Hegel into an Anglophone philosophical culture, but who also influenced the later development of modal actualism via his influence on the modal logician, Arthur Prior. Like certain actualists, Findlay distinguished between two modes of predication in order to distinguish, but relate, judgements about the actual from those about the possible. This predicative dualism is strikingly similar to the way Hegel distinguishes two types of predication in his treatment of judgement in Book 3 of the Science of Logic. Reading Hegel’s dualistic account of judgement structure against this background enables us to see how it was meant to provide a logical framework for the ‘actualist’ metaphysics he earlier sketched in the chapter, ‘Actuality’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351
Author(s):  
T. J. MAWSON

AbstractTheists such as Swinburne who seek to use natural theological arguments to move from observations about the world to conclusions about the existence (or probable existence) of God seem to need premises concerning what the world would have been like were Theism to have been false, viz. premises to the effect that it would have been (or would probably have been) different from the way we observe the actual world to be. Surely only that way could observations of the actual world be taken to be evidence that Theism is true.1 And surely for such arguments to be dialectically powerful in discussions with Atheists, these premises need to be acceptable to Theists and Atheists alike.2 In this article, I call these claims into question.


2019 ◽  
pp. 151-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker

This chapter was the first exposition and defense of an axiom system and model theory for a conditional logic in the possible worlds framework, a theory designed to model counterfactual propositions. It is argued, using a version of the Ramsey test, that the truth-conditions for conditionals that are provided can explain why we assess counterfactuals in the way we do. Counterexamples are given for various principles that are often taken to be valid for conditionals, but that are invalid on the semantics provided. It is argued that the theory helps to explain how propositions that are ostensibly about counterfactual possible situations can be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence about the actual world.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Babińska ◽  
Michal Bilewicz

AbstractThe problem of extended fusion and identification can be approached from a diachronic perspective. Based on our own research, as well as findings from the fields of social, political, and clinical psychology, we argue that the way contemporary emotional events shape local fusion is similar to the way in which historical experiences shape extended fusion. We propose a reciprocal process in which historical events shape contemporary identities, whereas contemporary identities shape interpretations of past traumas.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
Ben R. Newell

Abstract The purpose of human cognition depends on the problem people try to solve. Defining the purpose is difficult, because people seem capable of representing problems in an infinite number of ways. The way in which the function of cognition develops needs to be central to our theories.


1976 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 233-254
Author(s):  
H. M. Maitzen

Ap stars are peculiar in many aspects. During this century astronomers have been trying to collect data about these and have found a confusing variety of peculiar behaviour even from star to star that Struve stated in 1942 that at least we know that these phenomena are not supernatural. A real push to start deeper theoretical work on Ap stars was given by an additional observational evidence, namely the discovery of magnetic fields on these stars by Babcock (1947). This originated the concept that magnetic fields are the cause for spectroscopic and photometric peculiarities. Great leaps for the astronomical mankind were the Oblique Rotator model by Stibbs (1950) and Deutsch (1954), which by the way provided mathematical tools for the later handling pulsar geometries, anti the discovery of phase coincidence of the extrema of magnetic field, spectrum and photometric variations (e.g. Jarzebowski, 1960).


Author(s):  
W.M. Stobbs

I do not have access to the abstracts of the first meeting of EMSA but at this, the 50th Anniversary meeting of the Electron Microscopy Society of America, I have an excuse to consider the historical origins of the approaches we take to the use of electron microscopy for the characterisation of materials. I have myself been actively involved in the use of TEM for the characterisation of heterogeneities for little more than half of that period. My own view is that it was between the 3rd International Meeting at London, and the 1956 Stockholm meeting, the first of the European series , that the foundations of the approaches we now take to the characterisation of a material using the TEM were laid down. (This was 10 years before I took dynamical theory to be etched in stone.) It was at the 1956 meeting that Menter showed lattice resolution images of sodium faujasite and Hirsch, Home and Whelan showed images of dislocations in the XlVth session on “metallography and other industrial applications”. I have always incidentally been delighted by the way the latter authors misinterpreted astonishingly clear thickness fringes in a beaten (”) foil of Al as being contrast due to “large strains”, an error which they corrected with admirable rapidity as the theory developed. At the London meeting the research described covered a broad range of approaches, including many that are only now being rediscovered as worth further effort: however such is the power of “the image” to persuade that the above two papers set trends which influence, perhaps too strongly, the approaches we take now. Menter was clear that the way the planes in his image tended to be curved was associated with the imaging conditions rather than with lattice strains, and yet it now seems to be common practice to assume that the dots in an “atomic resolution image” can faithfully represent the variations in atomic spacing at a localised defect. Even when the more reasonable approach is taken of matching the image details with a computed simulation for an assumed model, the non-uniqueness of the interpreted fit seems to be rather rarely appreciated. Hirsch et al., on the other hand, made a point of using their images to get numerical data on characteristics of the specimen they examined, such as its dislocation density, which would not be expected to be influenced by uncertainties in the contrast. Nonetheless the trends were set with microscope manufacturers producing higher and higher resolution microscopes, while the blind faith of the users in the image produced as being a near directly interpretable representation of reality seems to have increased rather than been generally questioned. But if we want to test structural models we need numbers and it is the analogue to digital conversion of the information in the image which is required.


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