scholarly journals Divine Omniscience, Human Freedom, and Backwards Causation

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-88
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
Backwards Causation

Eternity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump ◽  
Norman Kretzmann
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Medieval Philosophy ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
History Of ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Temporal Location

The distinctive, philosophically interesting concept of eternity arose very early in the history of philosophy as the concept of a mode of existence that was not only beginningless and endless but also essentially different from time. It was introduced into early Greek philosophy as the mode of existence required for fundamental reality (being) contrasted with ordinary appearance (becoming). But the concept was given its classic formulation by Boethius, who thought of eternity as God’s mode of existence and defined God’s eternality as ‘the complete possession all at once of illimitable life’. As defined by Boethius the concept was important in medieval philosophy. The elements of the Boethian definition are life, illimitability (and hence duration), and absence of succession (or timelessness). Defined in this way, eternality is proper to an entity identifiable as a mind or a person (and in just that sense living) but existing beginninglessly, endlessly and timelessly. Such a concept raises obvious difficulties. Some philosophers think the difficulties can be resolved, but others think that in the light of such difficulties the concept must be modified or simply rejected as incoherent. The most obvious difficulty has to do with the combination of atemporality and duration. Special objections have arisen in connection with ascribing eternality to God. Some people have thought that an eternal being could not do anything at all, especially not in the temporal world. But the notion of an atemporal person’s acting is not incoherent. Such acts as knowing necessary truths or willing that a world exist for a certain length of time are acts that themselves take no time and require no temporal location. An eternal God could engage in acts of cognition and of volition and could even do things that might seem to require a temporal location, such as answering a prayer. The concept of God’s eternality is relevant to several issues in philosophy of religion, including the apparent irreconcilability of divine omniscience with divine immutability and with human freedom.

scholarly journals Molinism and Theological Compatibilism

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Jäger
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Transfer Principle ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Divine Omniscience

In a series of recent papers John martin Fischer argues that the so- called molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs a transfer principle about causal inaccessibility that molina rightfully rejects.

Do God's Beliefs about the Future Depend on the Future?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 124-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Ryan Byerly
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Simple Solution ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
Trenton Merricks ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
The Future ◽  
Beliefs About The Future

Trenton Merricks, among others, has recently championed in a series of papers what he takes to be a novel and simple solution to an age-old problem concerning the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom. The solution crucially involves the thesis that God’s beliefs about the future actions of human persons asymmetrically depend on the future actions of those persons. I show that Merricks’s defense of this thesis is inadequate and that the prospects for improving his defense of it would require him to enter the fray of articulating and defending a view about the mechanics whereby divine foreknowledge is achieved—something he and other advocates of the strategy he advances had hoped to avoid.

Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom

1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen T. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
Truth Value

Theists typically believe the following two propositions:(1) God is omniscient,and(2) Human beings are free.Are they consistent? In order to decide, we must first ask what they mean. Roughly, let us say that a being is omniscient if for any proposition he knows whether it is true or false. Since I have no wish to deny that there are true and false propositions about future states of affairs (as some philosophers have done), omniscience includes foreknowledge, which we can say is knowledge of the truth value of propositions about future states of affairs. For example, I believe the proposition ‘Davis will wear shoes tomorrow’ is true today, and if it is true today, i.e. if I will wear shoes tomorrow, an omniscient being knows today that it is true – and, if this being is eternally omniscient, he knew it millions of years ago.

scholarly journals Alternate Possibilities, Divine Omniscience and Critique of Judgement §76

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Kimberly Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Philosophical Theology ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
Modal Metaphysics ◽  
Divine Mind ◽  
Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Rule Out

Abstract A philosophically and historically influential section of the Critique of Judgement presents an ‘intuitive intellect’ as a mind whose representation is limited to what actually exists, and does not extend to mere possibilities. Kant’s paradigmatic instance of such an intellect is however also the divine mind. This combination threatens to rule out the reality of the mere possibilities presupposed by Kant’s theory of human freedom. Through an analysis of the relevant issues in metaphysical cosmology, modal metaphysics and philosophical theology, I show that Kant in fact possesses the resources to reconcile the philosophical claims of §76 of the Critique of Judgement with his keystone commitment to the reality of human freedom.

scholarly journals God, Evil, and Alvin Plantinga on the Free-Will Defense

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro De Florio ◽  
Aldo Frigerio
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
Critical Account ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Free Will Defense

In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantinga’s well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantinga’s view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom and the concept of transworld depravity. Then, we will sketch our own version of the Free-Will Defence, which maintains that moral evil depends on the misuse of human freedom. However, our argument does not hinge on problematic metaphysical assumptions, but depends only on a certain definition of a free act and a particular interpretation of divine omniscience.

Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. M. Zemach ◽  
D. Winderker
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Human Actions ◽  
The Past ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
God’S Foreknowledge ◽  
Backward Causation

Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists (I) distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ about the past which are alterable, and (2) argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past.

Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom

1984 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Basinger ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Omniscience
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