Nietzsche on the Soul as a Political Structure
A critic of metaphysically robust accounts of the human self, Nietzsche means not to do away with the self entirely, but to reimagine it. He pursues an account according to which the unity of the self is born out of a coherent organization of drives and yet is not something other than that organization. Readers of Nietzsche have pointed to a so-called “lack of fit” between this theoretical account of the self, according to which the self is nothing apart from the organization of drives, and Nietzsche’s practical account of human agency, which often seems to require that the self be something more than mere drives. I suggest Nietzsche’s interest in Greek agonistic norms of contest sheds light on this apparent incongruity. Agonistic relationships, insofar as they cultivate contest among diverse forces, are for Nietzsche one appropriate model for the subjectivity of beings whose psychology is similarly characterized by contest among diverse forces—that is, beings like us.Nietzsche est un critique des théories métaphysiques de l’ego. Cependant, il a l'intention de ne pas entièrement éliminer l’ego, mais de le réinventer. Selon Nietzsche, l’ego est le produit d'une organisation cohérente des pulsions et pourtant il n'est pas autre chose que cette organisation. Certains ont souligné une contradiction entre ce récit de soi et le récit de l'action humaine de Nietzsche, qui semble souvent exiger que le soi soit autre chose que de simples pulsions. Je suggère que l'intérêt de Nietzsche pour le concours grec soit important pour cette discussion. Selon Nietzsche, la contestation, parce qu'elle organise diverses forces, est un modèle approprié pour la subjectivité des personnes, dont la psychologie est caractérisée de la même manière par la lutte entre diverses forces.