Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction, by Timothy Williamson

2022 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-127
Author(s):  

Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson

What is philosophy and what are philosophers trying to achieve? Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction looks at the history of philosophy, including examples from history charting the successes and failures of philosophical thinking. Themes explored in detail include philosophy’s relationship to mathematics and science, common sense and its misinterpretations, the role of debate in the search for truth, and the importance of thought experiments to philosophical arguments. This VSI provides a contemporary look at philosophical methodology, asking if philosophy is always an ‘armchair-based’ discipline or if real-life thought experiments can help us solve philosophical problems.


2007 ◽  
pp. 42-63
Author(s):  
Sara Bender

The author discusses the history of the Jews of Chmielnik, a town situated 30 kilometres away from Kielce: from a short introduction covering the inter-war period, through the German invasion, ghetto formation, everyday life n the ghetto, deportations and the fate of the survivors. The author extensively describes social organisations and their activity in Chmielnik  (Judenrat, Ha Szomer ha-Cair), as well as the contacts between the Jews and the Poles.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-296
Author(s):  
Jeremy Black
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4 (28)) ◽  
pp. 180-189
Author(s):  
Aleksandr V. Antoshchenko

The edition of the address of the famous Russian church historian is preceded by a short introduction written by the publisher. In it, he explains the place of this document in the process of forming the views of A. V. Kartashev on church schisms among Russian post-revolutionary emigrants in Western Europe. This explanation, given against the background of the emigrant period of the historian’s biography, allows a better understanding of the meaning and significance of the arguments put forward in the published document.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52
Author(s):  
Timothy C. Lord

Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method provides an insightful critique of Russell’s analysis and metaphysics of logical atomism, proposing an unduly neglected neo-idealist alternative to Russell’s philosophical method. I summarize Collingwood’s critique of analysis and sympathetically outline the philosophical methodology of Collingwood’s post-Hegelian dialectical method: his scale of forms methodology, grounded on the overlap of philosophical classes. I then delineate Collingwood’s critique of the metaphysics of logical atomism, demonstrating how the scale of forms methodology is opposed to Russell’s logical atomism. Finally, I reflect on the reasons Collingwood’s Essay aroused little interest upon publication and the importance of continually rethinking the history of philosophy.


Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter ◽  
Emma C. Gordon ◽  
Benjamin W. Jarvis

In this introductory chapter, the volume’s editors provide a theoretical background to the volume’s topic and a brief overview of the papers included. The chapter is divided into five parts: Section 1 explains the main contours of the knowledge-first approach, as it was initially advanced by Timothy Williamson in Knowledge and its Limits. In Sections 2–3, some of the key philosophical motivations for the knowledge-first approach are reviewed, and several key contemporary research themes associated with this approach in epistemology, the philosophy of mind and elsewhere are outlined and briefly discussed. The volume’s papers are divided into two broad categories: foundational issues and applications and new directions. Section 4 discusses briefly the scope and aim of the volume as the editors have conceived it, and Section 5 offers an overview of each of the individual contributions in the volume.


Author(s):  
Catherine Rowett

The chapter starts by telling a narrative to explain how and why the author came to reject the mistaken assumptions with which the research began, and how these initial assumptions had assumed false dichotomies familiar from existing work in the field. The chapter thereby explains why the results presented in Chapters 1–12 might seem unexpected. It draws together the chief philosophical lessons of those chapters, highlighting the fact that Plato is right about (i) how conceptual knowledge differs from both propositional knowledge and recognition of tokens, (ii) the different sense of ‘being’ involved in knowing ‘what it is’, about a type, (iii) the value of images and icons in the philosophical method, and (iv) the irrelevance of Socratic definitions and other bogus criteria for knowledge. Finally, it sketches some possible ways in which a further volume might apply the results to other dialogues.


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