Collingwood and Russell on Philosophical Method

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52
Author(s):  
Timothy C. Lord

Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method provides an insightful critique of Russell’s analysis and metaphysics of logical atomism, proposing an unduly neglected neo-idealist alternative to Russell’s philosophical method. I summarize Collingwood’s critique of analysis and sympathetically outline the philosophical methodology of Collingwood’s post-Hegelian dialectical method: his scale of forms methodology, grounded on the overlap of philosophical classes. I then delineate Collingwood’s critique of the metaphysics of logical atomism, demonstrating how the scale of forms methodology is opposed to Russell’s logical atomism. Finally, I reflect on the reasons Collingwood’s Essay aroused little interest upon publication and the importance of continually rethinking the history of philosophy.

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 222-244
Author(s):  
Marina N. Volf

The views of M. Mandelbaum on the historiography of philosophy have undergone a certain evolution. The paper shows the epistemological foundations of Mandelbaum’s historical and philosophical position. From the standpoint of critical realism and its application to social sciences Mandelbaum shows the advantages and disadvantages of the monistic or holistic approaches, partial monisms and pluralism. He considers A. O. Lovejoy's history of ideas to be the most reasonable pluralistic conception, although its use as a historical and philosophical methodology is limited. Intellectual history, which replaced it, should be called a partial monism, however, according to Mandelbaum, it gets a number of advantages if it begins to use a pluralistic methodology. In this version of methodology, the history of philosophy and intellectual history can be identified. The paper also presents some objections of analytic philosophers against this identification.


Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson

What is philosophy and what are philosophers trying to achieve? Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction looks at the history of philosophy, including examples from history charting the successes and failures of philosophical thinking. Themes explored in detail include philosophy’s relationship to mathematics and science, common sense and its misinterpretations, the role of debate in the search for truth, and the importance of thought experiments to philosophical arguments. This VSI provides a contemporary look at philosophical methodology, asking if philosophy is always an ‘armchair-based’ discipline or if real-life thought experiments can help us solve philosophical problems.


Author(s):  
A.V. Pertsev ◽  
◽  
E.S. Kovaleva ◽  

The article, based on the historical-philosophical methodology as a «theory of the historical-philosophical process», examines the topical topic of the spiritual situation of the time. This methodology was developed at the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University, and then at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Philosophy of the Ural State University (T. I. Oyserman, P. P. Haydenko, E. V. Ilyenkov, M. K. Mamardashvili, A. S. Bogomolov, V. S. Gorsky, Z. A. Kamensky, K. N. Lubutin). The authors of the article show that the «history of philosophy» does not represent knowledge of the past, but always turns into an occasion and a way to reflect on the prospects of modern humanity. Historical and philosophical research is a necessary step towards self-identification of the cultural community in any country. The opposition of scientism and anthropology in the 20th century as directions in philosophy, the use of historical and philosophical studies by K. Jaspers, F. Nietzsche and M. Heidegger to influence the actual ideological attitudes of contemporaries is analyzed. Carl Jaspers’ methodology, which is outlined in his works «The Spiritual Situation of Modernity» and «World History of Philosophy», where he shows the psychiatric diagnosis of the historical epoch, is considered. Martin Heidegger’s methodology, outlined in his later works: Machenschaft, a universal technological efficiency of everything from details to works of culture, biological tissues and human relations as projects by social engineers, is also used for the first time. The concept of «machinism» is considered on the material of the translation of M. Heidegger’s manuscript «The Vision of Meaning» which is first involved in the scientific circulation in Russian literature by the authors of the article. Separately, the main signs of machinism (such as: engineering thinking, technology, standardization, computerization, digitalization, universalization), the position of a person, his place and role in the «living machine». In times of machinism, a person is not yet ready to recognize himself as a machine, he understands himself as a living being and tries to assert himself, showing his feelings about survival. The conclusion concludes that the humanities always find themselves between standards on the one hand and on the other, they hear the voice of being. The role of the humanities is shown neither as a prevention of the omnipotence of scientific and technological progress, but as a non-standardization of education and culture. It is proposed to return to the history of philosophy as a theoretical science from the disordered empirical descriptions of the teachings of some philosophers by others by choice and taste without a vision of world philosophy as a whole.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document