Uncertain peril: genetic engineering and the future of seeds

2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (03) ◽  
pp. 46-1469-46-1469
Author(s):  
John Parrington

We can now edit genomes. The technique, which involves cutting and pasting DNA code into the genome, is faster and cheaper than traditional genetic engineering and can be used on almost any animal or plant. What will this technology mean for the future? It may pave the way to banishing many diseases, and help feed the burgeoning population of the world. Woolly mammoths may again roam the tundra. But are there also risks? Might a nightmarish world of bioterrorism and rogue synthetic organisms await? John Parrington reports on the astonishing revolution underway in genetic engineering and why it matters to us all.


Author(s):  
Jorge Sierra Merchán

ResumenEn la discusión sobre las implicaciones éticas de la ingeniería genética, es común establecer una diferencia entre eugenesia negativa y eugenesia positiva. La eugenesia negativa está conformada por procedimientos orientados a corregir defectos genéticos, es decir, a evitar o minimizar la trasmisión de enfermedades hereditarias. La eugenesia positiva consiste en potenciar u optimizar caracteres que se consideran deseables (belleza o inteligencia). Una cosa es reparar, con fines terapéuticos, un error genético y otra cosa es mejorar genéticamente un rasgo que se considera bueno y deseable. En este sentido cabe preguntarse: ¿hay un deber moral de evitar, mediante la ingeniería genética, que los niños nazcan con discapacidades y no se les condene a una vida de desgracia? ¿O hay también un deber moral equivalente de garantizar que los niños posean belleza e inteligencia? El presente texto busca responder ambas cuestiones mediante una evaluación de los argumentos en pro y en contra de la eugenesia desarrollados por Singer y Nussbaum. Sostendré que hay una obligación moral de aplicar la eugenesia negativa, mientras que tal obligación no es extensiva para el caso de la eugenesia positiva. Esto implica que no es posible exigir un presunto derecho a ser desgraciado ni desde el punto de vista de los padres ni desde el punto de vista de los futuros hijos para el caso de la eugenesia negativa, en tanto que para el caso de la eugenesia positiva el derecho a ser desgraciados parece ser más defendible. Palabras clave: Eugenesia, genoma humano, principio preventivo, Singer, Nussbaum**********************************************************Is it possible to claim a alleged right to be disgraced? The “happy world” of eugenicsAbstractIn the discussion about the ethical implications of genetic engineering it is usual to distinguish between negative and positive eugenics. Negative eugenics refers to genetic imperfections correction procedures, which aim to avoid or minimize the transmission of hereditary diseases. Positive eugenics consists in the improvement or optimization of features considered desirable (as beauty or intelligence). One thing is to repair, for therapeutic purposes, a genetic error, and another to genetically improve a feature considered good and desirable. In this sense one could ask if it is a moral duty to avoid, through genetic engineering, impairments in newborns, saving them from an unfortunate life; and if there is also an equivalent moral duty to guarantee that children possess beauty and intelligence. This paper aims to answer both questions through an evaluation of the arguments for and against eugenics proposed by Singer and Nussbaum. I will hold that though there is a moral obligation to apply negative eugenics, this kind of obligation is not present in the case of positive eugenics. This implies that it is not possible to demand a presumed right to be miserable, either from the parent’s or the future children’s point of view, in the case of negative eugenics, although this presumed right to be miserable seems to be more defensible in the case of positive eugenics. Key words: Eugenics, human genome, preventive principle, Singer, Nussbaum.**********************************************************É possível reclamar um alegado direito a ser desgraçado? O “mundo feliz” da eugenesiaResumoNa discussão sobre as implicações éticas da engenharia genética é frequente estabelecer uma diferenciação entre eugenesia negativa e eugenesia positiva. A eugenesia negativa está conformada pelos procedimentos orientados a corrigir defeitos genéticos, ou seja, evitar ou minimizar a transmissão de doenças hereditárias. A eugenesia positiva consiste em potenciar ou aperfeiçoar caracteres que se consideram desejáveis (beleza ou inteligência). Uma coisa é reparar, com fins terapêuticos, um erro genético, e outra coisa é melhorar geneticamente um traço que se considera bom ou desejável, Nesse sentido é possível perguntar: há o dever moral de evitar, mediante a engenharia genética, que as crianças nasçam com incapacidades e não sejam condenados a uma vida de desgraça? Ou há também um dever moral equivalente de que as crianças possuam beleza e inteligência? O presente texto procura responder ambas as questões mediante uma avaliação dos argumentos em prol e em contra da eugenesia desenvolvidos por Singer e Nussbaum. Vou suster que há uma obrigação moral de aplicar a eugenesia negativa, enquanto que tal obrigação não é extensiva para o caso da eugenesia positiva. Isto implica que não é possível exigir um pressuposto direito a ser desgraçado nem desde o ponto de vista dos pais nem desde o ponto de vista dos futuros filhos no caso da eugenesia negativa, em tanto que no caso da eugenesia positiva o direito a ser desgraçados parece ser mais defendível. Palavras chave: Eugenesia, genoma humano, princípio preventivo, Singer, Nussbaum.


2008 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. D. Godwin ◽  
S. B. Williams ◽  
P. S. Pandit ◽  
H. K. C. Laidlaw

Author(s):  
Britta van Beers

Human genetic engineering and other human enhancement technologies bring about uncertainties and risks on both the physical and the conceptual and intangible levels. Much of the controversy surrounding these emerging technologies is due to the fact that categorical distinctions, such as between person and thing, and chance and choice, are blurred in radical ways. As a consequence, the emergence of biomedical technologies also entails, what could be called, metaphysical risks and symbolic uncertainties. This chapter explores the ways in which imaginings of the future of mankind and mankind itself have found their way into international legal regulation of biomedical technologies through an analysis of recent debates on the international ban on human germline genetic engineering. This prohibition, which is at the heart of international biolaw, is currently being questioned as recent scientific breakthroughs in the field of gene-editing are about to turn human genetic engineering into a reality.


Author(s):  
Vlatko Vedral

Life now seems so robust that it becomes difficult to imagine how it could ever end. Are we now masters of our own destiny? With the robustness of biological information, combined with deliberate genetic engineering, are we capable of adapting to any environment Nature throws at us? Aside from some exceptional force majeure (in which case no payout is guaranteed) is there any condition under which life may end? One of the most topical and interesting discussions is whether life could run out of energy to function. But how could life ever run out of energy; and what does this actually mean? Are we just talking about the Sun dying or natural resources being depleted? The argument is that however life evolves in the future, it is difficult to imagine how it could run without the basic fuel. So if the Sun does die, we may find ourselves in a bit of pickle. However, in my view this hypothesis is entirely incorrect. At the end of the day, regardless of what happens in the Universe, the total energy is always conserved and it is merely our ability to process this energy that remains in question. Regardless of the Sun dying or natural resources being depleted, the same energy still exists within the Universe, and the challenge would then be to find different ways of harnessing it. My argument in this chapter is that life paradoxically ends not when it underdoses on fuel, but, more fundamentally, when it overdoses on ‘information’ (i.e. when it reaches a saturation point and can no longer process any further information). We have all experienced instances where we feel we cannot absorb any more information. The question is: is this fatal? What would you like the epitaph on your tombstone to read when you die? Usually people do not have a strong desire to inscribe anything grand or meaningful themselves, but their close ones, the family, friends, and relatives, choose to write something down to commemorate their loss.


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