The Relationship between Corporate Governance, Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shikha Mittal Shrivastav ◽  
Anjala Kalsie
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Haroon ur Rashid Khan ◽  
Waqas Bin Khidmat ◽  
Osama Al Hares ◽  
Naeem Muhammad ◽  
Kashif Saleem

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency–performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency–performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency–performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized.


2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mejbel Al-Saidi ◽  
Bader Al-Shammari

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure (ownership concentration and ownership composition) and firm performance in Kuwaiti non-financial firms. To this end, it examines the relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration to determine whether the impact of this relationship is conditional on the nature of the large shareholders. Design/methodology/approach – First, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance was tested using ordinary least squares regressions on 618 observations (103 listed firms) from 2005 to 2010; next, the ownership compositions were classified as institutional, government and individuals (families) and their impact on firm performance examined. Findings – The overall concentration ownership by large shareholders showed no impact on firm performance. However, when the type of shareholders was introduced, only the government and individuals (families) ownership categories influenced firm performance. Therefore, certain types of shareholders are better at monitoring, and not all concentration by large shareholders is beneficial to Kuwaiti firms. Research limitations/implications – This study examined only one important aspect of the corporate governance mechanisms, namely, ownership concentration. Thus, further study may include other mechanisms such as board variables, role of debt and shareholders rights in examining the firm performance. This study is limited to the Kuwaiti environment, and thus, next step can be very useful in case of comparing ownership concentration in the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) or across different Arab countries. Practical implications – The results of this study have important implications for the regulators in Kuwait in their efforts to increase the efficiency of the rapidly developing capital markets and in protecting investors and keeping confidence in the economy. They may mandate a corporate governance code to protect minority shareholders. Investors may use the findings to understand Kuwaiti companies. Such findings may assist them to diversify their investment portfolios. Originality/value – This paper extends literature review by investigating the role of large shareholders in the context of a developing country that is characterized by high level of ownership concentration and weak legal protection for investors as well as the absence of code that organized the corporate governance practices.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 597-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Arayssi ◽  
Mohammad Issam Jizi

PurposeThe aim of the paper is to examine the association of corporate governance (CG), the firms’ characteristics and the financial performance of firms operating in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after Arab Spring. The study focuses on CG, exemplified by boards’ composition and ownership structure. It also explores the possible moderating effects of environmental social and governance characteristics (ESG), leverage and size on the relationship between CG and the company’s performance.Design/methodology/approachUsing Thomson-Reuters database, a sample of 67 firms was extracted in the MENA region to measure CG and financial performance post Arab Spring from 2012 to 2016. Panel GLS regression random effects is used to quantify the relationship; robustness is checked by using several alternative regressions and specifications to the performance measure.FindingsThe results reveal that board independence (BI) is negatively correlated with firm profitability but ownership concentration and board gender diversification contribute to profits. When firms that voluntarily form a governance committee are examined, ownership is less concentrated. We obtain a stronger impact of good governance on performance in these firms: board composition, in general, and workers’ satisfaction generate more profits; and undertaking ESG activities become a more dispensable activity. The effect of board size (BS) and forming a governance committee are studied and ensuing recommendations are drawn. In addition, relevant internal control of firms’ characteristics that strongly predict firms’ market values are discussed in the context of agency and stewardship theories.Originality/valueDespite the fact that governance-performance nexus has been extensively discussed and examined, the focus of this volume of research is on western developed countries. The growing economies of the MENA countries, and the limited governance-performance literature in the MENA context have created a demand to understand the governance environment in these countries and its influence on firm’s performance. In this region where firms’ owners are mainly family members, governments and/or institutions, governance is typically weak; moreover, ownership concentration is expected to guarantee good performance, as the role of independent directors becomes ineffective. For firms where ownership is more diluted, a sound governance system should be established to replace ownership concentration, and to more efficiently monitor management, and consequently improve firm performance. Therefore, this study not only contributes a summary of the prevailing corporate structure in MENA. Moreover, it explains the settings where both the stewardship and agency theories apply in MENA firms. Some recommendation on the importance of changes to the existing governance rules are highlighted in terms of more rules requiring board independence, board gender diversity, limits on board size and establishing governance committees.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tolossa Fufa Guluma

AbstractThe paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) measures on firm performance and the role of managerial behavior on the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance using a Chinese listed firm. This study used CG mechanisms measures internal and external corporate governance, which is represented by independent board, dual board leadership, ownership concentration as measure of internal CG and debt financing and product market competition as an external CG measures. Managerial overconfidence was measured by the corporate earnings forecasts. Firm performance is measured by ROA and TQ. To address the study objective, the researcher used panel data of 11,634 samples of Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2018. To analyze the proposed hypotheses, the study employed system Generalized Method of Moments estimation model. The study findings showed that ownership concentration and product market competition have a positive significant relationship with firm performance measured by ROA and TQ. Dual leadership has negative relationship with TQ, and debt financing also has a negative significant association’s with both measures of firm performance ROA and TQ. Moreover, the empirical results also showed managerial overconfidence negatively influences the relationship of board independence, dual leadership, and ownership concentration with firm performance. However, managerial overconfidence positively moderates the impact of debt financing on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and negative influence on debt financing and operational firm performance relationship. These findings have several contributions: first, the study extends the literature on the relationship between CG and a firm’s performance by using the Chinese CG structure. Second, this study provides evidence that how managerial behavioral bias interacts with CG mechanisms to affect firm performance, which has not been studied in previous literature. Therefore, the results of this study contribute to the theoretical perspective by providing an insight into the influencing role of managerial behavior in the relationship between CG practices and firm performance in an emerging markets economy. Hence, the empirical result of the study provides important managerial implications for the practice and is important for policy-makers seeking to improve corporate governance in the emerging market economy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zorica Kalezić

AbstractThe relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance has been the focal point of corporate governance literature and the subject of rather rich empirical literature. However, the current literature lacks uniformity and consensus regarding the nature and direction of this relationship. This research aims to contribute to this literature by investigating the relationship in a small and open transition economy of Montenegro.We use primary data1from the period 2004-2008 to analyse, for the first time, the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in Montenegro. The results support the hypothesis that high ownership concentration enables effective monitoring by investors to protect their interests; i.e. in the specific circumstances of transition, ownership structure may be (temporarily) used as a viable substitute for the still underdeveloped corporate governance framework.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Tuyet Mai Nguyen ◽  
Elaine Evans ◽  
Meiting Lu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of independent directors on firm performance in Vietnam and identify how different types of ownership structure and the presence of controlling shareholders influence the relationship. Design/methodology/approach For a sample of 217 non-financial Vietnam-listed companies during the period from 2010 to 2014, this study uses the ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the relationship between independent directors and firm performance. Two econometric techniques – the fixed effects estimation and the difference in difference estimation – are used to control for endogeneity. The results are also robust to the lag variable of independent directors. Findings The results reveal that independent directors have an overall negative effect on firm operating performance. This finding may be because of information asymmetry, expertise disadvantage and the dominance of ownership concentration that prevent independent directors from fulfilling their monitoring function in governance. The negative relationship between independent directors and firm performance is stronger in firms where the State is a controlling shareholder. Research limitations/implications Findings suggest that changes relating to independent directors, as a response to the new corporate governance code in 2012, do not have a positive effect on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Further reform is required to improve internal control mechanisms and corporate governance systems in Vietnam. Originality/value This is the first study to provide a robust evidence on the relationship between independent directors and firm performance in Vietnam as well as to explore the impact of the type of controlling shareholders on the relationship.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gloria Y. Tian

Using data of Canadian corporations in 1994 and 2003, this study analyzes whether controlling shareholders of corporate pyramid groups, with substantial divergences in ownership and control, negatively or positively impact firm performance. We find some evidence that the combination of ownership concentration and pyramidal structure would lead to inferior firm performance and valuation, but little evidence concerning tunneling within groups. We argue the robust legal environment in Canada that encourages shareholder value maximization could mitigate the negative impact of control enhancing mechanisms on minority public investors.


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