A study on single supervisory mechanism and single resolution mechanism of european banking union

Author(s):  
P. S. Balasubramanya
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Alexander Spence

<p>The rationales for the creation of the European Banking Union (“EBU”), what its objectives are and the main pillars of support for such a scheme, are worthy of investigation.  This article means to critically discuss the various elements of the EBU and determine whether the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, the main pillars underpinning the structure, are robust enough to avert another debt crisis in Europe. At the EBU’s heart lies the Single Rulebook (“SR”), which aims to counter the risk of fragmentation and nationalist tendencies. This inward looking trend became apparent in the recent financial crises, and contributed greatly to them. In an effort to avoid repeating the divisive and disjointed mistakes of the past, the SR is instead looking to provide unity and harmonisation across all participating member states. </p>


Author(s):  
Agnieszka Smoleńska

AbstractCross-border banking presents a unique set of challenges in the EU from the perspective of arranging administrative oversight structures. Structuring cooperation between different EU and national authorities in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies in the internal market. To assess how the existing EU arrangements fare in this regard in the context of EU resolution law, this article comparatively analyses the different models of multilevel administrative cooperation in the post-crisis EU framework. These are specifically the centralised model of the European Banking Union (Single Resolution Mechanism) and the relatively looser networked model of the resolution colleges. The multilevel cooperation under both models is nuanced given the distinct roles of the national resolution authorities, EU agencies and the differentiated status of non-euro area Member States in the EBU (Croatia, Bulgaria). The article’s findings allow to identify specific problems of constitutional nature pertaining to the accountability of administrative cooperation, equality of Member States and the implications of Meroni doctrine’s distortive effects.


Author(s):  
Yener Altunbaş ◽  
Salvatore Polizzi ◽  
Enzo Scannella ◽  
John Thornton

AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk disclosure increased overall following BU but there was a weakening of disclosure by SSM-supervised banks relative to banks supervised by national authorities. We also find that the overall positive effect of the BU on bank disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and in the most troubled economies of the Eurozone (GIPSI countries), while the negative effect on centrally supervised banks is stronger if bank CEOs act also as chairmen (CEO duality). We interpret these findings in light of the fact that the new institutional arrangements for bank supervision under which the ECB relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act gives rise to inefficiencies with respect to the speed and completeness of the information flow between SSM supervised banks and the ECB, which are reflected in bank disclosure practices.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Braendle

Weak corporate governance in financial institutions has been a contributing factor of the financial crisis. The topic has, therefore, become the key priorities of banking supervision, because one of the takeaways was that. The article gives an overview about the newly established European Banking Union and about its structure focusing on the first pillar, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In a second step, the focus is laid on the recent regulatory changes regarding corporate governance, the related supervisory practice and implications for European banks. Overall, the conducted changes in the regulatory framework, especially regarding corporate governance, seem to meet the objective of ensuring safety and soundness of the European banking system. Room for improvement is found regarding proportionality and transparency of the supervisory practices as well as its influence on banks’ profitability.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
Rui do Carmo

Set up in the past few years under the shadow of the Euro debt crisis, the European Banking Union (EBU) has been taking its first steps, aiming to prevent the dreaded repetition of the recent shortcomings of the several components of the European Monetary Union (EMU). By revisiting some specific events that led to the Euro crisis, this paper seeks to provide some insights on the understanding of the set-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), in the context of the broader conjunction of the several instruments put forward to provide the EBU with the resilience to prevent future crises. The text provides a brief background of the events that triggered the need for setting up the EBU, followed by an overview of its different constitutive elements and, finally, a critical analysis of the most prominent aspects of the SSM.


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