scholarly journals Sobre el respeto a la evidencia empírica. McIntyre en La actitud científica.

Daímon ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 189-195
Author(s):  
Mariano Sanjuan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Scientific Attitude ◽  
Scientific Rationality

No hace mucho tiempo, la demarcación, el cambio teórico o la racionalidad científica coloreaban la paleta de la filosofía de la ciencia. Hoy estos problemas son vistos como asuntos clásicos de la disciplina. En La actitud científica, Lee McIntyre renueva el escaparate filosófico recuperando el problema de la demarcación, defendiendo que lo distintivo de la ciencia es “que se preocupa por la evidencia y está dispuesta a modificar sus teorías en función de la evidencia”. Se presentan a continuación una síntesis de la obra y cinco objeciones.   Not long ago, demarcation, theory change and scientific rationality used to clutter up debates on the philosophy of science. These issues are now seen as the classical subjects of the discipline. In The Scientific Attitude, Lee McIntyre revamps the philosophical showcase by taking over the demarcation problem by asserting that “what is distinctive about science is that it cares about evidence and is willing to change its theories on the basis of evidence”. I hereby synthetize his proposal and offer five objections.

Philosophical Analysis; Referents of Names

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Public Language ◽  
Arbitrary Collection

Replacing empirical concepts with unicepts has implications both for philosophical methodology and for some central matters in philosophy of science, plilosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. This chapter gives illustrations that concern the fixing of referents of naming words in a public language, the method of philosophical analysis, referential constancy of names for theoretical objects over theory change, the distinction between so-called “observational concepts” and “theoretical concepts,” and last, so-called “theory of mind.” This is a somewhat arbitrary collection of apparent implications of embracing unicepts, but the discussions of the “observation-theory” distinction and of “theory of mind” will be needed when discussing both perception and the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

The Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Attitude, II

1949 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-336
Author(s):  
Brian Coffey ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Attitude

Introduction

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Alister E. McGrath
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Language ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Scientific Rationality ◽  
Conceptual Space ◽  
The World ◽  
Major Transformation ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Opening Up

Philip Clayton opens his 1989 study of the concept of explanation in physics and theology with an arresting and engaging statement: ‘For believers, religious beliefs help to explain the world and their place within it.’1 For Clayton, this represents both a reliable summary of the consensus of religious believers, and a legitimate option within the changing intellectual landscape of that age. Clayton rightly emphasizes the radical changes in scholarly understanding of rationality which lay behind his book. The school of logical positivism, dominant in the early 1930s and still influential in the 1960s, left no conceptual space for ‘rational’ discussion of beliefs about God, generally taking the view that religious language could not be cognitively meaningful. Yet major transformation in the philosophy of science began to take place during the 1950s, as positivist accounts of reality were gradually displaced by contextualist or coherence-based theories of scientific rationality, opening up new possibilities of dialogue between theology and the philosophy of science....

Popper and Liberalism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Scientific Rationality ◽  
Constitution Building ◽  
Epistemological Views ◽  
Rationality Of Science

This chapter examines Karl Popper's commitment to political liberalism and its connection to his account on the rationality of science. It begins with the observation that liberalism must place a high value on liberty and equality, noting Popper's claim that although equality might be a good thing, it was excessively costly in terms of liberty. The sort of equality Popper has in mind is something like equality of wealth or income. The chapter also explains what kind of liberalism is espoused by Popper and considers his defensive view of democracy and constitution building, as well as his negative utilitarianism. It concludes with the argument that Popper's account of scientific rationality is political and that what sustains his commitment to some awkward epistemological views is his liberalism. That is, it is not so much that Popper's philosophy of science supports his liberalism as that it expresses it.

How and Why I Write History of Science

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 573-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem Fisch
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Rationality ◽  
Philosophical Position ◽  
Testing Ground ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Methodology Of Science

I have always been a philosopher at heart. I write history of science and history of its philosophy primarily as a philosopher wary of his abstractions and broad conceptualizations. But that has not always been the case. Lakatos famously portrayed history of science as the testing ground for theories of scientific rationality. But he did so along the crudest Hegelian lines that did injury both to Hegel and to the history and methodology of science. Since science is ultimately rational, he argued, rival methodologies can prove their mettle by competing for whose tendentiously reconstructed account of the history of science renders more of it rational! (Lakatos 1971). My own approach to the relationship between history and philosophy of science started out perhaps a little more open-mindedly than Lakatos's, but in a manner no less crude. Over the years the relationship between the history I wrote and the philosophy to which I was committed took on a firmer and more reciprocal shape. It did so in the course of a process that I now realize exemplified the philosophical position it eventually yielded. I would like to trace that development in the following pages and reflect as best I can on where it has led and left me.

Novelty and Reality

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-230
Author(s):  
Johannes Lenhard
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Modeling ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Human Activity ◽  
Major Part ◽  
Scientific Rationality ◽  
Science Technology ◽  
New Type ◽  
The Relationship

This last chapter summarizes the findings presented in earlier chapters, and the major part of the chapter presents an outlook on critical challenges for a philosophy of simulation. One of these challenges is to take into account the science–technology nexus. Another is to account for the relationship between human activity and reality that results from this nexus. This makes it necessary to rethink the instrumentalism versus realism divide in the philosophy of science. It is argued that simulation evades the stalemate of this divide. Finally, this chapter provides an outlook on rationality. To the extent that mathematization forms a constitutive part of modern scientific rationality, the philosophy of simulation faces the question whether and how the new type of mathematical modeling affects and potentially changes the conception of rationality.

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