scholarly journals The French System of Antitrust Enforcement: A Sui Generis Monist Model

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
Andrea Pezza
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Clear Separation ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Enforcement

The paper examines strengths and weakness of the French system of competition enforcement, with the aim of contributing to the discussion on the institutional design of systems of competition law enforcement. In this regard, special attention will be devoted to choosing to introduce a clear separation between investigative and adjudicative functions within the same institution: while this solution ensures compliance with the impartiality principle, it also implies a lack of coordination between the board and the investigative services, which could have negative consequences for the administrative activity of the institution.

13 Enforcement

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
General Public ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Financial Resources ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
The Government ◽  
Judicial Expertise ◽  
Policy Failures

This chapter explores the myriad difficulties and obstacles for competition law enforcement in developing countries and suggests possible solutions to some of these difficulties. Competition culture is generally lacking in developing countries. In addition, developing country authorities often face a particularly challenging enforcement environment due to past policy failures by the government, especially in the context of privatization. Another major external impediment to effective competition law enforcement is the lack of political will on the part of the government to enforce the law. The chapter also looks at the lack of authority independence, financial resources, enforcement powers, availability of data, and judicial expertise. Institutional design can have a bearing on setting of enforcement priorities. Poor institutional design may take flexibility away from the authority and make it impossible for the authority to set enforcement priorities. Apart from enforcement, however, another very important part of an authority’s work is advocacy. It is through advocacy with the general public that the authority can hope to build a competition culture. Meanwhile, it is through advocacy with the government that the authority can ensure government policies do not create intractable competition problems that are beyond the capability of the authority to solve. The chapter then considers the benefits and limitations of a regional approach to competition law enforcement. Enforcement and procedure

scholarly journals Collecting Evidence Through Access to Competition Authorities’ Files – Interplay or Potential Conflicts Between Private and Public Enforcement Proceedings?

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 161-180
Author(s):  
Anna Gulińska
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Private Action ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Access To Documents

Information asymmetry between claimants seeking damages for competition law violations and the alleged infringing undertaking(s) is a key problem in the development of private antitrust enforcement because it often prevents successful actions for damages. The Damages Directive is a step forward in the facilitation of access to evidence relevant for private action claims. Its focus lies on, inter alia, 3rd party access to files in proceedings conducted by national competition authorities (NCAs). The harmonization was triggered by the inconsistencies in European case-law and yet the uniform rules on access to documents held in NCAs’ files proposed in the Damages Directive seem to follow a very stringent approach in order to protect public competition law enforcement. The article summarizes the most relevant case-law and new provisions of the Damages Directive and presents practical issues with respect to its implementation from the Polish perspective

The Emerging Contribution of Director Disqualification in UK Competition Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 283-310
Author(s):  
Peter Whelan
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Enforcement Mechanism ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Normative Role ◽  
Competition Enforcement

Peter Whelan assesses a developing and increasingly significant enforcement tool in the UK competition authority’s armoury in Chapter 11. In it, Whelan notes that the enforcement of UK competition law is deterrence-focused and comprises both criminal and non-criminal (i.e. civil/administrative) elements. The chapter concentrates on the non-criminal enforcement apparatus that has been developed over the last twenty years. More specifically, it critically evaluates a particular enforcement mechanism that has been gaining increasing importance throughout the recent development of UK competition enforcement practice: the use of director disqualification. It first establishes the normative role of director disqualification in the UK’s armoury of non-criminal antitrust sanctions (i.e. its complementing of the deterrent function of corporate antitrust fines), following which it highlights their potential for performing this role effectively. It then outlines the legal basis for the use of director disqualification within the UK and evaluates the policy and enforcement practice to date with respect to such orders, before proceeding to outline some of the insights that the UK director disqualification regime can provide to other jurisdictions. Ultimately it concludes that, on the basis of the promising, albeit nascent, UK experience to date, director disqualification should be seriously considered by jurisdictions that wish to operate a robust competition law enforcement regime.

A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/2003 and the modernization of competition procedure

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Radical Reform ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Ec Competition Law

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.

Super platforms, big data, and competition law: the Japanese approach in contrast with the USA and EU

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiaki Takigawa
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Essential Facility ◽  
Share Data ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Data Portability ◽  
Efficiency Effects

ABSTRACT This article examines antitrust issues concerning digital platforms equipped with big data. Recent initiatives by the Japanese competition agency are highlighted, comparing them with those by the USA and EU competition authorities. First examined is whether competition among platforms would result in a select few super platforms with market power, concluding that AI with machine learning has augmented the power of super platforms with strong AI-capability, leading to increased importance of merger control over acquisitions by platforms. Next scrutinized is the argument for utility-regulation to be imposed on super platforms, concluding that wide support is limited to data portability, leaving competition law as the key tool for addressing super platforms, its core tool being the provision against exclusionary conduct, enforcement of which, initially, concerns whether to order super platforms to render their data accessible to their rivals. Passive refusal-to-share data needs to be scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine. Beyond passive refusal, platforms’ exclusionary conduct requires competition agencies to weigh the conduct’s exclusionary effects against its efficiency effects. Finally addressed is exploitative abuse, explaining its relation to consumer protection, concluding that competition law enforcement on exploitative abuse should be minimized, since it accompanies risk of over-enforcement.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document