13 Enforcement

Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter explores the myriad difficulties and obstacles for competition law enforcement in developing countries and suggests possible solutions to some of these difficulties. Competition culture is generally lacking in developing countries. In addition, developing country authorities often face a particularly challenging enforcement environment due to past policy failures by the government, especially in the context of privatization. Another major external impediment to effective competition law enforcement is the lack of political will on the part of the government to enforce the law. The chapter also looks at the lack of authority independence, financial resources, enforcement powers, availability of data, and judicial expertise. Institutional design can have a bearing on setting of enforcement priorities. Poor institutional design may take flexibility away from the authority and make it impossible for the authority to set enforcement priorities. Apart from enforcement, however, another very important part of an authority’s work is advocacy. It is through advocacy with the general public that the authority can hope to build a competition culture. Meanwhile, it is through advocacy with the government that the authority can ensure government policies do not create intractable competition problems that are beyond the capability of the authority to solve. The chapter then considers the benefits and limitations of a regional approach to competition law enforcement. Enforcement and procedure

Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter offers a coherent approach to competition law enforcement in developing countries. The promotion of economic growth and development should be the paramount objective of competition law enforcement in developing countries. However, ascribing the objective of the promotion of economic growth and development to competition law enforcement in developing countries does not require a detraction from a focus on promoting competition. In addition, competition law enforcement in developing countries must abide by the principle of causing no harm to the poor in society. If a developing country decides to pursue industrial policy, its competition authority may be asked to balance between competition and industrial policy objectives. Ultimately, competition law enforcement in developing countries must take into account the economic characteristics of developing countries as well as the enforcement capacity of developing country authorities.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This book explores the relationship between competition law and economic development, which takes on growing importance as more and more developing countries have adopted competition law in recent years. The work tackles two principal questions. The first is whether competition law enforcement promotes growth, which helps to determine how seriously developing countries should enforce their competition laws. The second is how developing countries should craft their competition law rules in light of the need to incorporate development concerns, the need to reflect the special economic characteristics of developing countries, and the need to improve the administrability of competition law rules to suit the enforcement capacity of developing country authorities.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter argues that there is no one universal approach to competition law and that the design and enforcement of competition law needs to take into account the political, economic, and social circumstances of the country. Given the overwhelming obstacles to attaining economic growth and development, economic policies in a developing country must be tailored to maximize the prospect of growth and development. This means that competition law enforcement should aim to promote growth and meet development needs, even if this may lead to conflict with other objectives of competition law such as the protection of consumer welfare and the pursuit of economic efficiency. Moreover, the various classifications of developing countries suggest that there is significant diversity among them. Indeed, there are likely to be significant differences in terms of market conditions among developing countries. Thus, it is unlikely that there is a single approach to competition law enforcement suitable for all of them.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This introductory chapter provides an overview of competition law in developing countries. Following the proliferation of competition law across the globe in the last few decades, developing countries now comprise a majority of the jurisdictions that have in place a competition law. At least in terms of the language of the main substantive provisions on restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance, many of these new jurisdictions have chosen to follow the U.S. and the EU models. However, the proliferation of competition law regimes has given rise to a fear of balkanization of competition law enforcement and an excessive compliance burden for businesses, especially multi-national corporations. Out of this fear grew the rallying cry for convergence. The implicit assumption behind the drive for convergence is that there exists one or a handful of models of competition law enforcement that are suitable for most countries across the globe, to which new jurisdictions are expected to converge. Some commentators and officials have challenged this, questioning whether the legal principles regulating markets in the industrialized economies of the United States and the European Union can be transplanted directly to developing countries. Apart from the need to tailor to the local economic environment, competition law must contribute to the economic growth and development agenda of developing countries.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
Andrea Pezza

The paper examines strengths and weakness of the French system of competition enforcement, with the aim of contributing to the discussion on the institutional design of systems of competition law enforcement. In this regard, special attention will be devoted to choosing to introduce a clear separation between investigative and adjudicative functions within the same institution: while this solution ensures compliance with the impartiality principle, it also implies a lack of coordination between the board and the investigative services, which could have negative consequences for the administrative activity of the institution.


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