scholarly journals The Condition of Fault in Private Enforcement of Competition Law – a Comparative Analysis of U.S. v. Polish and European Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 71-97
Author(s):  
Marta Mackiewicz ◽  

The purpose of the Polish Act on Claims for Damages for Remedying the Damage Caused by Infringements of Competition Law, based on and implementing EU law – the Damages Directive, was to enable undertakings to effectively use private enforcement of their damages claims from competition law offenders. Infringement of competition law is classified as a tort according to the said Act on Claims. Therefore, the Act on Claims refers to tort liability rules. The conditions of classic tort liability in domestic law do not have exactly the same dogmatic meaning and scope as the conditions of public or private liability for the infringements of domestic and EU competition law. In practice, their application by national courts may rise many questions regarding conformity between domestic and EU law. This paper aims to analyse one of the key conditions of tort liability, that is, the fault of both the undertaking – the offenders, as well as the fault of their governing bodies and officers. If one were to understand the notion of fault within the limits laid down by civil law, and follow the literal wording of the Polish Civil Code’s provisions referring to the fault condition, the efficiency of private enforcement of damage claims arising from infringements of competition law would be doubtful. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide the readers with such an interpretation of the notion of fault, as a condition of liability of undertakings, that the legislative purpose of the Act on Claims is achieved and that the principles of efficiency and equivalence of the EU law are observed. In order to present a comprehensive picture, this paper will also discuss the case law of the CJEU concerning ‘anti-trust fault’, accompanied by a comparative analysis of the German and French approach to the fault condition as well as United States antitrust laws in the same area.

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have become a pattern for competition rules provided in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994. Both EU competition law and EEA competition law can be enforced before national courts. Lodging damage claims in the EU was facilitated by Directive 2014/104/EU. The so-called Antitrust Damages Directive was highly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Although Directive 2014/104/EU has not been incorporated into the EEA law, damage claims resulting from violations of EEA competition rules are judged by national courts in the EEA Member States, which is why some aspects of private enforcement of competition law have become a point of interest for the EFTA Court, being – together with the Court of Justice of the European Union – the EEA court. Firstly, the article aims at checking if the EFTA Court jurisprudence on antitrust damage claims follows the guidelines formulated in the case law of the Court of Justice. Since the positive answer to this question is highly probable, secondly, the article aims at identifying the extent of the impact of EU jurisprudence in private enforcement cases on judgments of the EFTA Court. The article concludes that the EFTA Court’s activities regarding antitrust damage claims follow the route indicated by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Four identified judgments regarding – directly or indirectly – antitrust damage claims (Nye Kystlink, Fjarskipti, Schenker I and Schenker V), delivered by the EFTA Court, seem to strengthen its position as an institution that is able to guarantee a coherence between EEA and EU competition law. EFTA Court’s judgments in private enforcement cases are also a point of interest and reference for EU Advocates General and can become an inspiration for both EU and national case law.


Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).


Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens

The adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules has marked the beginning of a new era in the field of the private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The arduous legislative journey leading to the adoption of the Directive, the specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of damages actions covered by it and its attempt to establish an effective coordination between the systems of public and private enforcement have already received intense attention by antitrust scholars. However, this contribution will focus on the study of the Directive’s significance as a novel legal instrument in both the fields of EU competition law and EU law in general.


Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter sets the context for the EU’s Antitrust Damages Directive of 2014 in order to understand its significance and potential impact. It first provides a historical background to EU competition law before discussing its public enforcement, focusing on the traditional role of the European Commission in enforcing the EU competition law rules. It then considers developments in EU law private enforcement, citing the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and European Commission in seeking to promote and facilitate private enforcement, particularly damages actions. It also examines the experience of damages actions in the EU, the issue of collective redress, the US antitrust private enforcement context and experience, and EU private international law rules and their significance for raising damages actions across the Member States’ courts. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the development of competition law damages actions under EU law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz

On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory and legislative works preceding the Directive. The paper discusses also some of the remedies that have not been harmonised, and shows how these ‘gaps’ in harmonisation may limit the Directive’s expected influence on both the thinking and practice of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. It is argued in conclusion that further harmonisation may be needed in order to actually transform private enforcement of EU competition law before national courts


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 720-728
Author(s):  
Csongor István Nagy

The private enforcement of EU competition law has been in the center of scholarly discourse for almost two decades. Recently, the CJEU, with its ruling adopted in Vantaa v. Skanska and others, opened a new chapter in the history of EU competition law’s private enforcement. The Court held that the conditions of the existence of this right are questions of EU law and should be given an autonomous meaning. The judgment is revolutionary in terms of conceptualization and, as such, it is expected to have a considerable impact on substantive issues in the future. This signals the advent of a uniform regime of European ‘private competition law,’ which limits the role of national rules to the exercise of the right to compensation.


Author(s):  
Holzwarth Johannes

This chapter explores the cooperation between the European Commission and Member States’ courts that apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The risk of inconsistent interpretations of EU competition rules renders cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts crucial, particularly due to the role that such courts play when it comes to the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at the national level: in the era of decentralisation, it is the national courts that will ultimately be called upon to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU either directly, or when reviewing national authorities’ decisions based on those provisions. The central role that the Commission retains for the enforcement of EU competition law means that it has a particularly strong interest in ensuring effective cooperation with national courts. Moreover, the importance of cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts is further increasing due to the rise of private enforcement. This type of enforcement is generally associated with civil actions and damages awarded by national courts or tribunals.


Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter reflects on how the book has examined the implementation of the EU's Antitrust Damages Directive across a selected number of key Member States and how its transposition has impacted on one particular aspect of the EU competition law enforcement framework: private enforcement through competition damages claims. It has discussed the national transposition processes, debates, and final measures introduced and implemented, and how best to incorporate the Directive within the pre-existing national legal provision, as well as considering some of the key problems in implementing the Directive. A number of unresolved and complicated issues have been identified, such as those relating to the practical application of the rules on the presumption of harm, passing-on and quantification of damages, how to determine liability within groups of companies, how to apportion joint and several liability between co-infringers, and consumer/collective redress in the competition law context.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lena Hornkohl

The main issue that is still disrupting private enforcement of competition law is the calculation of damages. The 2014 Damages Directive contains some alleviations. Particularly Article 17(2) Damages Directive foresees a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm. Despite the clear statement in Recital 47 Damages Directive that this presumption should not cover the concrete amount of harm and studies that vary significantly regarding the typical overcharge, some Member States have created presumptions related to the amount of harm. Other Member States want to expand the presumption to non-cartel violations. This article takes a comparative analysis of the different Member States approaches and attempts to test the Damages Directive and EU competition law boundaries more generally. The article takes a sceptical perspective on some of the Member States’ approaches and proposes other solutions to ease the predicaments of damage quantifications: (i) a focus on illicit gains, (ii) amending the calculation guidelines and create a EU-wide competition damages database, (iii) create further procedural measures, such as collective redress instruments, special legal venues for private enforcement of competition law and expert judges, and (iv) foster further party-led solutions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document