scholarly journals Ce qui est abusif au sens de l'article 8 de la Charte canadienne lors de la recherche de preuves

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 965-982
Author(s):  
Bernard Auger
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Section 8 ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Liberal Approach ◽  
Compliance With The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
Minimum Criteria

In determining whether legislation permitting search and seizure properly meets the requirements of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts have been obliged to balance the right of the individual to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure with the right of the state to ensure compliance with the law. In Hunter v. Southam, the Supreme Court of Canada established the minimum criteria of reasonable search and seizure for the purposes of section 8. The liberal approach adopted by the Supreme Court raises an important question : Should the same criteria apply to administrative statutes empowering bodies to conduct inquiries and inspections ? The author compares section 8 of the Charter with the American 4th Amendment, examining the requirement for search warrants in the light of Canadian cases. He then examines and discusses the case law concerning the applicability of section 8 to statutory provisions relating to the production of documents and the standard of reasonableness that should apply to these situations.

The Right to Assisted Dying: Constitutional Jurisprudence and Its Impact in Canada, Germany and Austria

ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Assisted Dying ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

scholarly journals Was the Supreme Court right to change the law on the right to a speedy trial?

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reasonable Time ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.

The Charter in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Importance of Which Judges Hear an Appeal

1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew D. Heard
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Practical Impact

AbstractA traditional focus on the collective, institutional operation of the Supreme Court of Canada has obscured the practical impact on the Charter of Rights of the personal views held by the individual members of the Court. A study of all the Charter cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1983 to 1989 reveals a profound divergence of opinions within the Court. The differences are seen not only in each judge's overall support for Charter claims but also in the patterns of agreement between bilateral pairings of judges who have heard the same cases. The use of subsets of judges to sit on panels to hear Charter cases has meant that both the outcome of Charter cases and the content of our rights have depended to a large extent upon which judges happened to sit on the panels that heard the cases.

The Compensation of Wrongful Pregnancy in Québec Civil Law

1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Louise Langevin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Child Rearing ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reproductive Autonomy ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cost

AbstractThe Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the right to reproductive autonomy for women based on the right to liberty protected by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, it is a woman's choice whether to have children. It follows, therefore, that in the case of a violation of her reproductive autonomy, a woman has a right to compensation. It is in light of these principles that I analyze the wrongful pregnancy cases in Québec civil law. From a feminist analytical framework, I posit that Québec courts have effectively denied women the right to reproductive autonomy by awarding compensation for the cost of child-rearing only in cases where a difficult economic situation is evidenced by the parents. In so doing, the courts have not only refused to fully compensate women for the injuries caused to them, but they continue to reproduce the dominant pronatalist ideology in reproductive matters. This judicial reaction to cases of wrongful pregnancy is another example of the gendered dimension of law.

scholarly journals The Supreme Court of Canada, the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and Administrative Law

1969 ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
D. H. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Mumbo Jumbo ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual

The Supreme Court of Canada's contribution to the jurisprudence of administra tive law has been weak and fitful, erratic and lacking in attention to the principles of its own previous decisions. Failure to articulate points of distinction between its decisions has led to uncertainty in the law. The speaker suggested that the insufficiency of the Court's reasoning and the inadequacy of its citation might be reduced if judgments were more often delivered by more members of the Court thus increasing the individual research and writing of the Court so that its earlier fcmons would be kept in view and the case law developed more coherently. Furthermore, the Court should foUow the House of Lords in not considering itself bound by ds own decisions. The speaker regretted the Court's tendency to take mechanically conceptualise approach to substantive administrative law issues- if Canadian courts are to keep pace with those of other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Canada cannot continue to use outworn mumbo-jumbo as substitute for identifyltZtJ «»*"*»* societal interests that are the stuff of /hefPe?kfr aho discussed and compared the contributions of the House of Lords and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Although it has fewer members the House of Lords has more dissenters in administrative law decisions than the Supreme Court of Canada, (whereas the Privy Council until 1966 could not have dissent). While the S.C.C. has been inconsistent and weak, the Privy Council has been consistent and weak. Although there have been occasional achievements, between 1951 and 1971 the Privy Council rendered series of regressive decisions that impaired coherent development of the administrative law in England and in the Commonwealth. ReidZhh^ i*' f" H0USe °f Lof* under the influenc* of the late Lord h^'^nuJf has enjoyed as most creative °n TegreSSiVe period inPrivy relation Council to public decisions> law si™ However *• earlyhaknZd 1960's mnnt rxiicc ft ££Icrt has*eenperfo

scholarly journals Privacy in the Age of the Internet: Lawful Access Provisions and Access to ISP and OSP Subscriber Information

2016 ◽  
pp. 709
Author(s):  
Graham Mayeda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Privacy And Security ◽  
Internet Service ◽  
Section 8 ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
C 30 ◽  
The Right

Bill C-30 (the Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act) and the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act are two recent attempts by the Canadian government to create incentives for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Online Service Providers (OSPs) to disclose the subscriber information of Internet users to government agencies. In this article, the author argues that while such provisions may not violate section 8 of the Charter based on current judicial interpretation, they ought to be found unconstitutional. To date, the Supreme Court of Canada’s search and seizure jurisprudence uses a normative framework that does not distinguish between defining the right to privacy and justifying limitations to it. This approach is not consistent with that taken for other Charter rights. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court in R v. Spencer and R v. Fearon may signal a slight shift, but they do not go far enough. If courts defined privacy interests more broadly than under current law and required the government to justify restrictions on these interests under section 1, this would create a legal regime that achieves a better balance between competing privacy and security interests.

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

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