scholarly journals July Fudge and Eric Tucker. Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action in Canada, 1900–1948

2001 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-68
Author(s):  
Steven High
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Javier Auyero ◽  
Katherine Sobering

Residents in Arquitecto Tucci believe that the police are part of their problems in their neighborhood. Continuing the thick description of everyday life in Arquitecto Tucci, this chapter examines different expressions of the shared belief that police officers are seen not only as abusive and extortive but also as actively complicit with criminals. It finds that suspicions of collusion have bred a deep collective distrust in the police and contributed to a shared cynicism toward the law that pervades everyday life. It then shows how these attitudes constrain residents’ recourse against violence, finding that when they become the victims of crimes, residents do not call the police, but instead choose either not to act or to solve their problems through alternative channels or collective action.



2004 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 257
Author(s):  
Todd McCallum ◽  
Judy Fudge ◽  
Eric Tucker
Keyword(s):  


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luisa Béjar

RESUMEN: El principal argumento de este escrito es que la heterogeneidad de los diseños institucionales que prima en el campo electoral en América Latina (Carroll y Shugart, 2005) también se reproduce en el parlamentario. El perfil morfológico del sistema de comisiones propio de cada Congreso y el lugar que la ley les asigna en el proceso legislativo son prueba evidente de ello. Mientras el marco normativo de algunas legislaturas no deja lugar a dudas en cuanto a la intención de delegar en los partidos las decisiones encomendadas a estos cuerpos; en otros casos, ello ocurre en menor medida. En los casos formalmente ceñidos a una lógica de partido, por otra parte, se alientan esquemas de delegación de corte muy diverso. En este escrito se revisa el acomodo institucional del sistema de comisiones de la Cámara Baja en: Argentina; Bolivia; Brasil; Colombia; Chile; México; Paraguay; República Dominicana y Uruguay. En este sentido, el estudio examina tanto la importancia concedida a su trabajo, como algunos aspectos de su morfología que afectan la estructura de incentivos que acota el desarrollo del proceso legislativo. Asimismo, se analizan los procedimientos utilizados en cada Congreso para enfrentar los problemas de acción colectiva. Por último, se presentan algunas ideas para la elaboración de una futura taxonomía sobre la relación que guardan en la región los partidos y las comisiones permanentes del Congreso.ABSTRACT: The main argument of this paper is that the heterogeneity of the institutional framework that prevails in Latin America’s electoral field (Carroll y Shugart, 2005), also reproduces itself in the parliamentary one. This is proved by the morphologic profile of each Congress’ commission system and the place that the law assigns to the system. While some legislative frameworks clearly intend to delegate to parties the decisions entrusted to this bodies; in other cases, this takes place in a less important way. In the cases formally related with a party logic, on the other hand, diverse delegation schemes are encouraged. In this article we analyze the institutional framework of the commission systems of the low chamber in: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Chile; Mexico; Paraguay; Dominican Republic and Uruguay. In this sense, this work examines the importance given to their job and some aspects of its morphology that affect the structure of incentives that narrows the development of the legislative process. We also analyze the procedures used by each Congress to solve its problems of collective action. Lastly, some ideas for the elaboration of a future taxonomy on the relationship between parties and permanent commissions in the region are presented.



2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 456-492
Author(s):  
Neil Boister ◽  
Martin Jelsma

Abstract Legal tensions are growing as more jurisdictions move towards legal regulation of the cannabis market in contravention of the obligation under UN drug control treaties to limit cannabis exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Reaching a global consensus to amend the conventions does not appear to be a viable political option in the foreseeable future. Amongst the limited options not requiring consensus, inter se modification – based on article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – provides a useful safety valve for collective action to adjust a treaty regime arguably frozen in time. Restrictions imposed on inter se modification require a clear commitment to the original treaty aim to promote the health and welfare of humankind and to the original treaty obligations vis-à-vis states not party to the agreement. A coordinated collective response has benefits compared to a chaotic scenario of multiple unilateral reservations and questionable re-interpretations.



Art Attacks ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 271-304
Author(s):  
Malvika Maheshwari

Chapter 6 explores the dynamics of this form of collective action, which might be best characterized as the violence of offence-taking, along with exploring the role and motivations of individuals at the forefront of these attacks—to bring out the inconsistencies of what is otherwise passed off as an all-encompassing chronicle of communal and ethno-religious tensions or as party politics. The chapter presents narratives of three attackers with special emphasis on the micro-political make-up of this violence, underlined by a common thread—namely, the search for glory, recognition, and dignity through the interiorization and creative appropriation of a cult of the hero and role model. Reiterating the central argument of the book, the language of the Indian Constitution—assuring its citizens dignity, respect, and equality—emerges here as an enabling technique for attackers to indulge their violent rage, taking on a particularly perverse form in a state that already suffers from weak enforcement of the law.



Author(s):  
Martha Elba Izquierdo Muciño ◽  
Enrique Uribe Arzate

La Ley federal de Protección al Consumidor (LFPC) de 1975, que creó a la Procuraduría Federal del Consumidor (PROFECO), había considerado de manera incipiente la forma de representar a los consumidores en forma colectiva ante las autoridades judiciales, lo cierto es que en treinta años de existencia, la PRO FECO no había presentado acciones de grupo, lo empezó a hacer hasta 2007 en diversos procedimientos judiciales para que los afectados pudieran recuperar el dinero que habían perdido y fueran indemnizados conforme a la ley . Es por esta situación que la PROFECO ha visto con agrado la modificación al artículo 17 constitucional, pues a través de las acciones colectivas se evitará la presentación de numerosas demandas individuales, con la garantía de una mejor impartición de justicia.The federal Law for Consumers Protection (Ley Federal de Proteccion al Consumidor, LFPC) created in 1975 the «Procuraduria Federal del Consumidor (PROFECO)» with the main intention to represent to the consumers in a collective way in front of the Justice authorities. However during its 30 years of creation the PROFECO did not represent any group activities until year 2007 in a diverse of judicial procedures where the victims could recover their lost money and were compensated according the Law. Is for this situation that PROFECO has seen in a gently way the modification of Article No. 17 from the Mexican Constitution where the collective action took place instead individual demands to warrant a better justice for all.



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