Power politics and small state survival: the classic balance of power, 1648–1814

Author(s):  
Matthias Maass

How safe was the largely unbridled balance of power of the 17th and 18th centuries for the small state? This chapter shows that the balance of power system was in fact rather permissive and allowed small states to survive in historically large numbers. The loose and fairly unrestrained balance of power system turned out to be a surprisingly safe environment for the small state. The chapter covers the era of the classic balance of power, which is bookended by two major peace summits, the Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, and the Congress of Vienna, held in 1814/15. During this era, the particular balance-of-power that defined it was also the main cause of the moderate decline in small states numbers.

Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller

The balance of power—a notoriously slippery, murky, and protean term, endlessly debated and variously defined—is the core theory of international politics within the realist perspective. A “balance of power” system is one in which the power held and exercised by states within the system is checked and balanced by the power of others. Thus, as a nation’s power grows to the point that it menaces other powerful states, a counter-balancing coalition emerges to restrain the rising power, such that any bid for world hegemony will be self-defeating. The minimum requirements for a balance of power system include the existence of at least two or more actors of roughly equal strength, states seeking to survive and preserve their autonomy, alliance flexibility, and the ability to resort to war if need be. At its essence, balance of power is a type of international order. Theorists disagree, however, about the normal operation of the balance of power. Structural realists describe an “automatic version” of the theory, whereby system balance is a spontaneously generated, self-regulating, and entirely unintended outcome of states pursuing their narrow self-interests. Earlier versions of balance of power were more consistent with a “semi-automatic” version of the theory, which requires a “balancer” state throwing its weight on one side of the scale or the other, depending on which is lighter, to regulate the system. The British School’s discussion of balance of power depicts a “manually operated” system, wherein the process of equilibrium is a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen, a sense of community of nations, of shared responsibility, and a desire and need to preserve the balance of power system. As one would expect of a theory that made its appearance in the mid-16th century, balance of power is not without its critics. Liberals claim that globalization, democratic peace, and international institutions have fundamentally transformed international relations, moving it out of the realm of power politics. Constructivists claim that balance of power theory’s focus on material forces misses the central role played by ideational factors such as norms and identities in the construction of threats and alliances. Realists, themselves, wonder why no global balance of power has materialized since the end of the Cold War.


Author(s):  
Matthias Maass

In the previous chapters, it has been demonstrated how over more than 3 ½ centuries, the fate of small states has depended first of all on the states system. This chapter concludes the investigation with the key finding, that small state survival and proliferation are largely system-dependent phenomena. It is pointed out that the small state’s dependency and its structural irrelevance in a world of power are critical to properly understanding the issue of small state survival. On the one hand, small states are units that don’t matter much to the system. On the other hand, small states’ survival is to a good degree predetermined by the particular system in which they exist, but which they cannot shape.


Author(s):  
Matthias Maass

The 4th chapter starts with the Congress of Vienna 1814/15 and moves the discussion to the eve of the First World War. At Vienna, the so-called concert system was introduced, and it structured most of 19th century international politics. But how did the small state fare in the 19th century system? During the first half of the century, small state numbers continued to erode before the all but collapsed in the later decades of the century. These historic losses of small states, it is argued, stem largely from the particular ‘oligopolistic’ features of the concert system and its key modifiers. Small state survivability decreased as great powers formed a cartel and later split into two hostile camps.


Author(s):  
Matthias Maass

What is the story behind the paradoxical survival of small and weak states in a world of great powers and crude power politics? The answer lies at the system-level: Small states survival is shaped by the international states system. Resting on three main pillars – theory, history, and quantitative analysis – the study’s key findings draw a picture of the small state as highly dependent on the states system in its efforts to survive. The investigation is focused on the causal link between small state survival, abolishment, or proliferation and the states system in its various historical incarnations. This provides the basis for the main argument: Variations in the states system’s main characteristics create noticeable changes in the system’s hospitality toward the small state and thus impact heavily on small state survivability. These dynamics lead to small state creation and termination, which is reflected in and thus explains the large up- or downward changes in the number of small states over time.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Schroeder

Students of international politics do not need to be told of the unsatisfactory state of balance of power theory. The problems are well known: the ambiguous nature of the concept and the numerous ways it has been defined, the various distinct and partly contradictory meanings given to it in practice and the divergent purposes it serves (description, analysis, prescription, and propaganda); and the apparent failure of attempts clearly to define balance of power as a system and specify its operating rules. Not surprisingly, some scholars have become sceptical about the balance of power ‘system’ and a few have even denied that balance of power politics prevailed in the nineteenth century. None of the methods generally used seems to promise much help. These have included studying the views and theories of balance of power held by individual publicists, theorists, and statesmen, making case studies of the balance of power in certain limited periods, analysing events and policies within an assumed balance of power framework, or constructing theoretical analyses comparing the supposed system of balance of power to other systems. Undoubtedly a method for operationalizing the study of the balance of power would be very valuable, and efforts to do this have yielded useful information. But the obstacles to establishing reliable indices of power and status and the problems of quantifying alignments and co-operation-conflict ratios in international affairs are formidable indeed.


Author(s):  
Matthias Maass

How did the small state fare in the 20th century? As it turns out, small states did remarkably well. Surprisingly enough, during the height of the Cold War small state proliferation doubled their total number. The 20th century’s international-political environment became highly permissive of small state survival and in fact strongly supportive of small state proliferation. As a result, the 20th century witnessed the reversal of the centuries-old downward trend in small state numbers. The early 20th century saw the introduction of collective action and security and the beginnings of global governance. After the Second World War, the system evolved further towards global governance but was challenged by the end of the Cold War and rise of global terrorism. The chapter demonstrates how these changes were critical factors in shaping a corresponding story of small state survival. The highly permissive environment of the Cold War and its era of decolonization are given particular attention.


Author(s):  
Matthias Maass

The chapter has to major objectives: First, the chapter works towards a definition of the small states that allows for the collection of statistical data on small state survival across time. This definition is developed in a way consistent with the overall theoretical framework. The small state is defined as a formally equal but structurally irrelevant unit of the system of states. Second, the chapter presents the quantitative data put together on the basis of the definition developed previously. Surveying the data of small state survival over the course of more than 3 ½ centuries, a picture emerges of the historical rise and fall of the small state. This first cut at the picture of small state survival, together with the theoretically-derived definition of the small state provides the basis for the following investigations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 135 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustapha Aachiq ◽  
Joao Gari da Silva Fonseca Junior ◽  
Takashi Oozeki ◽  
Yumiko Iwafune

Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

The end of the Cold War was a “big bang” reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? This book examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. The book explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit “constitutional” characteristics. Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, the book will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.


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