The Balance of Power in World Politics

Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller

The balance of power—a notoriously slippery, murky, and protean term, endlessly debated and variously defined—is the core theory of international politics within the realist perspective. A “balance of power” system is one in which the power held and exercised by states within the system is checked and balanced by the power of others. Thus, as a nation’s power grows to the point that it menaces other powerful states, a counter-balancing coalition emerges to restrain the rising power, such that any bid for world hegemony will be self-defeating. The minimum requirements for a balance of power system include the existence of at least two or more actors of roughly equal strength, states seeking to survive and preserve their autonomy, alliance flexibility, and the ability to resort to war if need be. At its essence, balance of power is a type of international order. Theorists disagree, however, about the normal operation of the balance of power. Structural realists describe an “automatic version” of the theory, whereby system balance is a spontaneously generated, self-regulating, and entirely unintended outcome of states pursuing their narrow self-interests. Earlier versions of balance of power were more consistent with a “semi-automatic” version of the theory, which requires a “balancer” state throwing its weight on one side of the scale or the other, depending on which is lighter, to regulate the system. The British School’s discussion of balance of power depicts a “manually operated” system, wherein the process of equilibrium is a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen, a sense of community of nations, of shared responsibility, and a desire and need to preserve the balance of power system. As one would expect of a theory that made its appearance in the mid-16th century, balance of power is not without its critics. Liberals claim that globalization, democratic peace, and international institutions have fundamentally transformed international relations, moving it out of the realm of power politics. Constructivists claim that balance of power theory’s focus on material forces misses the central role played by ideational factors such as norms and identities in the construction of threats and alliances. Realists, themselves, wonder why no global balance of power has materialized since the end of the Cold War.

Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

The end of the Cold War was a “big bang” reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? This book examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. The book explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit “constitutional” characteristics. Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, the book will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Schroeder

Students of international politics do not need to be told of the unsatisfactory state of balance of power theory. The problems are well known: the ambiguous nature of the concept and the numerous ways it has been defined, the various distinct and partly contradictory meanings given to it in practice and the divergent purposes it serves (description, analysis, prescription, and propaganda); and the apparent failure of attempts clearly to define balance of power as a system and specify its operating rules. Not surprisingly, some scholars have become sceptical about the balance of power ‘system’ and a few have even denied that balance of power politics prevailed in the nineteenth century. None of the methods generally used seems to promise much help. These have included studying the views and theories of balance of power held by individual publicists, theorists, and statesmen, making case studies of the balance of power in certain limited periods, analysing events and policies within an assumed balance of power framework, or constructing theoretical analyses comparing the supposed system of balance of power to other systems. Undoubtedly a method for operationalizing the study of the balance of power would be very valuable, and efforts to do this have yielded useful information. But the obstacles to establishing reliable indices of power and status and the problems of quantifying alignments and co-operation-conflict ratios in international affairs are formidable indeed.


Author(s):  
Matthias Maass

How safe was the largely unbridled balance of power of the 17th and 18th centuries for the small state? This chapter shows that the balance of power system was in fact rather permissive and allowed small states to survive in historically large numbers. The loose and fairly unrestrained balance of power system turned out to be a surprisingly safe environment for the small state. The chapter covers the era of the classic balance of power, which is bookended by two major peace summits, the Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, and the Congress of Vienna, held in 1814/15. During this era, the particular balance-of-power that defined it was also the main cause of the moderate decline in small states numbers.


2015 ◽  
Vol 135 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustapha Aachiq ◽  
Joao Gari da Silva Fonseca Junior ◽  
Takashi Oozeki ◽  
Yumiko Iwafune

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Chin-Hao Huang ◽  
David C. Kang

Abstract State formation occurred in Korea and Japan 1,000 years before it did in Europe, and it occurred for reasons of emulation and learning, not bellicist competition. State formation in historical East Asia occurred under a hegemonic system in which war was relatively rare, not under a balance-of-power system with regular existential threats. Korea and Japan emerged as states between the fifth and ninth centuries CE and existed for centuries thereafter with centralized bureaucratic control defined over territory and administrative capacity to tax their populations, field large militaries, and provide extensive public goods. They created these institutions not to wage war or suppress revolt: the longevity of dynasties in these countries is evidence of both the peacefulness of their region and their internal stability. Rather, Korea and Japan developed state institutions through emulation and learning from China. The elites of both copied Chinese civilization for reasons of prestige and domestic legitimacy in the competition between the court and the nobility.


2002 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Goldfischer

Realist international relations scholars have approached the connection between economics and security in two ways. Cold War-era realists derived the national interest from the international balance of power, and assessed the utility of both military and economic instruments of statecraft. A second realist approach, advanced by E. H. Carr in his 1939 The Twenty Years' Crisis, places interstate competition in the context of another struggle over wealth and power in which no-one's primary concern is the national interest. That is the realm of capitalism (and resistance to capitalism). That deeper set of connections between economics and security was overlooked in Cold War IR literature, at considerable cost to our understanding of world politics. Understanding why Carr's ‘historical realism’ was bypassed can help pave the way for a more fruitful realist approach to comprehending a new era in world politics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Beckley

Power is the most important variable in world politics, but scholars and policy analysts systematically mismeasure it. Most studies evaluate countries’ power using broad indicators of economic and military resources, such as gross domestic product and military spending, that tally their wealth and military assets without deducting the costs they pay to police, protect, and serve their people. As a result, standard indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries, such as China and India. A sounder approach accounts for these costs by measuring power in net rather than gross terms. This approach predicts war and dispute outcomes involving great powers over the past 200 years more accurately than those that use gross indicators of power. In addition, it improves the in-sample goodness-of-fit in the majority of studies published in leading journals over the past five years. Applying this improved framework to the current balance of power suggests that the United States’ economic and military lead over other countries is much larger than typically assumed, and that the trends are mostly in America's favor.


Author(s):  
Yu Cai ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Bao Zhang ◽  
Wenjian Wu ◽  
Deren Sheng ◽  
...  

Fast valving of ultra-supercritical unit has great effects on over-speed prevention, load-shedding control, transient stability analysis of electrical system and other security problems. The purpose of fast valving is to maintain the stability of power system once fault or load shedding of unit occurs in the electric power system. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the reliability of fast valving for ultra-supercritical unit. In this paper, the KU ( short shedding) logic condition of SIEMENS T3000 system is analyzed as the research object of fast valving. The unit can be avoided over speed by monitoring the unit load and fast valving under faulty grid conditions based on the KU control. A series of measures will be taken after KU is triggered, for instance the governing valving will be closed quickly and the DEH (digital electro-hydraulic) control of the steam turbine will be switched to speeding control mode. On the other hand, the unit will return to normal operation if the transient fault of power grid disappears. The key contributions of this thesis include three parts: Firstly, based on the analysis of control characteristics of ultra-supercritical unit and protective logic and triggered conditions of KU function, a novel dynamic model by coupling the fast valving of steam turbine and the transient stability of generator is established by applying the PSCAD software. Then, the dynamic response process of ultra-supercritical unit is simulated and calculated by adopting the coupling dynamic model when KU function is triggered. Also the influence factors and reliability of fast valving are analyzed under transient fault conditions. Finally, two optimized measures by increasing the time delay and the speed of quantitative judgment are put forward to reduce risks and avoid the misoperation of signal distortion which may be caused by the power transmitter under transient fault conditions. The results of this study can not only help to evaluate the reliability of fast valving function scientifically in power grid transient fault, but also guide the technicians to analyze the stability of the power grid.


2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mousseau

Democracy does not cause peace among nations. Rather, domestic conditions cause both democracy and peace. From 1961 to 2001, democratic nations engaged in numerous fatal conflicts with each other, including at least one war, yet not a single fatal militarized incident occurred between nations with contract-intensive economies—those where most people have the opportunity to participate in the market. In contract-intensive economies, individuals learn to respect the choices of others and value equal application of the law. They demand liberal democracy at home and perceive it in their interest to respect the rights of nations and international law abroad. The consequences involve more than just peace: the contract-intensive democracies are in natural alliance against any actor—state or nonstate—that seeks to challenge Westphalian law and order. Because China and Russia lack contractualist economies, the economic divide will define great power politics in the coming decade. To address the challenges posed by China and Russia, preserve the Westphalian order, and secure their citizens from terrorism, the contract-intensive powers should focus their efforts on supporting global economic opportunity, rather than on promoting democracy.


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