8. The Great Depression and the Current Financial Crisis

Author(s):  
Corinne Crawford

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;">The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 in response to the failure of the banks following the Great Depression.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One out of every five banks failed in the aftermath of the stock market crash. Legislators and regulators questioned the role the underwriting of securities played in the financial collapse. Many believed these investment banking activities caused a conflict of interest in that banks often suggested that their customers purchase securities the banks had underwritten.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>They believed that this conflict of interest contributed significantly to the stock market crash and the bank failures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The Glass-Steagall Act forced banks to choose between being a commercial bank or an investment bank, in effect constructing a wall between commercial banking and investing banking activities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The Glass- Steagall Act was the first law signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt upon taking the oath of office.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Almost immediately upon enactment, the financial community lobbied to have the Act repealed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Over the years, this persistent lobbying led to a continual reinterpretation and liberalization of the Glass-Steagall Act, until the Act was repealed in 1999.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>On the dawn of repeal, the late Senator Paul Wellstone made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. He said the repeal of Glass-Steagall would enable the creation of financial conglomerates which would be too big to fail.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Furthermore, he believed that the regulatory structure would not be able to monitor the activities of these financial conglomerates and they would eventually fail due to engaging in excessively risky financial transactions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Ultimately, he said, prophetically, that the taxpayers would be forced to bail out these too-big-to-fail financial institutions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Clearly, Senator Wellstone was in the minority as the legislation repealing the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in both the House and the Senate with large majorities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>President Bill Clinton signed the legislation into law in late November, 1999.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It has now been over ten years since the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the United States is in the grip of the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Legislators and regulators are again questioning the role that the investment banking activities of commercial banks have played in a financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Some believe the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed significantly to the current financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Others believe that if Glass-Steagall had still been in place, the financial crisis would be much worse.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This paper examines the role that the repeal of Glass-Steagall played in the current financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span></p>


2019 ◽  
pp. 94-112
Author(s):  
Edward Fieldhouse ◽  
Jane Green ◽  
Geoffrey Evans ◽  
Jonathan Mellon ◽  
Christopher Prosser ◽  
...  

The Global Financial Crisis, which began in 2007–8, was the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and acted as a large shock to British politics. The economic vote is usually thought about as a short-term mechanism: a reward or punishment for the incumbent depending on recent economic conditions. In this chapter we examine how this shock played a role in the outcome of the 2015 General Election, seven years after the crisis began. The Global Financial Crisis continued to affect voting behaviour in 2015 for two reasons: first, it did long-lasting damage to perceptions of Labour’s economic competence, and second, it created a political opportunity for the Conservatives to blame the previous Labour government for the aftermath of the financial crisis.


2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 527-529

Kenneth Kuttner of Williams College reviews “From Financial Crisis to Global Recovery” by Padma Desai. The EconLit abstract of the reviewed work begins: Presents an introduction for economics and finance undergraduate students to the financial crisis, using a combination of scholarly research and narrative. Discusses the financial crisis origin; banking sector stress tests -- the United States versus the European Union; whether the U.S. economy is on the mend; global recovery prospects -- North America and Europe, Asia, and South America; hedge funds and derivatives, credit default swaps, and rating agencies; U.S. and EU regulatory proposals -- how strict and how cooperative; the dollar's future as a reserve currency; the Great Depression and the current financial crisis; and the future of American capitalism. Desai is Gladys and Roland Harriman Professor of Comparative Economic Systems and Director of the Center for Transition Economies at Columbia University. Index.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-260
Author(s):  
Asad Zaman Kemal

This is a review and a summary of some of the key arguments presented by Mian and Sufi in their recent book “House of Debt.” It highlights the contribution of Mian and Sufi by showing how they have solved the mystery of why there was a huge drop in aggregate demand during the Great Depression of 1929 and also following the recent Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. The article shows how major economists like Keynes, Friedman, Lucas and others tried and failed to provide an adequate explanation of this mystery. The key to the mystery is the huge amount of levered debt present during both of these economic crises. The solution suggested by Mian and Sufi is to replace interest based debt by equity based contracts in financial markets. This solution resonates strongly with Islamic teachings on finance. These links are also highlighted in this article. JEL classification: B22, E12, E32 Keywords: Great Depression, Global Financial Crisis, Debt-Deflation, Levered Debt


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 525
Author(s):  
Gustavo Passarelli Giroud Joaquim ◽  
Marcelo Leite Moura

This study investigates the performance and persistence of the Brazilian hedge fund market using daily data from September 2007 to February 2011, a period marked by what was characterized by many as the world’s worst financial crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. Despite the financial turmoil, the results indicate the existence of a representative group of funds with abnormal returns and evidence of a joint persistence of funds with time frames of one to three months. Individual evaluations of the funds, however, indicate a reduced number of persistent funds.


2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-99
Author(s):  
Blake Singley

During the Global Financial Crisis of 2009, many commentators drew parallels with the Great Depression of the 1930s. While the suffering of those Australians affected by the recent economic turmoil cannot be dismissed, the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the nation as a whole was modest compared with that of the Great Depression. The levels of unemployment that were reached during the Depression, and the ensuing poverty and social turmoil, would be unlikely to occur today on the same scale due to welfare provisions set in place by government and charitable institutions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 538-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoffer Koch ◽  
Gary Richardson ◽  
Patrick Van Horn

In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.


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