G. Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, Military Intelligence Section, Historical Division, U.S. Army

2010 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 1255-1282 ◽  
Author(s):  
KAUSHIK ROY

AbstractTowards the end of World War II, the morale of British units stationed in Burma and India was on a downslide. In contrast, the morale of Indian units was quite high. In fact, after the 1943 Arakan Campaign, the morale of Indian units rose slowly but steadily. The morale and discipline of Indian troops are also compared and contrasted with another colonial army: the African troops. By making a comparative study of the Commonwealth troops deployed in Burma and India, this paper attempts to show how and why the contours of morale and discipline changed among the various groups of troops at different times. The study of morale and discipline of the troops deployed in these two regions represents two extreme conditions: while Burma remained a war front, India did not experience any actual warfare except for some skirmishes with Indus tribes at the northwest frontier. In general, bad discipline is partly responsible for bad morale and vice versa, which adversely affects the fighting power of armies. This turns to the issue of ‘why do men fight’? The ‘will to war’ is directly proportional to good discipline and strong morale amongst troops. This paper will look for the causative factors shaping discipline and morale of both metropolitan and colonial soldiers, based mainly on military intelligence reports on morale. We will see that rather than grand ideas like nationalism and anti-fascism, mundane factors like the supply of good rations, access to sex and service conditions, influence the morale and discipline of soldiers, and hence their combat-worthiness.


1979 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
James J. Weingartner ◽  
David Kahn ◽  
F. W. Winterbothan

1979 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Robert B. Armeson ◽  
David Kahn

1986 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 218
Author(s):  
Charles B. Burdick ◽  
David Kahn

Author(s):  
Andrew T. McDonald ◽  
Verlaine Stoner McDonald

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Paul Rusch was detained at a makeshift, minimum-security jail in Tokyo. Sharing quarters with other missionaries and clergy, Rusch acted as chief organizer and camp cook, preparing meals with food scrounged from the black market and gleaned from his loyal network of students. Daily life among internees at Sumire camp was amiable, almost pleasant, until the Americans bombed Tokyo and Yokohama. The Doolittle Raid sparked a fierce debate between pacifists and prowar factions in the camp, foreshadowing the heated controversy that would arise while Rusch was repatriated on the ships Asama Maru and Gripsholm. Missionaries aboard ship were divided into opposing factions who debated the morality of the war. On the journey home, Rusch made connections with American intelligence officers aboard the ships, setting him up for his work in military intelligence during World War II. Despite his loyalty to the Japanese, Rusch cooperated with military intelligence, dedicating himself to winning a war against a militarist government he believed was enslaving a great people. Rusch still trusted his Japanese colleagues in Tokyo, believing they would hold fast to their promise to protect Rikkyo’s Christian identity while safeguarding Seisen-Ryo.


1988 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Edward L. Homze ◽  
Lauran Paine

2008 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK GUGLIELMO

Economists played a crucial role in military intelligence during World War II. Economists working at the Office of Strategic Services estimated enemy battle casualties, analyzed the intentions and capabilities of both enemies and allies, and helped to prepare for negotiations regarding the postwar settlement. Economists working at the Enemy Objectives Unit helped to select enemy targets for bombing. Finally, economists working at the Statistical Research Group worked on a variety of problems brought to them by the U.S. military services. As a consequence of their usefulness during the war, the military continued to employ economists after the war.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document