The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence During World War II

2008 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK GUGLIELMO
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Research Group ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Statistical Research ◽  
Office Of Strategic Services ◽  
The Military ◽  
Military Services ◽  
The U.S

Economists played a crucial role in military intelligence during World War II. Economists working at the Office of Strategic Services estimated enemy battle casualties, analyzed the intentions and capabilities of both enemies and allies, and helped to prepare for negotiations regarding the postwar settlement. Economists working at the Enemy Objectives Unit helped to select enemy targets for bombing. Finally, economists working at the Statistical Research Group worked on a variety of problems brought to them by the U.S. military services. As a consequence of their usefulness during the war, the military continued to employ economists after the war.

“Self-Interest Well Understood”: The Origins & Lessons of Public Confidence in the Military

Daedalus ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 142 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew A. Hill ◽  
Leonard Wong ◽  
Stephen J. Gerras
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
World War ◽  
The Public ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
Physical Defense ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
High Regard ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

In recent decades, the U.S. military has enjoyed high levels of public confidence. We argue that the rise (and sustainment) of public confidence in the military reflects two phenomena. First, the public has a high regard for the military and its mission, arising from a shift to a professional (nonconscript) force that is perceived to be competent, fair, and accountable. Second, the public has little fear of military abuses in the domestic arena, owing chiefly to the reduced domestic presence of the military in the post – World War II era, with less emphasis on the physical defense of the homeland; and to the military's careful cultivation of an apolitical culture since Vietnam. We conclude with a brief discussion of the military's efforts to develop and encourage public-mindedness among its members, and the challenges to replicating the military approach in other institutional settings.

Office of Strategic Services versus Special Operations Executive: Competition for the Italian Resistance, 1943–1945

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-58
Author(s):  
Tommaso Piffer
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
World War ◽  
Special Operations ◽  
History Of ◽  
Military Support ◽  
Office Of Strategic Services ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

This article explores the relationship between the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the Italian campaign during World War II. Drawing on recently declassified records, the article analyzes three issues that prevented satisfactory coordination between the two agencies and the impact those issues had on the effectiveness of the Allied military support given to the partisan movements: (1) the U.S. government's determination to maintain the independence of its agencies; (2) the inability of the Armed Forces Headquarters to impose its will on the reluctant subordinate levels of command; and (3) the relatively low priority given to the Italian resistance at the beginning of the campaign. The article contributes to recent studies on OSS and SOE liaisons and sheds additional light on an important turning point in the history of their relations.

scholarly journals The Army-Navy Contest for Control of Land-Based Antisubmarine Aviation and the Military Unification Debate, 1942–1948

2019 ◽  
pp. 270-295
Author(s):  
George H. Monahan
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War ◽  
Western Atlantic ◽  
War Department ◽  
Military Command ◽  
Post War ◽  
Civilian Leadership ◽  
The Military ◽  
Secretary Of War ◽  
The U.S

In this chapter, George H. Monahan discusses the success of the German U-boat offensive in the Western Atlantic after the U.S. entry into World War II, which led the War Department leadership to believe that the U.S. Navy was not employing adequate antisubmarine tactics. In the application of airpower to combat the submarine threat, the War Department and Army leadership believed that aggressive "hunter-killer" tactics would prove more effective than the Navy's preferred defensive tactic of conducting aerial patrols in the vicinity of convoys. Navy leaders, meanwhile, contended that its defensive tactics were the best method of protecting shipping. A bitter interservice conflict ensued as the War Department sought to initiate an Army Air Forces antisubmarine offensive over the Bay of Biscay. Claiming jurisdiction over all air operations at sea, the Navy leadership firmly opposed the War Department's initiative and insisted that Army Air Forces antisubmarine units operate according to the Navy's defensive doctrine. Secretary of War Henry Stimson's frustration over Admiral Ernest King's refusal to accede to the War Department antisubmarine initiative led the former to support a post-war reorganization of the military command apparatus, thereby ensuring Navy subordination to civilian leadership under an overarching Secretary of Defense.

Legacy, 1926–1929

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Chemical Warfare ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
World War ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign policy. By 1926, the CWS was a well-established organization capable of supporting the continuation of poison gas work into the foreseeable future. It had successfully influenced public policy to continue chemical warfare research after World War I. However, the CWS and its supporters failed to convince people to believe that gas warfare was humane. Public hostility toward chemical weapons ultimately led to the signing of international agreements prohibiting chemical warfare. This chapter discusses the CWS's sustained accomplishment during the period 1926–1929, with particular emphasis on its new chemical weapons initiatives in partnership with other departments and branches of the military; the United States' continued support for international efforts to prevent chemical warfare; and the CWS's reorganization into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps after World War II.

scholarly journals Deferments and the Relative Cost of Conscription

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Perri
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Relative Cost ◽  
World War ◽  
Reservation Wages ◽  
Military Conscription ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

Abstract A model of military conscription with costly deferments is developed. Deferments may enable the induction of only those with the lowest reservation wages, avoiding the usual misallocation of resources with conscription versus a volunteer military. With costly deferments, the tradeoff between conscription and a volunteer military involves the cost of deferments with the former and the higher deadweight cost of taxation with the latter. Among the results are: 1) conscription is socially preferable to a volunteer military only if a large percentage of eligible individuals is demanded by the military; 2) if conscription is used when it is socially cheaper than a volunteer military, welfare is improved if deferments have lower social benefits; and 3) ignoring other costs of conscription (e.g., higher turnover and reduced investment in human capital), the U.S. in World War II may have been near the point at which conscription and a volunteer military were of equal social cost.

Living in America

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etsuko Takushi Crissey
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
American Woman ◽  
Family Health ◽  
Japanese Americans ◽  
World War ◽  
Discrimination In Employment ◽  
Close Friendship ◽  
American Society ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

Witnesses at the 2012 trial in Ohio of a former airman convicted of beating his Okinawan wife to death testified that he had often battered her. The case exemplified the isolation of wives who arrive with no acquaintances in the U.S. besides their husbands, and cannot overcome the language barrier to make other contacts. Isolation also results from the individualistic nature of American society. Interviewees accustomed to close relationships with relatives and neighbours typical in Okinawa were surprised that in the U.S. “neighbours don’t even speak to each other.” Many suffered from homesickness. However, one expressed her gratitude for the close friendship and support of an American woman next door who guided her to the supermarket and post office, teaching her the essentials for daily life. Several encountered racial discrimination in employment, marriage (before 1967), and the bullying of their children in school. Some women had been apprehensive about coming to the U.S. where Japanese Americans were interned during World War II and anti-Japanese hostility persisted afterwards. Those whose husbands were still in the military had free family health care and discount shopping, but had to endure their husbands’ long absences, and deployments to areas of conflict.

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