scholarly journals Perkembangan Five Power Defence Arranggements dalam Menanggapi Dinamika Keamanan Asia Tenggara pasca Perang Dingin

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Putri Pratama ◽  
Darang Sahdana Candra

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is a regional security institution in Southeast Asia, with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and United Kingdom as its members. As one of the oldest, and still existing, regional security institution in the Southeast Asia region, FPDA’s existence seems to be unheard of, compared to the region’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or even the Cold War’s Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Although FPDA was created in the height of the Cold War, as well as in response to the potential hegemonic Indonesian threat to former British colonies, the institution is still exist even after both original existential threat wanes. In the end, how the FPDA can maintain its existence in the changing security dynamics in the region, especially after the end of the Cold War, is an interesting piece of puzzle to be solved.

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moch Faisal Karim ◽  
Tangguh Chairil

The continuity of stable peace in East Asia, especially Southeast Asia, since the end of the Cold War raises one major question: why is there no apparent balancing behaviour against China, the emerging great power in East Asia? In response to this question, exceptionalists argue that there will be no balancing behaviour against China from Southeast Asian states, while soft balancing theorists argue that the balancing behaviour has already occurred in the form of institutional balancing. This article refutes those arguments and maintains that balancing behaviour is not yet apparent in Southeast Asian balancing, yet it exists in an indirect form. In order to make this argument, this article examines the recent military build-up among Southeast Asian states as well as recent assessments of the ineffectiveness of the Southeast Asian regional security framework. The article also further analyses the conditions under which Southeast Asia’s indirect balancing might turn into hard balancing.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 611-613

On September 8, 1954, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, a protocol designating the areas to which the treaty was to apply, and the Pacific Charter, a declaration setting forth the aims of the eight countries in southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. Negotiations leading up to the actual signature of the treaty had been underway throughout the summer of 1954 and had culminated in an eight-power conference in Manila which opened on September 6.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-863

Tenth meeting: The tenth meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was held in London on May 3–5, 1965, under the chairmanship of Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. Other member governments were represented by Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs of Australia; D. J. Eyre, Minister of Defense of New Zealand; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan; Librado D. Cayco, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines; Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Aflairs of Thailand; and George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State of the United States. Achille Clarac, French Ambassador in Bangkok and Council representative for France, also attended the London session as an observer. (On April 20 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced that France would not send a delegation to the meeting although Ambassador Clarac would be present as an observer only.)


Author(s):  
Kenton Clymer

The U.S. relationship with Southeast Asia has always reflected the state of U.S. interactions with the three major powers that surround the region: Japan, China, and, to a lesser extent, India. Initially, Americans looked at Southeast Asia as an avenue to the rich markets that China and India seemed to offer, while also finding trading opportunities in the region itself. Later, American missionaries sought to save Southeast Asian souls, while U.S. officials often viewed Southeast Asia as a region that could tip the overall balance of power in East Asia if its enormous resources fell under the control of a hostile power. American interest expanded enormously with the annexation of the Philippines in 1899, an outgrowth of the Spanish-American War. That acquisition resulted in a nearly half-century of American colonial rule, while American investors increased their involvement in exploiting the region’s raw materials, notably tin, rubber, and petroleum, and missionaries expanded into areas previously closed to them. American occupation of the Philippines heightened tensions with Japan, which sought the resources of Southeast Asia, particularly in French Indochina, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia). Eventually, clashing ambitions and perceptions brought the United States into World War II. Peeling those territories away from Japan during the war was a key American objective. Americans resisted the Japanese in the Philippines and in Burma, but after Japan quickly subdued Southeast Asia, there was little contact in the region until the reconquest began in 1944. American forces participated in the liberation of Burma and also fought in the Dutch Indies and the Philippines before the war ended in 1945. After the war, the United States had to face the independence struggles in several Southeast Asian countries, even as the Grand Alliance fell apart and the Cold War emerged, which for the next several decades overshadowed almost everything. American efforts to prevent communist expansion in the region inhibited American support for decolonization and led to war in Vietnam and Laos and covert interventions elsewhere. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, relations with most of Southeast Asia have generally been normal, except for Burma/Myanmar, where a brutal military junta ruled. The opposition, led by the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi, found support in the United States. More recently American concerns with China’s new assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea, have resulted in even closer U.S. relations with Southeast Asian countries.


Author(s):  
William D. James

Abstract Why did Britain withdraw from its military bases in the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia midway through the Cold War? Existing accounts tend to focus on Britain's weak economic position, as well as the domestic political incentives of retrenchment for the ruling Labour Party. This article offers an alternative explanation: the strategic rationale for retaining a permanent presence East of Suez dissolved during the 1960s, as policymakers realised that these military bases were consuming more security than they could generate. These findings have resonance for British officials charting a return East of Suez today under the banner of ‘Global Britain’.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document