Social Psychology as a Cognitive Science

1995 ◽  
Vol 40 (9) ◽  
pp. 839-840
Author(s):  
James S. Uleman
Author(s):  
Amanda Anderson

This chapter explores the specific challenges that cognitive science and social psychology pose to those literary concepts and modes that are grounded in traditional moral understandings of selfhood and action, including integrity of character and notions such as tragic realization and moral repair. Focusing on the concept of moral time, the chapter explores two literary texts in which profound middle-of-life dramas take place: Henry James’s “The Beast in the Jungle” and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale. A form of slow psychic time entirely lost to view in recent cognitive science is shown to take place in James’s tale, while The Winter’s Tale insists on the forms of moral and emotional experience that are beyond reflection and explanation. The readings presented are set in relation to key critical debates on the works, to challenge a persistent evasion of moral frameworks in contemporary anti-normative approaches.


2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-92
Author(s):  
Vladimir Konecni

This Opinion Article highlights three sets of important implications of the very recent work by C. Firestone and B. Scholl on the encapsulation of visual perception: (a) methodological implications, especially with regard to experimental areas of cognitive science, such as cognitive social psychology; (h) implications of interest to philosophers of mind, some of whose more extravagant recent claims have been based on the assumption of "top-down" cognitive effects on perception; and (c) implications that challenge some recent work in philosophical and psychological aesthetics regarding art expertise, as well as defend the logic of A. Danto's theorizing from attacks that are based on the assumption of "top-down- cognitive effects.


Author(s):  
Lucille Cairns

‘Intra-Israeli Conflict’ examines how the primary corpus represents conflict between different ethnic and political demographics among Jews in Israel. Using cognitive science, social psychology, and cognitive psychology, Cairns attempts to understand how and why conflict comes to be. The chapter takes an in-depth view at the immigrants who form the main constituents of Francophone communities in Israel, namely those of Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian descent, and highlights their intra-ethnic differences and the intense emotions felt between them.


2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich

Krueger & Funder (K&F) are right that various imbalances characterize social psychology, but I question whether they are characteristic of psychology or cognitive science as a whole. Dual-process theories, popular in the latter fields, emphasize both processing biases and the adaptiveness of human cognition in a more balanced manner.


Author(s):  
Gregory Currie

The subject of this article is the connection between art and all those aspects of mind that have, to some degree, an empirical side. It covers results in neuropsychology and neuroscience, in cognitive and developmental psychology, as well as in various parts of the philosophy of mind. This article, however, ignores questions about the natural history of our mental capacities. To the extent that art has human psychology as its subject, there must be potential for conflict with the sciences of mind. As philosophers have recently noted, results in social psychology challenge our ordinary conception of human motivation, suggesting that moral character either does not exist at all or plays an insignificant role in shaping behaviour.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi Morrison Ravven

Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation.


Author(s):  
Helen S. Jones ◽  
John N. Towse ◽  
Nicholas Race

The authors review the existing literature on the psychology of email fraud, and attempt to integrate the small but burgeoning set of research findings. They show that research has adopted a variety of methodologies and taken a number of conceptual positions in the attempt to throw light on decisions about emails that may be in best-case scenarios, sub-optimal, or in the worst-case scenarios, catastrophic. They point to the potential from cognitive science and social psychology to inform the field, and attempt to identify the opportunities and limitations from researcher's design decisions. The study of email decision-making is an important topic in its own right, but also has the potential to inform about general cognitive processes too.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam H. Ham

Perhaps the most oft-cited phrase in all the interpretation literature is a sentence written by an anonymous U.S. National Park Service ranger in an obscure administrative manual a half century ago: Through interpretation, understanding; through understanding, appreciation; through appreciation, protection. When Freeman Tilden quoted the manual in Interpreting Our Heritage, little did he know that those few words would evolve into a philosophical orientation around which interpreters all across the globe would soon rally. In this article, Tilden's claim is reexamined in light of contemporary cognitive and social psychology. Does the chain of events Tilden describes really stand up, or is it just a nice, warm, and fuzzy phrase? Is there a substantiated theoretical basis for claiming that “interpretation” can create a kind of “understanding” that would indeed lead people to “protect” the places they visit? According to the weight of evidence from cognitive science, the answer is yes.


Author(s):  
Launa Gauthier

Publisher Description: Distilling the research literature and translating the scientific approach into language relevant to a college or university teacher, this book introduces seven general principles of how students learn. The authors have drawn on research from a breadth of perspectives (cognitive, developmental, and social psychology; educational research; anthropology; demographics; organizational behavior) to identify a set of key principles underlying learning, from how effective organization enhances retrieval and use of information to what impacts motivation. Integrating theory with real-classroom examples in practice, this book helps faculty to apply cognitive science advances to improve their own teaching.


Author(s):  
David Borgo

One of the particular joys of improvising music together is not knowing precisely the relationship between one’s own actions and thoughts (one has to surprise oneself, after all) or between one’s actions and those of other improvisers (did you do that because I did that? Or did I do that because you did that?). Drawing on research in social psychology, actor-network theory, and the extended mind thesis in cognitive science, this chapter argues that one’s experience of musical “authorship” can be enhanced or undermined rather easily by social, material, and technological forms of agency in the environment. It concludes that musical improvisation offers simultaneously a situated practice for exploring interagency—and thereby exorcising the humanistic ghost of a “self-luminous” will—and the possibility of creating some provisional closure, some fleeting reduction of complexity, in a world increasingly characterized by relentless machinic heterogenesis.


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