Copernican Revolution in Neuroscience and Philosophy: Vantage Point from beyond Brain

2018 ◽  
pp. 403-434
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem

How can we eliminate the “intuition of mind”? I demonstrated that the “intuition of mind” can be traced to our pre-Copernican vantage point from within mind or brain (chapter 20). Analogous to Copernicus, we need to radically shift our vantage point to eliminate the intuition of mind and take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and mental features. For that, we need shift our vantage point from within either mind or brain to a “vantage point from beyond brain”. My main argument in the present chapter is that, analogous to Copernicus with regard to earth, we need to replace the pre-Copernican “vantage point from within mind” (or from within brain) by a post-Copernican “vantage point from beyond brain”. Unlike the “vantage point from within mind” (or brain), the “vantage point from beyond brain” includes relation, i.e., world-brain relation, as possible epistemic option within its “logical space of knowledge”. This allows us to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and mental features through world-brain relation as ontological predisposition of consciousness (chapter 10). Most importantly, this renders superfluous if not impossible both “intuition of mind” and mind-body problem which then can be replaced by world-brain relation and world-brain problem. I conclude that such “vantage point from beyond brain” with the world-brain problem amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy.

Copernican Revolution in Physics and Cosmology: Vantage Point from beyond Earth

2018 ◽  
pp. 351-376
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
The World ◽  
Pulling Forces ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Why do we so stubbornly cling to the assumption of mind? Despite the so far presented empirical, ontological, and conceptual-logical evidence against mind, the philosopher may nevertheless reject the world-brain problem as counter-intuitive. She/he will argue that we need to approach the question for the existence and reality of mental features in terms of the mind-body problem as it is more intuitive than the world-brain problem. Our strong adherence to mind is thus, at least in part, based on what philosophers describe as “intuition”, the “intuition of mind” as I say. How can we resist and escape the pulling forces of our “intuition of mind”? The main focus in this chapter and the whole final part is on the “intuition of mind” and how we can avoid and render it impossible. I will argue that we need to exclude the mind as possible epistemic option from our knowledge, i.e., the “logical space of knowledge”, as I say. The concept of “logical space of knowledge” concerns what we can access in our knowledge, i.e., our possible epistemic options that are included in the “logical space of knowledge”, as distinguished from what remains inaccessible to us, i.e., impossible epistemic options, as they are excluded from the “logical space of knowledge”. For instance, the “logical space of knowledge” presupposed in current philosophy of mind and specifically mind-body discussion includes mind as possible epistemic option while world-brain relation is excluded as impossible epistemic option. This, as I argue, provides the basis for our “intuition of mind” and the seemingly counterintuitive nature of world-brain relation. How can we modify and change the possible and impossible epistemic options in our “logical space of knowledge”? I argue that this is possible by shifting our vantage point or viewpoint - that is paradigmatically reflected in the Copernican revolution in cosmology and physics. Copernicus shifted the “vantage point from within earth” to a “vantage point beyond earth”; this enabled him to take into view that the earth (rather than the sun) moves by itself which provided the basis for his shift from a geo- to a helio-centric view of the universe. Hence, the shift in vantage point modified his epistemic options and thus expanded the presupposed “logical space of knowledge”. I conclude that we require an analogous shift in the vantage point we currently presuppose in philosophy of mind. This will expand our “logical space of knowledge” in such way that makes possible to include world-brain relation as possible epistemic option while, at the same time, excluding mind as impossible epistemic option. That, in turn, will render the world-brain problem more intuitive while the mind-body problem will then be rather counter-intuitive. Taken together, this amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy – that shall be the focus in next chapter.

Pre-Copernican Stance in Neuroscience and Philosophy: Vantage Point from within Mind or Brain

2018 ◽  
pp. 377-402
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Our intuition pulls us towards assuming the mind. We are therefore inclined to approach the question for the existence and reality of mental features in terms of mind and mind-body problem rather than the world-brain problem (even if the latter is more plausible). The present chapter focuses on the origin of our “intuition of mind”. I argue that our “intuition of mind” is closely related to the vantage point or point of view we presuppose – the vantage point determines or frames the possible epistemic options that are included within the “logical space of knowledge”. Specifically, I argue that a “vantage point from within mind” makes possible to include the “intuition of mind” as possible epistemic option in our “logical space of knowledge”. However, such “vantage point from within mind” as well as its various escape strategies including vantage point from within reason and vantage point from brain or body amount to a pre-Copernican stance as they can be compared to the “vantage point from within earth” (chapter 12). My main argument in the present chapter is therefore that, analogous to Copernicus, we need to replace the pre-Copernican “vantage point from within mind” (or from within brain) by a post-Copernican “vantage point from beyond brain” – the latter will be developed in the next chapter.

Conclusion: Copernican Revolution—Is the Brain’s Spontaneous Activity an Empirical, Epistemic, and Ontological Game Changer in Neuroscience and Philosophy?

2018 ◽  
pp. 435-438
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Spontaneous Activity ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Game Changer

Are the brain and its spontaneous activity a “game changer” in our pursuit of the question of the existence and reality of mental features? A game changer is something that allows to take something into view that hitherto remained invisible and was not yet discovered. That, for instance, makes it possible to raise a novel question or problem replacing the previous one. I argue that the brain’s spontaneous activity is indeed a game changer in this sense, an “empirical and ontological game changer” in that it allows us to replace the mind–body problem with the world–brain problem....

Color and Color Experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Spectral Reflectance ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Surface Features ◽  
Color Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Internal Mental States

In this paper I investigate the problems for “locating” color in the world, surveying the various subjectivist and objectivist positions and finding them wanting. I then argue that the problem is that colors are “ways of appearing,” an odd kind of property that essentially implicates the mind and turns the problem of locating color into part of the mind–body problem. Rather than identify colors with objective surface features, such as surface spectral reflectance, or with dispositions to cause certain internal mental states, I treat them as relations holding between the subject and the objects of perception. This is seen to explain why colors are so hard to locate, and also accounts for several other features of color experience.

Ontology III: From the World to Consciousness

2018 ◽  
pp. 315-348
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Main Argument ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Spatiotemporal Scale ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The Brain

Summary I so far focused mainly on the brain and how it is related to consciousness. This let me suppose that the brain, through its relation to the world, i.e., the world-brain relation, is necessary connected to consciousness (chapter 10). While this highlighted the central importance of the brain for the existence and reality of consciousness, the world itself and its ontological role were rather neglected so far – that shall be the focus in this chapter. My main argument is that the world is indispensable for consciousness and mental features in general: without world, there could no world-brain relation, which, in turn, renders impossible consciousness. I will discuss the role of the world for consciousness in terms of three arguments, the “argument of calibration”, the “argument of structure”, and the “argument of location”. First, as discussed in the “argument of calibration”, the world serves as “spatiotemporal frame”; this makes it possible for world-brain relation to serve as “spatiotemporal baseline” and “space of possible experience” for calibrating the possible objects or events for consciousness. That, as I argue, is central for yielding specifically the phenomenal features of consciousness. Secondly, as discussed in the “argument of structure”, the world itself can ontologically be characterized by “spatiotemporal nestedness”: the brain and its smaller spatiotemporal scale are contained and nested within the larger spatiotemporal scale of the world. Such “spatiotemporal nestedness” is an ontological feature of the world which is necessary for and makes possible, i.e., predisposes, consciousness. Finally, as discussed in the “argument of location”, the world allows for “complex location” of both brain and consciousness as part of and within the world as distinguished from both “simple location” and “non-location”. In sum, inclusion of the world in our ontology is indispensable if one wants to understand the existence and reality of mental features which, if reduced or limited to either brain or mind, remain unclear. I conclude that we need to include both world and brain including their relation, i.e., world-brain relation, in our ontology of consciousness – this amounts to what I describe as world-brain problem. Otherwise, when considering either brain or world alone as in “brain problem” and “world-problem” as I say, one leaves a gap between world and brain which makes it impossible to account for the existence and reality of mental features like consciousness.

Nagel's Challenge and the Mind-Body Problem

Philosophy ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rom Harré
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The World ◽  
Material State ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
Brain States ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Person Experience

Nagel has argued that the ‘mind-body’ problem, as traditionally conceived, is insoluble. His challenge to philosophers is to devise a metaphysical scheme that incorporates materialist concepts in describing first person experience and mentalistic concepts in describing third person experience, such that the internal relations between the concepts thereby constructed are necessary. Nagel's own suggestion, a scheme not unlike the ‘underlying process’ schemes of the physical sciences, seems to lead him towards a covert materialism. Progress can be made in meeting the challenge by tackling the problem first by taking the units in each ‘sphere’ to be brains and persons. I show that a metaphysics based on the metaphor of person defined tasks and materially defined tools does satisfy both Nagel's challenge conditions. To devise a scheme for qualia and brain-states I turn back to Locke's presentation of the primary/secondary quality distinction. This depends on the concept of a causal power, grounded in material states of the world. While this scheme is inadequate, a variation, based on Gibson's concept of an affordance, and drawing on Bohr's resolution of the seeming incompatibility between wave and particle ontologies for physics, is promising. The world, whatever it is, affords material states to our perceptual apparatus, and mental states to our proprioceptual apparatus. The mental states/brain states duality is not a duality of types of states, which might stand in causal relations to one another, but is a duality of means of access to two classes of affordances of whatever the world is. There is no mind-body problem in the traditional sense, namely ‘How could a material state cause or be caused by a mental state?’

scholarly journals Representationalism about Consciousness

2020 ◽  
pp. 404-437
Author(s):  
Adam Pautz
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Sensory Consciousness ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Special Case

According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Some (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske) have suggested that representationalism fits well with the idea that consciousness can be reduced to something physical. Others think that representationalism makes the mind–body problem harder because our usual models for reducing representation do not apply in the special case of conscious representation. This chapter formulates representationalism, discusses an argument for it, and considers standard objections. The chapter concludes by looking at reductive and nonreductive representationalism.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Laurent Bonnefoy
Keyword(s):  
World Politics ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Global Order ◽  
The World

The introduction aims to present the paradox of Yemen’s place in world politics and global representations over the last one hundred years or so. The country often appears as one where threats to the global order emerge and is at the same time largely overlooked. The introduction presents the main argument of the book: Yemeni society is concerned by a multitude of interactions with the outside world, many of which remain hidden. As the successive chapters show, this relationship to the world offers an interesting vantage point to understand contemporary Yemen.

Ontology II: From World–Brain Relation to Consciousness

2018 ◽  
pp. 269-314
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
The Brain

How can we account for the existence and reality of consciousness and mental features in general? The present chapter complements the previous one by shifting the focus from the ontological determination of the brain to consciousness. I characterized the brain’s existence and reality by world-brain relation for which I presupposed relation and structure as basic units of existence and reality. This entails structural realism, that is, ontic structural realism (OSR). I now apply the definition of the brain by world-brain relation and OSR to consciousness. The main point is that I extend the spatiotemporal definition of world-brain relation to consciousness, that is, its phenomenal features as distinguished from neuronal (and physical) features (while leaving out other features of consciousness like cognitive features; chapter 7). Specifically, I argue that the world-brain relation provides the necessary non-sufficient ontological condition of possible consciousness, the “ontological predisposition of consciousness” (OPC) as I say. The world-brain relation is characterized by spatiotemporal structure with relational time and space which makes possible “upward spatiotemporal entailment” of consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness is entailed spatiotemporally by world-brain relation; this, in turn, makes possible necessary (rather than contingent) a posteriori ontological connection between brain and consciousness on the basis of their commonly underlying and shared world-brain relation. Importantly, this makes superfluous the introduction of the concept of mind to account for necessary connection of mental features to their underlying ontological basis. Therefore, I suggest replacing the concept of mind by the one of world-brain relation. This entails that the mind-body problem becomes superfluous and can be replaced by what I describe as “world-brain problem”.

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