Selective Membership

2019 ◽  
pp. 87-109
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This chapter assesses in detail the exclusion of Britain from the ANZUS Treaty, which embarrassed British policymakers and undermined many of the United Kingdom's interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Clement Attlee had initially accepted exclusion, but Winston Churchill's election to office in October of 1951 resulted in a concerted effort to gain membership. Although Australia and New Zealand remained sympathetic to an expanded treaty, both feared that pushing British membership too forcefully risked the United States dissolving the ANZUS Treaty. Despite enjoying a degree of recovery, economic limitations and ongoing commitments to Europe and the Middle East meant that the United Kingdom was unable to offer the antipodean states a credible alternative to existing arrangements. Australia and New Zealand consequently attempted to secure membership for Britain but prioritized ongoing cooperation with the United States. The major obstacle to British membership in ANZUS remained the United States. As far as U.S. policymakers interpreted matters, British inclusion provided few benefits and considerable economic and strategic drawbacks. Yet, U.S. officials preferred to use arguments about race and imperialism to justify British omission from the treaty. Ultimately, the United States remained committed to maintaining ANZUS in its existing form and rebuffed efforts by the antipodean powers to secure British inclusion.

2019 ◽  
pp. 156-179
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This chapter studies the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). After almost a decade since the end of World War II, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand once again enjoyed a formal strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific. The eventual creation of the SEATO in early 1955 complemented the short-term ambitions of all four Western powers in the region. Nevertheless, diplomatic bargaining preceding signature and ratification led to compromises that diluted the usefulness of the security alliance. The United States continued to limit commitments to joint planning after the implementation of the treaty. SEATO was therefore smaller, weaker, and less integrated than originally envisaged. The organization also lacked the necessary military and economic infrastructure to be effective, which helped encourage Australia and New Zealand to focus on regional rather than British Commonwealth interests, shifting focus away from the Middle East and Mediterranean and toward the “near north.”


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naveed Ahmed ◽  
Angus G Ritchie ◽  
Michael Lam-Po-Tang ◽  
Tushar J Vachharajani

Interventional nephrology is relatively a new field dealing with the procedural aspect of dialysis access. The subspecialty has focused on the nephrologist taking a lead role and learning the procedural skills needed to provide timely care to the end stage renal disease patients on dialysis. The subspecialty has been in existence for over a decade in the United States and is well accepted as a main-stream field. The safety and positive outcomes of nephrologists performing these procedures in the United States are being duplicated across the globe. The growing trend of acceptance of this field is evident in the Asia-Pacific region, which is rapidly embracing this new development. The current report from New Zealand is being presented here in this article.


2019 ◽  
pp. 134-155
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This chapter looks at how, throughout 1954, the United States began to consider seriously the creation of a wider strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific that would include the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Such a policy reversal reflected growing concerns about Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The United States consequently looked abroad for support for collective action. Only a small number of states, however, could provide substantial military resources. Washington focused its attention on London, Canberra, and Wellington. Fundamental disagreements among all four states concerning Cold War strategy persisted throughout negotiations. Although welcoming the opportunity for closer cooperation in the realm of security planning, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand all resisted U.S. ideas about immediate and major military commitments in the region. Even the existence of the ANZUS Treaty proved insufficient motivation for Canberra and Wellington to agree to support Washington's request for military support. The treaty instead appeared to have the opposite effect as antipodean officials feared the dilution or dissolution of existing trilateral strategic arrangements in favor of a wider alliance. All three British Commonwealth powers instead drove debate away from immediate military action toward longer-term alliance building.


2019 ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This chapter examines the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). United States policymakers increasingly recognized the importance of Japan in the Cold War. Indeed, the Truman administration concluded that the recovery of Japan was strategically and economically essential for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Imperative to achieving such ambitions was ending formal occupation by Allied forces and providing a Japanese peace treaty that would allow for its full economic and industrial recovery. However, U.S. plans encountered considerable opposition. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand resented a new commercial challenger in the region and feared a Japanese military revival. As all were signatories to the Japanese instruments of surrender, their support was essential to secure the two-thirds majority required to end formal occupation. The United States' desire for a Japanese peace treaty provided Australia and New Zealand with the opportunity to push for their longtime goal of a security treaty with the United States. Following negotiations, the ANZUS Treaty emerged in February of 1951. The United States, however, excluded the United Kingdom from this newly formed security pact. Washington also brushed aside London's efforts at drafting its own Japanese peace treaty, instead pushing forward a more lenient agreement that largely reflected U.S. wishes.


2019 ◽  
pp. 110-133
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This chapter details how, following the arrival of a new U.S. administration in 1953, the British government resumed its efforts to improve its position in the Asia-Pacific. The United Kingdom again sought membership in the ANZUS Treaty but also offered an alternative in the form of a Pacific security pact. This larger alliance would provide a more comprehensive global defense umbrella that would allow the British government to continue to prioritize the defense of its preferred regions. The United States rejected such proposals, fearing that any Pacific security pact would inevitably involve greater contributions to the region and risked drawing it into the defense of other territories. United States policymakers and diplomats again used the concept of race to defend British exclusion, however, rather than stressing strategic or economic concerns. In contrast to the events of the preceding year, the United States reacted more forcefully against British efforts and adopted rougher diplomacy with Australia and New Zealand. Formal cooperation between all four powers in the Asia-Pacific looked unlikely by the close of 1953.


2019 ◽  
pp. 40-64
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This chapter discusses events in Malaya and Korea, which, when viewed together, help explain progress toward closer cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific. The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand slowly developed elements of strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region following crises in Malaya and Korea between 1948 and 1951. The extent of cooperation varied between states and rarely reflected purely strategic concerns. Whereas New Zealand supported the United Kingdom in the Malayan Emergency, the United States and Australia were initially far more cautious in offering assistance. Although the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand did support the United States in the Korean War, their efforts also reflected attempts to build closer strategic relations, generate diplomatic capital, and restrain their superpower ally from escalating the conflict. In both instances, all four states held different assumptions about the causes and management of conflict. Divergent national interests therefore weakened a coherent and united response to the Communist challenge from the Western powers.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph A. Cossa ◽  
Brad Glosserman ◽  
Michael A. McDevitt ◽  
Nirav Patel ◽  
James Przystup ◽  
...  

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