The Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1975

Through the voices of senior officials, teachers, soldiers, journalists, and artists, this book presents us with an interpretation of “South Vietnam” as a passionately imagined nation in the minds of ordinary Vietnamese, rather than merely as an expeditious political construct of the United States government. The moving and honest memoirs collected, translated, and edited here describe the experiences of war, politics, and everyday life for people from many walks of life during the fraught years of Vietnam's Second Republic, leading up to and encompassing what Americans generally call the “Vietnam War.” The voices gift the reader a sense of the authors' experiences in the Republic and their ideas about the nation during that time. The book reveals that far from a Cold War proxy struggle, the conflict in Vietnam featured a true ideological divide between the communist North and the non-communist South.

Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


Author(s):  
Andrew J. Gawthorpe

From 1965 to 1973, the United States attempted to prevent the absorption of the non-Communist state of South Vietnam by Communist North Vietnam as part of its Cold War strategy of containment. In doing so, the United States had to battle both the North Vietnamese military and guerrillas indigenous to South Vietnam. The Johnson administration entered the war without a well-thought-out strategy for victory, and the United States quickly became bogged down in a bloody stalemate. A major Communist assault in 1968 known as the Tet Offensive convinced US leaders of the need to seek a negotiated solution. This task fell to the Nixon administration, which carried on peace talks while simultaneously seeking ways to escalate the conflict and force North Vietnam to make concessions. Eventually it was Washington that made major concessions, allowing North Vietnam to keep its forces in the South and leaving South Vietnam in an untenable position. US troops left in 1973 and Hanoi successfully invaded the South in 1975. The two Vietnams were formally unified in 1976. The war devastated much of Vietnam and came at a huge cost to the United States in terms of lives, resources, and political division at home. It gave birth to the largest mass movement against a war in US history, motivated by opposition both to conscription and to the damage that protesters perceived the war was doing to the United States. It also raised persistent questions about the wisdom of both military intervention and nation-building as tools of US foreign policy. The war has remained a touchstone for national debate and partisan division even as the United States and Vietnam moved to normalize diplomatic relations with the end of the Cold War.


1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-63
Author(s):  
Richard Lobban

I would like to take the liberty of responding to a “statement” which appeared at the end of Issue, number 4 [Winter 1975] which was recently sent to the ASA membership. Since the authors have often sought to keep “politics” out of the Association I was rather surprised to see them taken by a “matter of conscience” which is perhaps one of the most politically charged issues of the day. In any case I was annoyed with the inference that the fight against colonialism, racism, apartheid, and fascism was a “partisan urge” while attributing only the noblest sentiments to their “statement”.It was particularly ironic for the authors to note that they will withdraw their “support” from nationalist organizations and governments which identify Zionism as a form of racism since they stood against a resolution raised and passed in the 1973 ASA meetings calling upon the United States government to recognize the Republic of Guinea Bissau.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Bergeron-Boutin

The long and stable Franco-American diplomatic rapport was undermined throughout the American escalation of the Vietnam War. This paper specifically examines French President Charles de Gaulle’s increasing discontent at his ally’s involvement in Southeast Asia and analyzes the decisions of successive American presidents to ignore him. Beginning in 1961, with the inauguration of American President John F. Kennedy, the paper proceeds chronologically to 1964, by which point transatlantic relations had worsened considerably as a result of de Gaulle’s growing confrontation of the Indochina question. Using archival diplomatic documents from both countries, this paper seeks to explain why the United States government refused to comply with De Gaulle’s requests. This papers makes two main conclusions: American policy makers were willfully blind to their ally’s suggestions and the French proposal for the neutralization of Vietnam was not realistic. These findings are supported by various policy decisions made leading up to the war, relying heavily on primary sources to demonstrate the failings of both the French proposal and the American willingness to consider the perspective of a crucial ally.


Author(s):  
Michael David Martignago

The Vietnam War was the quintessential Cold War conflict between the United States and the Sino-Soviet supplied, nationalistic North Vietnamese. This war saw the world’s most wealthiest and dominant military force suffer a long, drawn out defeat to a poverty-stricken society of farmers, armed with nothing but an unyielding nationalism and outdated weaponry. This paper examines the United States’ involvement in Vietnam throughout the Vietnam War and also explores the ways in which the Vietnam War affected the Cold War. Beginning with President Harry S. Truman in 1945 and ending with President Gerald Ford in 1975, this paper examines the motivations behind each of the six United States Presidential Administrations during the Vietnam War and gives an in-depth explanation for the crucial decisions that were made by the United States Government over the course of the war. The effect that these foreign policy decisions and directives had on the Cold War atmosphere is also heavily analyzed. The faults and failures of the United States that led to their humiliating defeat in Vietnam consequently altered the Cold War atmosphere. In order to fully understand the Cold War, it is necessary to understand the Vietnam War and its impact on United States foreign policy.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (01) ◽  
pp. 127-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Champney ◽  
Paul Edleman

AbstractThis study employs the Solomon Four-Group Design to measure student knowledge of the United States government and student knowledge of current events at the beginning of a U.S. government course and at the end. In both areas, knowledge improves significantly. Regarding knowledge of the U.S. government, both males and females improve at similar rates, those with higher and lower GPAs improve at similar rates, and political science majors improve at similar rates to non-majors. Regarding current events, males and females improve at similar rates. However, those with higher GPAs and political science majors improve more than others.


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