The Oil Strategies of Nazi Germany

Author(s):  
Rosemary A. Kelanic

This chapter analyzes four cases that span the Nazi era in Germany. From the beginning of the Nazi regime in March of 1933 until its defeat in April of 1945, the chapter identifies three major turning points: (1) Adolf Hitler's announcement of the Four-Year Plan in September of 1936; (2) the imposition of an Anglo-French naval blockade against Germany on September 3, 1939; and (3) the shift from blitzkrieg to attrition warfare against the Soviet Union in December of 1941. This divides the case into four distinct periods: March 1933 to August 1936; September 1936 until September 3, 1939; September 4, 1939, until the end of December 1941; and January 1942 through the end of the war in April 1945. Hitler's anticipatory strategies changed over time, in tandem with his country's coercive vulnerability, intensifying from self-sufficiency before World War II to indirect control at the war's start to, finally, direct control after Operation Barbarossa failed to speedily defeat the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). One would expect that Hitler, as the most expansionist leader of the twentieth century, would engage in conquest to get oil; yet primarily, he sought oil security through less extreme measures.

Author(s):  
Steve R. Waddell

With the outbreak of war in Europe, a growing fear of and ultimately a concerted effort to defeat Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany defined American involvement. Competing Allied national and strategic interests resulted in serious debates, but the common desire to defeat the enemy proved stronger than any disagreements. President Franklin Roosevelt, understanding the isolationist sentiments of the American public and the dangers of Nazism and Imperial Japan perhaps better than most, carefully led the nation through the difficult period of 1939–1941, overseeing a gradual increase in American military preparedness and support for those standing up to Nazi Germany, as the German military forces achieved victory after victory. Following American entry into the war, strategic discussions in 1942–1943 often involved ambitious American military plans countered by British voices of moderation. The forces and supplies available made a direct invasion of northern France unfeasible. The American desire to launch an immediate invasion across the English Channel gave way to the Allied invasion of North Africa and subsequent assault on Sicily and the Italian peninsula. The Tehran Conference in November 1943 marked a transition, as the buildup of American forces in Europe and the overwhelming contribution of war materials enabled the United States to determine American-British strategy from late 1943 to the end of the war. The final year and a half of the war in Europe saw a major shift in strategic leadership, as the United States along with the Soviet Union assumed greater control over the final steps toward victory over Nazi Germany. By the end of World War II (May 1945 in Europe and September 1945 in Asia), the United States had not only assumed the leadership of the Western Allies, it had achieved superpower status with the greatest air force and navy in the world. It was also the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. Even with the tensions with the Soviet Union and beginnings of a Cold War, most Americans felt the United States was the leader as the world entered the post-war era.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-44
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Borisov

It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Bazyler ◽  
Kathryn Lee Boyd ◽  
Kristen L. Nelson ◽  
Rajika L. Shah

Between 1939 and 1944, Finland fought two separate wars against the Soviet Union. In 1941, Finland entered World War II aligned with Nazi Germany in its fight against the Soviet Union. Finland was never conquered or occupied by Germany, nor were any anti-Jewish laws passed in the country. No immovable property—private, communal, or heirless—was taken from Jews or other targeted groups in Finland during the war. As a result, no immovable property restitution laws were required. Finland endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009 and the Guidelines and Best Practices in 2010.


Author(s):  
Volker R. Berghahn

This chapter covers the years up to the official American entry into World War II on the side of Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany, Italy, and Japan. During the years 1933–41, strategies were developed by those six countries and then turned into actual policies that determined the shape of the relations of American big business with Britain and Germany during the subsequent wartime and postwar periods. And this decade was also decisive for the organization of both the world economy and world politics for the following fifty years until the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989–90.


Author(s):  
Joseph T. Glatthaar

At the end of World War II, America was in a uniquely strong position which it was not always able to leverage. “The limits of power” details the deterioration of America’s relationship with the Soviet Union into weapons stockpiling, brinkmanship, and the threat of mutually assured destruction. The Vietnam War lost popularity over time and while wars in the Gulf captured the public imagination, they fueled anti-American sentiment in those territories. During the War on Terror, strategists first overestimated the effectiveness of technology and then underestimated numbers and costs required for the lengthier, costlier, but more effective “boots on the ground” approach. Care for veterans was also under-resourced.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


Author(s):  
Vēsma Lēvalde

The article is a cultural-historical study and a part of the project Uniting History, which aims to discover the multicultural aspect of performing art in pre-war Liepaja and summarize key facts about the history of the Liepāja Symphony Orchestra. The study also seeks to identify the performing artists whose life was associated with Liepāja and who were repressed between 1941 and 1945, because of aggression by both the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany. Until now, the cultural life of this period in Liepāja has been studied in a fragmentary way, and materials are scattered in various archives. There are inaccurate and even contradictory testimonies of events of that time. The study marks both the cultural and historical situation of the 1920s and the 1930s in Liepāja and tracks the fates of several artists in the period between 1939 and 1945. On the eve of World War II, Liepāja has an active cultural life, especially in theatre and music. Liepāja City Drama and Opera is in operation staging both dramatic performances, operas, and ballet, employing an orchestra. The symphony orchestra also operated at the Liepāja Philharmonic, where musicians were recruited every season according to the principles of contemporary festival orchestras. Liepāja Folk Conservatory (music school) had also formed an orchestra of students and teachers. Guest concerts were held regularly. A characteristic feature of performing arts in Liepaja was its multicultural character – musicians of different nationalities with experience from different schools of the world were encountered there. World War II not only disrupted the balance in society, but it also had a very concrete and tragic impact on the fates of the people, including the performing artists. Many were killed, many repressed and placed in prisons and camps, and many went to exile to the West. Others were forced to either co-operate with the occupation forces or give up their identity and, consequently, their career as an artist. Nevertheless, some artists risked their lives to save others.


2020 ◽  
Vol 152 ◽  
pp. 142-151
Author(s):  
Uta G. Lagvilava ◽  

A few months after the fascist Germany’s attack on the USSR, under harsh wartime conditions, at the end of 1941 military industry of the Soviet Union began to produce such a quantity of military equipment that subsequently was providing not only replenishment of losses, but also improvement of technical equipment of the Red Army forces . Successful production of military equipment during World War II became one of the main factors in the victory over fascism. One of the unlit pages in affairs of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) is displacement and evacuation of a huge number of enterprises and people to the east, beyond the Urals, which were occupied by German troops at the beginning of the war in the summer of 1941. All this was done according to the plans developed with direct participation of NKVD, which united before the beginning and during the war departments now called the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, SVR, the Russian Guard, Ministry of Emergency Situations, FAPSI and several smaller ones. And all these NKVD structures during the war were headed by Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document