scholarly journals Do Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) perceive what conspecifics do and do not see?

PeerJ ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. e1693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Canteloup ◽  
Emilie Piraux ◽  
Nicolas Poulin ◽  
Hélène Meunier

The understanding of the visual perception of others, also named visual perspective taking, is a component of Theory of Mind. Although strong evidence of visual perspective taking has been reported in great apes, the issue is more open to discussion in monkeys. We investigated whether Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) know what conspecifics do and do not see, using a food competition paradigm originally developed in great apes. We tested individuals in pairs, after establishing the dominance relationship within each pair. Twenty-one pairs were tested in four different conditions. In one condition, the subordinate had the choice between two pieces of food, one that was visible only to it and another that was also visible to the dominant. It was predicted that if the subordinate understands that the dominant cannot see both pieces of food because one is hidden from its view, the subordinate should preferentially go for the food visible only to itself. In the three other conditions, we varied the temporal and visual access to food for both individuals, to control for alternative explanations based on dominance. We recorded the first movement direction chosen by subjects, i.e. towards a) visible food b) hidden food or c) elsewhere; and the outcome of the test, i.e. the quantity of food obtained. Results showed that subordinates moved preferentially for the hidden food when released simultaneously with the dominant and also with a head start on the dominant. By contrast, dominants’ choices of the two pieces of food were random. We also describe and discuss some of the strategies used by subordinates in these tests. According to the whole of our results, Tonkean macaques seem capable of visual perspective taking despite the fact that a low-level explanation as behavior reading has not been totally excluded.


Behaviour ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 138 (11-12) ◽  
pp. 1337-1354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Byrne ◽  
Michael Mendl ◽  
Claire Devereux ◽  
Suzanne Held

AbstractAnimals with visual perspective taking abilities should differ in their responses to individuals that do and individuals that do not have visual access to some critical event. We investigated whether domestic pigs show behaviour consistent with this ability. Ten subjects were trained to move from a start box into one of four corridors that they had seen a human enter with a bucket for baiting. They received a food reward for choosing the correct corridor. In unrewarded probe tests, the subjects' view of the corridors was blocked, but they could see a 'seeing' companion pig who had visual access to the baiting event, and another, whose view was also blocked, located in start boxes to their left and right. After the companions had been released and entered corridors, the subject was released and which companion it followed was recorded. Eight pigs followed companions less frequently than expected by chance, probably due to specific corridor or centre/side preferences. However, one subject showed no positional bias, and a significant preference for following the 'seeing' companion, consistent with the ability to take another's visual perspective. Our design rules out learning of a correct response during the experiment, by testing subjects in unrewarded probe trials, and by using companions that were equally trained and unaware of the subject's task. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that previously learned contingencies were used to solve the problem. We therefore consider that this apparent visual perspective taking ability does not necessarily imply any ability to understand knowledge states.



2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Schneider ◽  
Anne Grigutsch ◽  
Matthias Schurz ◽  
Romi Zäske ◽  
Stefan R. Schweinberger

It has been hypothesized that visual perspective-taking, a basic Theory of Mind mechanism, might operate quite automatically particularly in terms of ´what´ someone else sees. As such we were interested in whether different social categories of an agent (e.g., gender, race, nationality) influence this mental state ascription mechanism. We tested this assumption by investigating the Samson level-1 visual perspective-taking paradigm using agents with different ethnic nationality appearances. A group of self-identified Turkish and German participants were asked to make visual perspective judgments from their own perspective (self-judgment) as well as from the perspective of a prototypical Turkish or German agent (other-judgment). The respective related interference effects - altercentric and egocentric interferences - were measured. When making other-judgments, German participants showed increased egocentric interferences for Turkish compared to German agents. Turkish participants showed no ethnic group influence for egocentric interferences and reported feeling associated with the German and Turkish nationality to a similar extent. For self-judgments, altercentric interferences were of similar magnitude for both ethnic agents in both participant groups. Overall this indicates that in level-1 visual perspective-taking, other-judgments and related egocentric interferences are sensitive to social categories and are better described as a flexible, controlled and deliberate mental state ascription mechanism. In contrast, self-judgments and related altercentric interference effects are better described as automatic, efficient and unconscious mental state ascription mechanisms. In a broader sense the current results suggest that we should stop considering automaticity an all-or-none principle when it comes theory of mind processes.



2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mi Tian ◽  
Tianrui Luo ◽  
Jinxia Ding ◽  
Xin Wang ◽  
Him Cheung


Author(s):  
Jing Zhai ◽  
Jiushu Xie ◽  
Jiahan Chen ◽  
Yujie Huang ◽  
Yuchao Ma ◽  
...  




NeuroImage ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 118462
Author(s):  
Yuan-Wei Yao ◽  
Vivien Chopurian ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Claus Lamm ◽  
Hauke R. Heekeren


2017 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 102-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun M. Eack ◽  
Jessica A. Wojtalik ◽  
Matcheri S. Keshavan ◽  
Nancy J. Minshew


Cognition ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonia F. de C. Hamilton ◽  
Rachel Brindley ◽  
Uta Frith


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