International conflict management after the end of the Cold War

African peace ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Paris

Peacebuilding—helping societies make the transition from civil violence to a durable peace—has been the UN’s principal security activity since the end of the Cold War. Although peacebuilding methods have been refined over years of trial and error, it remains an uncertain science, yielding mixed results. Nevertheless, for all its shortcomings, the international peacebuilding ‘project’ remains one of the most remarkable exercises in collective conflict management the world has ever witnessed. This chapter identifies the principal features of the UN’s peacebuilding operations, examines the record of peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War, and describes some of the main issues and controversies surrounding these missions.


1995 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muthiah Alagappa

Regionalism, and more generally multilateralism, is commanding considerable attention in the policy and intellectual communities. In the security domain, this interest can be traced to a number of developments. One is the regionalization of international security brought about by the dramatic change in the dynamics of the international political system. In the absence of a new overarching and overriding global-level security dynamic, domestic, bilateral and regional dynamics have become more salient and have to be addressed in their own terms. It is now much more necessary and possible, for example, to discuss security in Asia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East in regional and sub-regional contexts, quite independent of a global dynamic or developments in other regions. While the interests and linkages arising from the involvement of external powers must still be taken into account, the context is qualitatively different from the Cold War era, when the dynamics of the superpower conflict permeated and in many cases subsumed the local dynamics of conflicts.


2004 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 612-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Tures

The Middle East has witnessed a recent spate of alterations in rulers and regimes. These new leaders are coming to power in countries having a history of international conflict with other states in the region. Will the change in government exacerbate interstate crises, producing disputes and wars? Or will the nascent leadership steer their countries to peace, choosing instead to focus on an internal consolidation of power? To answer this question, this article examines the theories of foreign policy behavior of new leaders. It discusses the results of a quantitative analysis of an earlier time frame: the initial years of the Cold War. The article then conducts a series of case study analyses of contemporary times to determine if the theory and prior statistical tests remain valid. The results show that new administrations are more likely to target rivals with a threat, display, or limited use of force. Such incoming leaders, however, seem reluctant to drag their countries into a full-scale war. These findings hold for a variety of countries in a number of different contexts. Such results are relevant for Middle East scholars, conflict mediators, as well as American foreign policymakers who seem to have adopted a taste for regime change in the region.


1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 721-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Saideman

With the end of the Cold War, many observers expected that international conflict would be less likely to occur and easier to manage. Given the successful resolution of the Gulf War and the European Community's (EC) efforts to develop a common foreign policy, observers expected international cooperation to manage the few conflicts that might break out. Instead, the disintegration of Yugoslavia contradicted these expectations. Rather than developing a common foreign policy, European states were divided over how to deal with Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Germany pushed for relatively quick recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, whereas other members of the EC wanted to go slower. Some observers expected Russia to fall in line with the West because of its need for investment and trade, but instead it supported Serbia. It is puzzling that Europe failed to cooperate regardless of whether greater international cooperation could have managed this conflict. How can we make sense of the international relations of Yugoslavia's demise? Since secession is not a new phenomenon, we should study previous secessionist conflicts to determine if they share certain dynamics, and we should consider applying to Yugoslavia the arguments developed to understand such conflicts.


2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL D. SENESE ◽  
JOHN A. VASQUEZ

This analysis outlines and tests the steps-to-war explanation of international conflict. At the core of this explanation is the expectation that territorial disputes are a key source of war and that as states that have these disputes make politically relevant alliances, have recurring disputes and build up their military forces against each other, they will experience ever-increasing probabilities of war. The absence of these risk factors is expected to lessen the chances of severe conflict. Utilizing the Militarized Interstate Dispute data of the Correlates of War project, the data analyses provide full support for the steps-to-war explanation during the 1816–1945 era and partial support for the Cold War nuclear 1946–92 span. Among the findings for this latter period is the presence of a curvilinear relationship between the number of prior disputes and the probability of war – after a large number of disputes, states begin to ritualize their behaviour at levels short of war.


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