scholarly journals DEVELOPING STANDARDIZED FACILITY CONTINGENCY PLANS

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-11
Author(s):  
David A. Davidson

ABSTRACT Texaco consists of several operating departments that are, in effect, independent companies. Each of these departments is responsible for complying with all environmental laws and regulations. This includes the preparation by each facility to respond to an oil spill at that location. For larger spills, however, management of the response will rest with corporate regional response teams. Personnel from all departments make up the regional teams. In 1990, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act. In 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard began developing oil spill response contingency plan regulations, which they are still working on. Meanwhile, four of the five west coast states have also passed laws requiring contingency plans. (Only Hawaii has chosen to wait and see what the federal regulations will entail.) Three of the states have already adopted regulations. Given these laws and regulations, along with its corporate structure, Texaco addressed the need to standardize local facility plans as well as its response organization. This paper discusses how, by working together, the Texaco corporate international oil spill response staff and the Texaco western region on-scene commander developed:A standard contingency plan format crossing corporate boundaries and meeting federal and state requirements.A response organization applicable to any size facility or spill.A strategy to sell the standard contingency plan and response organization to the operating units.

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 944-944
Author(s):  
Carolyn M. White ◽  
Patricia Donahue

ABSTRACT The existence of area contingency plans, at least in draft form, for coastal and inland areas, combined with the National Contingency Plan's emphasis on and deferral to area committees, presents a timely opportunity for area committees to address vital response issues. By drawing upon each others’ plans, area committees can enhance their own plans and assist the development of a comprehensive and consistent system for oil spill response. This presentation identifies specific area committee responsibilities imposed under the National Contingency Plan. Materials to be available at the conference will suggest key issues for inclusion in plan revisions and offer helpful samples from existing plans.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Villoria ◽  
Elia Gomez ◽  
Nelson García Tavel

ABSTRACT In November 1993, the first drill of the Venezuelan national oil spill contingency plan (VNCP) was carried out to evaluate both the response capability of the plan to cope with an emergency and the effectiveness of the regional response organization to manage the given scenario. During four days of intensive work, 800 participants, evaluators, and controllers of the drill made decisions and took actions to mobilize resources and pollution countermeasure equipment for cleanup operations. To measure the effectiveness of the response actions, 23 oil spill response processes were evaluated based on flow charts or decision trees designed for each process. In summary, the drill covered all areas related to response actions in the case of an oil spill (alert, notification, evaluation, decision-making, mobilization, field response, and postmortem), evaluating the ability of the VNCP to cope with a major emergency and identifying weaknesses in order to improve the response capability.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017425
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Joe Stewart ◽  
Yvonne Addassi

California has approximately >10,000 vessels calling its ports each year, and 200–300 facilities state wide, many of which are required to have a California Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan) on file with Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR). Spill Management Teams (SMT), either staffed by Contingency Plan holders' employees or contracted out, and the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure must be described in these plans. OSPR introduced an unannounced SMT drill program (Program) in 2012 to ensure that Contingency Plan holders can successfully complete the proper initial notifications, activate their SMT, and use ICS in accordance with their approved Contingency Plan and California Code 820.01, Drills and Exercises. There are multiple goals of this Program, including the enhanced capability of SMTs, OSPR, and other partners. This Program provides continued education and training for Contingency Plan holders and SMTs in an effort to bolster the initial response phase of an actual incident. Through these drills, SMTs must demonstrate that they could make proper notifications and decisions during an actual incident and be staffed with trained personnel in ICS to fill positions before State and Federal representatives respond. Additionally, SMTs should deploy resources listed in their approved Contingency Plans and ensure those resources are up to date, available, and sufficient. Furthermore, drills provide an opportunity for OSPR and SMTs to build relationships through testing these procedures, which should make the initial response more efficient and effective. Lastly, the drills are often conducted with representatives from United States Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have their own drill programs. Working in conjunction with federal partners ensures continuity and fewer required drills of SMTs. Since the beginning of the Program, SMTs continue to improve their response capabilities, validated by more successfully completed unannounced drills. OSPR has conducted 30 unannounced drills, all of which were on SMTs for marine facilities and vessels. With the expanded authority of OSPR to regulate facilities statewide in 2015, this Program will continue to grow. Ultimately, a more comprehensive Program should lead to enhanced SMT capability statewide, and therefore better protection of the State's natural resources overall. The goal of this poster will be to describe: 1) the history and purpose of this Program; 2) the lessons learned and improvements of SMTs and Contingency Plans; and 3) the expansion of the Program from marine to statewide.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2879-2894
Author(s):  
Christopher Klarmann ◽  
LCDR Johna Rossetti

ABSTRACT ID: 2017-101 – GIUEs: Developing Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 to conduct Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUE), a cornerstone of the oil spill exercise cycle. These exercises are instrumental for USCG Captains of the Port (COTP) to evaluate industry preparedness for oil spill response by specifically testing a facility or vessel on notification procedures, response time, and deployment of facility-owned or Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) equipment. Facility Response Plan holders and Vessel Response Plan holders are subject to these exercises under federal regulations 33 C.F.R. § 154 and § 155. In 2013, the USCG restructured their GIUE policy to provide better guidance for employees. This updated policy detailed how to properly plan and conduct a GIUE as well as established expectations following both satisfactory and unsatisfactory exercises. In this paper we will examine the changes that the USCG has made regarding its policy on planning and conducting GIUEs, describe how USCG field units are implementing the new policy, including how unsatisfactory GIUEs are addressed, and examine what commonalities, are being seen in GIUE unsatisfactory results. Finally, we will discuss how plan holders, OSROs, and regulatory agencies can work together to better prepare for responding to an environmental emergency when it occurs.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 927-928 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger D. Mowery ◽  
Bill Edgar

ABSTRACT The authors of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) viewed the key to effective response to be a contingency plan developed by all stakeholders. OPA 90 laid the groundwork for developing true consensus-based contingency plans. Northwest U.S. state and federal agencies have combined the plans of two U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port zones, one Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) region, and three states into one document that addresses general operational and administrative spill response issues. Operational issues that differ among the participants are covered in comprehensive geographic response plans (GRPs).


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wu Jiabin

ABSTRACT Recently Shanghai's economics have been rapidly developed, and the oil shipping is daily on the increase, In order to prevent oil pollution, Shanghai has made great efforts, such as having made several pollution prevention laws and regulations, improving the construction of ships, map out oil spill contingency plan, produce the equipment and materials to handle an accident in case it occurs, etc.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-262
Author(s):  
Charles R. Corbett

ABSTRACT The U.S. government has elected to proceed unilaterally with respect to oil spill response plans for vessels—despite the fact that it is party to two important treaties which support a globally unified system. While the timetable for implementing the vessel response plans required by U. S. legislation moves forward for tanker owners, the U. S. executive branch has not kept pace by providing badly needed guidelines—demanded by the same legislation. Of particular importance are the failure of revisions to the U. S. National Contingency Plan, area contingency plans, and oil spill cleanup contractor approval procedures and guidelines to appear.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.


1989 ◽  
Vol 1989 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-219
Author(s):  
P. B. Ryan ◽  
D. J. S. Brown

ABSTRACT Oil spill contingency planning is concerned with the organization of preplanned responses to anticipated oil pollution emergencies in defined geographical areas. A major factor that must be considered when drafting any contingency plan is the support that can be expected from a variety of sources in times of emergency. Oil spills vary in both their magnitude and complexity and so do the responses to such incidents. It follows, therefore, that there is a tiered structure of oil spill contingency planning and response and that there is a corresponding tiering of sources of support. This paper identifies the various tiers of oil spill planning and response and reviews the external support relevant to each tier. The discussion base of this paper relates particularly to the ROPME sea area as defined herein but many of the observations will apply to other regions of the world where similar situations may be encountered.


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