Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs): Developing Response Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2879-2894
Author(s):  
Christopher Klarmann ◽  
LCDR Johna Rossetti

ABSTRACT ID: 2017-101 – GIUEs: Developing Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 to conduct Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUE), a cornerstone of the oil spill exercise cycle. These exercises are instrumental for USCG Captains of the Port (COTP) to evaluate industry preparedness for oil spill response by specifically testing a facility or vessel on notification procedures, response time, and deployment of facility-owned or Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) equipment. Facility Response Plan holders and Vessel Response Plan holders are subject to these exercises under federal regulations 33 C.F.R. § 154 and § 155. In 2013, the USCG restructured their GIUE policy to provide better guidance for employees. This updated policy detailed how to properly plan and conduct a GIUE as well as established expectations following both satisfactory and unsatisfactory exercises. In this paper we will examine the changes that the USCG has made regarding its policy on planning and conducting GIUEs, describe how USCG field units are implementing the new policy, including how unsatisfactory GIUEs are addressed, and examine what commonalities, are being seen in GIUE unsatisfactory results. Finally, we will discuss how plan holders, OSROs, and regulatory agencies can work together to better prepare for responding to an environmental emergency when it occurs.

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


1985 ◽  
Vol 1985 (1) ◽  
pp. 623-625
Author(s):  
Leon J. Kazmierczak ◽  
Thomas A. Crawford

ABSTRACT Sun Transport, the Marine division of Sun Refining and Marketing Company, a subsidiary of Sun Company, Inc., has conducted a series of drills to assess the effectiveness of its Oil Spill Response Plan. The latest drill, third in the series, was conducted in September 1982. Papers presented at the 1979, 1981, and 1983 Oil Spill Conference describe the plan, its rationale, and the previous two drills. This paper reviews the training progression of the previous exercises and reports on the findings and experiences of this latest exercise. As in previous drills, the planning committee and a few others were the only people in Sun Company with any prior knowledge of the drill. This simulation was the most extensive. It involved simultaneous and separate call-out scenarios, full-scale use of contractor cleanup crew and equipment, chartering aircraft, and participation by representatives of the Clean Caribbean Cooperative, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), and the U.S. Coast Guard. The realism provided by this exercise allowed each participant to experience firsthand the problems on-scene at a major cleanup operation and to come away with confidence in managing them.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 926-926
Author(s):  
Duane Michael Smith

ABSTRACT With the implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 came the requirement for vessels to develop plans for responding to oil spills from their vessels. While some companies had such plans in the past, the National Response System did not formally recognize their existence. Individual vessel response plans must now be viewed as an integral part of the National Response System. All of the parties that could be involved in an oil spill response must begin to view themselves as one tile of many that make up the mosaic known as the National Response System.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 848-850
Author(s):  
David C. Barry ◽  
John J. Gallagher

ABSTRACT Since June 1993, the Center for Marine Environmental Protection and Safety has operated (and integrated into its industry-oriented training programs for the Oil Pollution Act of 1990) a Nor-Control Oil Spill Management Simulator.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-262
Author(s):  
Charles R. Corbett

ABSTRACT The U.S. government has elected to proceed unilaterally with respect to oil spill response plans for vessels—despite the fact that it is party to two important treaties which support a globally unified system. While the timetable for implementing the vessel response plans required by U. S. legislation moves forward for tanker owners, the U. S. executive branch has not kept pace by providing badly needed guidelines—demanded by the same legislation. Of particular importance are the failure of revisions to the U. S. National Contingency Plan, area contingency plans, and oil spill cleanup contractor approval procedures and guidelines to appear.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-172
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Sobieski ◽  
Kathryn L. Kelley

ABSTRACT No. 2017 – 296 On April 11, 2016 the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) released the 2016 National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines. The new guidelines became effective on June 10, 2016 and replaced the previous guidelines issued in 2002. Established under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), the PREP guidelines were developed to provide a mechanism for compliance with response plan drill and exercise requirements under the Act and implementing regulations. Use of the PREP Guidelines is voluntary, however, compliance with the PREP guidelines will satisfy these requirements. The 2016 PREP Guidelines apply to all OPA 90 response plan holders including USCG regulated vessels and marine transportation-related facilities, EPA non-transportation-related onshore and offshore facilities, PHMSA-regulated facilities and pipelines, BSEE-regulated offshore facilities and area on-scene coordinator (OSC) exercises. The guidelines specify that, within a three-year cycle, all elements of the Facility Response Plan (FRP) or Vessel Response Plan (VRP), including the 15 core components, should be exercised in a drill, or series of drills, involving the Owner/Operator, Qualified Individual (QI), Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSRO) and Salvage and Marine Firefighting (SMFF) resource providers. This paper will provide an overview of the PREP requirements, including plan holder initiated exercises, the remote assessment and consultation exercises (RACE) for vessels, shore-based tabletop exercises, response equipment deployment exercises, and Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GUIEs). As the QI, O’Brien’s has designed, conducted, played, and or evaluated well over 1,000 PREP related activities. This paper will discuss the implementation of PREP from the QI’s perspective, and the identification of some lessons learned and best practices that may be applicable more broadly to support the regulated industry and response community with the implementation of PREP.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2053-2063
Author(s):  
LT Christopher Kimrey ◽  
Doug Helton

ABSTRACT Abandoned and derelict vessels are a problem in almost every U.S. port and waterway, and these vessels can have significant impacts on the coastal environment and economy, including oil pollution, marine debris, and wildlife entrapment. They become hazards to navigation, illegal dumping of waste oils and hazardous materials and general public health hazards. Pollution response, including removal and disposal of these vessels can be complex and costly. As a result, many abandoned vessels are left in place unless they are obstructing or threatening to obstruct navigation, or threatening a pollution discharge. Faced with a growing number of abandoned vessels and costly interventions, the National Response Team (NRT) held a session on abandoned vessels during the 2011 Co-Chairs meeting in Dallas, TX. Representatives from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) gave presentations about the scope of the problem and the need for national guidance for Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs). Based on issues presented and discussed during the session, the NRT Executive Secretariat agreed an interagency best practices document was needed. An Abandoned Vessel Response Workgroup was established, co-chaired by the USCG and NOAA, and was tasked with identifying: 1) best practices used for responding to abandoned vessels; 2) the regulatory and policy authority of each agency with a nexus to abandoned vessels; and 3) the roles and responsibilities of each agency pursuant to those authorities. This paper summarizes the report on authorities and best practices.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document