Integrated Incident Management System

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 867-868
Author(s):  
Grant Vidrine ◽  
Larry Dietrick ◽  
Carl Lautenberger ◽  
Charlene Hutton

ABSTRACT The North Slope of Alaska Oil Operators—ARCO, (Alaska), Inc.; BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.; and Alyeska Pipeline Service Company—and their governing agencies—Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—currently use some form of the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage oil spill incidents and exercises. Although the ICS principles are similar, the structure, terminology and forms are diverse. The North Slope operators and regulatory agencies in Alaska are “thinking out-of-the-box” these days with the development of a new, all hazards, systems to maximize the use of resources on the North Slope. The new integrated Incident Management System (IMS) was designed to offer benefits such as standardized processes, forms and nomenclature, integrated organizational structures, common management/training, enhanced interactions, shared learning's, central coordination, standard Emergency Operation Center layouts, and access to equipment and personnel.

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-135
Author(s):  
Edward J Wieliczkiewicz

ABSTRACT In a crisis situation responders from different organizations may find each other's priorities and goals in conflict. By training to a common standard, we create an environment where adversarial conflicts are replaced with open discussions. We may disagree on the path, but in the end it is in everyone's best interest to have a common, well understood goal. After 2010, it became apparent to me that agencies and industry did not always share a common understanding of the principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The result would be conflicting agendas, potential mistrust and a perception that responders did not have control of the emergency. This paper will describe the method that Alaska's North Slope responders used in 2012 to extend the practice of spill response teams training together to the Incident Management Teams and the benefits that resulted from this approach. Our goal was to strengthen the response posture of Alaska's North Slope through an aggressive training program involving multiple industry and agency partners in a year-long series of classroom and field opportunities, working together as members of the same team. A common national curriculum delivered by a team of certified instructors allowed participants to develop or reinforce a common understanding of the NIMS based principles and processes. At the end, teams would participate in a 3 day long field exercise (using a scenario they had never seen before) involving responder and equipment deployment based on plans developed by the Unified Command. Rarely does a training product actually end up as a plan implemented in the field. Because the scenario was not rehearsed, this reality check ensured everyone took their duties seriously. Responders would implement tactics, request and expect supplies, and the consequences of the team's actions would result in a success, or failure, that could affect the reputation of all the parties involved. Program participants included personnel from six oil companies (including UK based personnel), U.S Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency, State of Alaska, North Slope Borough, Alaska Cleans Seas and a myriad of North Slope Spill Response Team. Key benefits included a common understanding of NIMS ICS at all levels, building relationships, a mentoring environment allowing inexperienced participants to build competency and expertise, and meeting portions of contingency plan readiness requirements. The program helped reinforce Alaska's North Slope responder's reputation for world class response capability.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 972-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph J. Leonard

ABSTRACT In October 1994, southeast Texas experienced some of its worst flooding ever. Near Houston, the raging waters of the San Jacinto River caused a pipeline to rupture, spilling vast quantities of gasoline. When this gasoline found an ignition source, the river became a devastating conflagration. The Coast Guard immediately activated its incident command system (ICS) with a unified command to direct response activities. Lessons learned following the San Jacinto River incident will improve future response activities and serve as the foundation for the adoption of the National Interagency Incident Management System (which includes the ICS) by the Coast Guard and the state of Texas.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2253-2259
Author(s):  
Kasey Talbot ◽  
Jeff Dauzat

ABSTRACT Hurricane Isaac made landfall on August 29, 2012 over Louisiana, lingering overhead for more than 60 hours. While most were concerned with surviving the 80+ mph winds and ensuing storm surge and floods, Coast Guard members statewide knew there would be no calm after the storm; instead it would be a grueling fight to restore the port to normalcy. The slow moving storm caused grounded deep draft vessels and barges, spilled oil, releases of hazardous materials (HAZMAT), and damage to various buildings and infrastructures. U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans integrated local, states, and federal agencies into a Unified Command structure to coordinate limited resources post-storm. Within Sector New Orleans, the Incident Management Division (IMD) made it their primary mission to mitigate any substantial threats of oil discharges or HAZMAT releases and ensure proper cleanup. On September 2, 2012, IMD utilized the Incident Command System (ICS) to establish a Marine Environmental Response (MER) Incident Management Team (IMT) to achieve their post storm mission. The MER IMT consisted of 200 personnel, of which 60 were Coast Guard members, and included representatives from the National Strike Force, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO), Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), and three Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSROs); together the team collected 4500 barrels of oily water and 1200 HAZMAT containers, deployed over 11,000 feet of containment boom, and federalized three pollution projects. The MER IMT was disestablished on September 28, 2012 leaving Sector New Orleans IMD to maintain complete management of the ongoing federalized projects, “Fantome”, “Map Drilling”, and “Gulf South”. The projects included oil discharges in adjacent waterways of two oil production/storage facilities, oil discharges from fixed facility barges, and oil discharges from a storage platform along the marsh shoreline. Sector New Orleans executed $9.5 million in Oil Spill Liability Trust Funds towards emergency response efforts and successfully restored safety to the public health, welfare, environment, and maritime community.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1051-1055
Author(s):  
K. Moore

ABSTRACT On January 12, 2007 the MIV TONG CHENG, a 485 ft. Chinese flag break bulk vessel loaded with cargo and 130,000 gallons of oil, en route to the Panama Canal, notified Coast Guard Sector Honolulu that it had suffered damage to its #2 cargo hold and the hold was full of seawater. Located 700 miles from the nearest port (Honolulu), the vessel'S pumps were unable to keep up with the flooding, and with 26 personnel on board, the vessel advised it was diverting to Honolulu for emergency repairs. As the vessel proceeded toward Honolulu, its decreasing speed, the presence of two additional cargo ships in escort and the discovery of an oil sheen trailing the vessel raised significant concerns over the threat this posed to Hawaii. At stake in allowing the vessel a safe haven were the pristine shorelines of the Hawaiian Islands and potential crippling of the port'S vital lifeline to commercial marine traffic, its only source of sustenance. A myriad of issues had to be addressed as the vessel made preparations to come into Honolulu Harbor and a multi-agency, international Unified Command was established. The Unified Command, using the Incident Command System, managed the various contingencies from search and rescue of the crew if the ship were lost, to the potential discharge of 130,000 gallons of fuel. A risk-based decision process was employed to weigh the off-shore response challenges against the near-shore risks while taking into account the remoteness and sensitive marine environment of the Hawaiian Islands. This paper provides insight into the dynamic and complex response and the incident management teams decisions regarding allowing this vessel in distress to enter a critical and environmentally sensitive port. The vessel was successfully repaired and allowed to depart Hawaii. This case is a classic example of proper decision making and risk balancing for a critical safe refuge request.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017425
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Joe Stewart ◽  
Yvonne Addassi

California has approximately >10,000 vessels calling its ports each year, and 200–300 facilities state wide, many of which are required to have a California Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan) on file with Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR). Spill Management Teams (SMT), either staffed by Contingency Plan holders' employees or contracted out, and the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure must be described in these plans. OSPR introduced an unannounced SMT drill program (Program) in 2012 to ensure that Contingency Plan holders can successfully complete the proper initial notifications, activate their SMT, and use ICS in accordance with their approved Contingency Plan and California Code 820.01, Drills and Exercises. There are multiple goals of this Program, including the enhanced capability of SMTs, OSPR, and other partners. This Program provides continued education and training for Contingency Plan holders and SMTs in an effort to bolster the initial response phase of an actual incident. Through these drills, SMTs must demonstrate that they could make proper notifications and decisions during an actual incident and be staffed with trained personnel in ICS to fill positions before State and Federal representatives respond. Additionally, SMTs should deploy resources listed in their approved Contingency Plans and ensure those resources are up to date, available, and sufficient. Furthermore, drills provide an opportunity for OSPR and SMTs to build relationships through testing these procedures, which should make the initial response more efficient and effective. Lastly, the drills are often conducted with representatives from United States Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have their own drill programs. Working in conjunction with federal partners ensures continuity and fewer required drills of SMTs. Since the beginning of the Program, SMTs continue to improve their response capabilities, validated by more successfully completed unannounced drills. OSPR has conducted 30 unannounced drills, all of which were on SMTs for marine facilities and vessels. With the expanded authority of OSPR to regulate facilities statewide in 2015, this Program will continue to grow. Ultimately, a more comprehensive Program should lead to enhanced SMT capability statewide, and therefore better protection of the State's natural resources overall. The goal of this poster will be to describe: 1) the history and purpose of this Program; 2) the lessons learned and improvements of SMTs and Contingency Plans; and 3) the expansion of the Program from marine to statewide.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 905-908
Author(s):  
James Lukin ◽  
Ron Hocking ◽  
Fred McAdams ◽  
Bruce McKenzie ◽  
Mary Cocklan-Vendl ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Alaska Clean Seas (ACS), the oil industry spill response cooperative on Alaska's North Slope, has prepared a new core response plan to give ACS operations staff the tactical information they need during a spill response and to allow ACS members to prepare streamlined response plans for facilities. The project grew from the work of the joint agency/industry North Slope Spill Response Project Team, which re-evaluated North Slope response capability. The ACS Technical Manual allows operators to concentrate on spill prevention and overall response strategies. The manual is innovative in that it is based primarily on the operational needs of the responder rather than regulatory demands—although it addresses the regulations, too. Volume 1, Tactics Descriptions, is the heart of the plan and was prepared primarily by ACS operations personnel. These tactics provide building blocks for facility scenarios and contain diagrams; descriptions; equipment, personnel, and support requirements; and operational considerations. Text is minimal in the tactics descriptions, which comprise mainly graphics and tables. The tactics cover safety, containment, recovery/storage, tracking/surveillance, burning, shoreline cleanup, wildlife, disposal, logistics/equipment, and administration. The manual's other volumes provide a facility and environmental map atlas and an Incident Management System manual.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 299651
Author(s):  
Lydia Miner ◽  
Robert Klieforth ◽  
Eppie Hogan

Oil discharge prevention and contingency plans (ODPCPs) have been required under Alaska statutes and regulations for oil exploration, production, storage, and transportation facilities since 1992. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc. (BPXA) has prepared and submitted their North Slope ODPCPs (Milne Point, Endicott, Greater Prudhoe Bay, and Northstar) as a single volume for each facility under these requirements. However, in 2011, when the four plans were renewed, BPXA elected to present their ODPCPs in two volumes for each facility. The purpose of this organizational change from one to two volumes was to focus information in each volume; the first volume is a stand-alone Emergency Action Plan for spill responders, dedicated to spill response planning and preparedness, and the second volume is dedicated to spill prevention requirements and procedures. The 2-volume edition allows BPXA's plan writers, operators, and regulators to concentrate on specific response or prevention topics and regulatory compliance. The 2-volume plan is easier to use and revise through the amendment process. This approach is allowed under Alaska regulations and was embraced by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Federal regulators (Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, US Environmental Protection Agency, US Coast Guard, and US Department of Transportation) have reviewed and approved the 2-volume response plans as well. According to regulators, with such large ODPCPs, the effort to maintain publication efficiency during public review creates a potential risk of confusion or lack of sufficient detail, which may lead to comments that focus on form or style, rather than content. Working with two volumes circumvented this potential problem. Due to the size and lengthy history of the facilities, an comprehensive Alaska regulations governing the contents of ODPCPs, two volumes allowed BPXA to include all of the necessary information for the plans without creating a storage or ergonomic problem for the reviewers. Regular users of the ODPCPs at the BPXA facilities have found that working with a smaller, more focused volume is more efficient.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document