M/V TONG CHENG: SAFE ASSURANCE, SAFE HAVEN, SAFE RESULTS

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1051-1055
Author(s):  
K. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Hawaiian Islands ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Safe Haven ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Marine Traffic ◽  
Near Shore ◽  
Environmentally Sensitive ◽  
To Come ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT On January 12, 2007 the MIV TONG CHENG, a 485 ft. Chinese flag break bulk vessel loaded with cargo and 130,000 gallons of oil, en route to the Panama Canal, notified Coast Guard Sector Honolulu that it had suffered damage to its #2 cargo hold and the hold was full of seawater. Located 700 miles from the nearest port (Honolulu), the vessel'S pumps were unable to keep up with the flooding, and with 26 personnel on board, the vessel advised it was diverting to Honolulu for emergency repairs. As the vessel proceeded toward Honolulu, its decreasing speed, the presence of two additional cargo ships in escort and the discovery of an oil sheen trailing the vessel raised significant concerns over the threat this posed to Hawaii. At stake in allowing the vessel a safe haven were the pristine shorelines of the Hawaiian Islands and potential crippling of the port'S vital lifeline to commercial marine traffic, its only source of sustenance. A myriad of issues had to be addressed as the vessel made preparations to come into Honolulu Harbor and a multi-agency, international Unified Command was established. The Unified Command, using the Incident Command System, managed the various contingencies from search and rescue of the crew if the ship were lost, to the potential discharge of 130,000 gallons of fuel. A risk-based decision process was employed to weigh the off-shore response challenges against the near-shore risks while taking into account the remoteness and sensitive marine environment of the Hawaiian Islands. This paper provides insight into the dynamic and complex response and the incident management teams decisions regarding allowing this vessel in distress to enter a critical and environmentally sensitive port. The vessel was successfully repaired and allowed to depart Hawaii. This case is a classic example of proper decision making and risk balancing for a critical safe refuge request.

Developing a Technological Tool for Managing Complex Environmental Incidents1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 839-842
Author(s):  
Steve Wischmann ◽  
Lome Thomas ◽  
Jim Gynther
Keyword(s):  
Relational Databases ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Management Tools ◽  
Training Requirements ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Technological Tools ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT This paper will discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's response to the need for technological solutions to the incident management challenges posed by oil spills and hazardous material releases. Additionally, this paper will examine some of the difficulties presented by technology itself; that is to say, technological tools come with both implicit and explicit ramifications that must be understood and overcome in order to fully harness the potential contained within such capabilities. With the advent of both the public and Congress demanding increasingly effective spill response and fiscal conservancy, the Coast Guard has sought technological innovations to enhance its ability to coordinate and manage complex, multi-agency response operations. Through the development of the On-Scene Command and Control (OSC2) system, the Coast Guard intends to bring the potential leverage of computer-based technology to the Incident Command System (ICS) by harnessing the advantages of large-screen display, relational databases, and a Geographic Information System (GIS) for mapping response resources and activities. The decision-support and resource tracking advantages produced by OSC2 are expected to contribute mightily to improve performance within the Unified Command/ICS organization. However, the challenges posed by the implementation of OSC2 cannot be ignored. Factors ranging from human resource inhibitions and training requirements to blending individual technical components into a seamless whole must be considered when technological tools are designed, developed, and employed. Technology is not inherently good or bad, but remains always contextual—it is dependent on the intervening factors introduced by the human condition in which it is imagined and then utilized. This paper will discuss these issues and describe the key elements in achieving the success of OSC2 as one of the Coast Guard's spill response management tools.

SAN JACINTO RIVER INCIDENT: ARMEGEDDON VISITS HOUSTON

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 972-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph J. Leonard
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Ignition Source ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Direct Response ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Southeast Texas ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT In October 1994, southeast Texas experienced some of its worst flooding ever. Near Houston, the raging waters of the San Jacinto River caused a pipeline to rupture, spilling vast quantities of gasoline. When this gasoline found an ignition source, the river became a devastating conflagration. The Coast Guard immediately activated its incident command system (ICS) with a unified command to direct response activities. Lessons learned following the San Jacinto River incident will improve future response activities and serve as the foundation for the adoption of the National Interagency Incident Management System (which includes the ICS) by the Coast Guard and the state of Texas.

Hurricane Isaac Post-Storm Response1

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2253-2259
Author(s):  
Kasey Talbot ◽  
Jeff Dauzat
Keyword(s):  
New Orleans ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Environmental Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Moving Storm ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT Hurricane Isaac made landfall on August 29, 2012 over Louisiana, lingering overhead for more than 60 hours. While most were concerned with surviving the 80+ mph winds and ensuing storm surge and floods, Coast Guard members statewide knew there would be no calm after the storm; instead it would be a grueling fight to restore the port to normalcy. The slow moving storm caused grounded deep draft vessels and barges, spilled oil, releases of hazardous materials (HAZMAT), and damage to various buildings and infrastructures. U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans integrated local, states, and federal agencies into a Unified Command structure to coordinate limited resources post-storm. Within Sector New Orleans, the Incident Management Division (IMD) made it their primary mission to mitigate any substantial threats of oil discharges or HAZMAT releases and ensure proper cleanup. On September 2, 2012, IMD utilized the Incident Command System (ICS) to establish a Marine Environmental Response (MER) Incident Management Team (IMT) to achieve their post storm mission. The MER IMT consisted of 200 personnel, of which 60 were Coast Guard members, and included representatives from the National Strike Force, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO), Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), and three Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSROs); together the team collected 4500 barrels of oily water and 1200 HAZMAT containers, deployed over 11,000 feet of containment boom, and federalized three pollution projects. The MER IMT was disestablished on September 28, 2012 leaving Sector New Orleans IMD to maintain complete management of the ongoing federalized projects, “Fantome”, “Map Drilling”, and “Gulf South”. The projects included oil discharges in adjacent waterways of two oil production/storage facilities, oil discharges from fixed facility barges, and oil discharges from a storage platform along the marsh shoreline. Sector New Orleans executed $9.5 million in Oil Spill Liability Trust Funds towards emergency response efforts and successfully restored safety to the public health, welfare, environment, and maritime community.

TO BOLDLY GO WHERE NO STATE HAS GONE BEFORE1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Marine Safety

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.

Unified Command Response To Simultaneous Oil Spills1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 937-932
Author(s):  
Meredith Austin
Keyword(s):  
Pressure Drop ◽  
Gulf Of Mexico ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Level Of Activity ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
Marine Safety ◽  
Responsible Party

ABSTRACT At 10:30 p.m. on January 22, 1998, Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Galveston, Texas received notification of a sudden pressure drop within the High Island Pipeline System (HIPS), indicating a possible break in the pipeline, approximately 55 miles from Galveston in the Gulf of Mexico. The Coast Guard, Responsible Party, and State of Texas established a Unified Command to respond to the incident. At 3:15 p.m. on January 23, the M/V Red Seagull, located approximately 60 miles from Galveston, reported oil around her hull. The Federal Incident Commander established a second Unified Command, using Coast Guard members of the HIPS response, augmented by personnel from other Coast Guard units, the second Responsible Party and the state of Texas. As the level of activity for each of the responses changed, so did the Incident Command structure. The responses were a success due to the Unified Command's understanding of the Incident Command System, and the willingness to bring in additional personnel from other sources as necessary.

U.S. Coast Guard Federal on Scene Coordinator Role in Vessel Salvage1

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-173
Author(s):  
Michael R. Moore ◽  
Thomas C. Miller ◽  
George L. Boone ◽  
Rendall B. Farley
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Marine Environment ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Informed Decision ◽  
Contingency Planning ◽  
Informed Decision Making ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT Salvage operations must be conducted with the utmost concern for the safety of personnel, as well as protection of the marine environment, and property. Due to the highly dynamic circumstances involved in salvage operations, there is no standard or foolproof method for responding to a casualty. Therefore, contingency planning and pre-established relationships with industry become indispensable to ensure that informed decision making, maximum responder cooperation and optimum asset coordination. Inherent in contingency planning is having an understanding that the role of the Captain of the Port (COTP) / Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) during a salvage response is multifaceted. While the COTP/FOSC has federal responsibilities to protect people, property, and the environment, it is achieved only through close coordination of multiple responding agencies, the response/salvage community and their resources. This successful coordination is greatly facilitated through an understanding of FOSC roles and proper use of the Incident Command/Unified Command (ICS/UC) System. This paper also describes the assets and authorities available to the COTP/FOSC during a salvage response, the triggers and overriding issues that would initiate full or partial federalization.

ICS CONTRIBUTES TO THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
The North ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.

THE FOSS BARGE 248-P2 OIL SPILL: A CHALLENGE IN SPILL MANAGEMENT

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 491-494
Author(s):  
Paul S. O'Brien
Keyword(s):  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Response Force ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Oil Storage ◽  
Beach Sediments ◽  
Environmentally Sensitive ◽  
Water Response ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT On December 30, 2003, a 4620 gallon spill of heavy oil occurred from the tank barge FOSS 248-P2 as it was loading bunker fuel at the Chevron Point Wells oil storage facility at Shoreline (Seattle), Washington. Under the Northwest Area Contingency Plan (NWACP), a unified command made up of a responsible party Incident Commander (IC) from Foss Maritime, a federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), a state OSC from the Washington Department of Ecology, a tribal OSC from the Suquamish Tribe and a local OSC from the Kitsap County Department of Emergency Management (KDEM) formed to manage the spill. A large on-water response force was mobilized but the oil quickly impacted an important environmentally sensitive marsh and beaches owned by both the Suquamish Tribe and the State of Washington. Commercial and recreational shellfish beds, beach sediments, a pristine marsh and high use public beaches were all affected by the spill. A significant four-month cleanup effort occurred on the beaches and marsh to remove the oil. Operational cleanup endpoints were established for the beaches and marsh. Shellfish and sediment sampling and monitoring plans were developed jointly by agency and tribal workgroups. The Suquamish Tribe was placed in the lead for conducting beach surveys under a long term monitoring plan approved by the unified command. The five members of the unified command faced major challenges during the spill due to overlapping federal, state, local and tribal jurisdictions, land ownership disputes, political consequences, cleanup/operational problems, shellfish and sediment contamination concerns, public outreach issues and the inexperience of several agencies involved. This paper will explore the unique challenges faced by the unified command in responding to the spill.

FOSS 248-P2 OIL SPILL – A CASE STUDY

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 485-489
Author(s):  
Tedd Hutley ◽  
Myola Martinez ◽  
Mark Dix
Keyword(s):  
Puget Sound ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Indian Tribe ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
Marine Safety

ABSTRACT At 1205, on December 30, 2003, the Foss Maritime tank barge 248-P2 spilled nearly 6,000 gallons of bunker fuel oil during a loading operation at the Chevron-Point Wells facility in Shoreline, Washington. Approximately 4,637 gallons was discharged into Puget Sound. Upon notification, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Safety Office (MSO) Puget Sound, Washington Department of Ecology (DOE), and Foss Maritime launched an aggressive response, mobilizing numerous spill response personnel and nearly every major piece of spill response equipment in the Northwest. In less than 24 hours of the spill, nearly all the oil had moved ashore impacting only two miles of shoreline. The most heavily impacted area belonged to the Suquamish Indian Tribe, which included a highly sensitive and culturally significant saltwater marsh. A representative for the Suquamish Tribe quickly joined the Unified Command. Operational success can be linked to the frequent training and exercising of the responding agencies, preplanned geographic response plans, and use of incident command system. Despite the successes, weather and tides proved to be the leading contributor to the four-month shoreline clean up operation. Lessons learned identify response strong points in addition to areas needing improvement.

Optimizing the value of near misses in wildlife response preparedness: The Kulluk Incident

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2288-2294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curt Clumpner ◽  
Barbara Callahan
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Exercise Program ◽  
Near Miss ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Near Misses ◽  
Response Options ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Specific Incident ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT Mitigating the impact of an oil spill on wildlife is one of the stated priorities in nearly every oil spill. Wildlife in some way is regularly included in drills and exercises in many places around the world. While planning, training, and exercising are critical to wildlife preparedness, responders know that nothing compares to real world experience. In many spills and near miss situations, the Wildlife Branch is not activated until after there are documented wildlife impacts. Most incident management teams will only bring in professional oiled wildlife responders when oiling of wildlife has occurred or is imminent. During the December 2013 response to the Kulluk Tow Incident, a small Wildlife Branch was activated as an integral part of the Incident Command structure put in place. The Wildlife Branch proceeded to provide a detailed plan for an active response, if one was needed. Over the next week, while the rig grounded, refloated and finally towed to a place of refuge, the Wildlife Branch, working with the Environmental Unit, developed a wildlife plan that identified the resources at risk, the wildlife response options and the personnel, equipment and facilities that would be needed if oil were to be released. The Alaska Wildlife Response Center was prepared for activation, wildlife responder's availability, and travel time was documented and incident specific equipment gaps were identified and sourced. Additionally, specific incident plans were developed for hazing (bird deterrence), solid waste and wastewater that stood ready for implementation. While Alaska has a robust preparedness and exercise program, the quick decision by Shell and the Unified Command to ensure wildlife response was in place, if needed, provided a real test of the oiled wildlife response system with all the problems, challenges and changing parameters of a real event. It added real value by showing the public and trustees the importance that was placed on wildlife protection as well as by increasing integration, confidence and teamwork in the Alaskan response community.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document