TO BOLDLY GO WHERE NO STATE HAS GONE BEFORE1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 987-990
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
Jean R. Cameron ◽  
Vickie Huyck

ABSTRACT The original oil spill Field Operations Guide (FOG) was a product of the Standard Oil Spill Response Management System (STORMS) Task Force comprised of representatives of the U. S. Coast Guard, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), other states, the petroleum industry, oil spill response organizations, and local government. The STORMS Task Force produced this first version of the “oilized” Incident Command System (ICS) FOG and Incident Action Plan (IAP) forms in 1994 and made subsequent revisions in 1995 and 1996. With 2 more years of ICS experience and facilitated by the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, a new group of representatives from federal and state governments, the petroleum industry, and oil spill response professionals met to review and update the 1996 FOG and IAP forms in October 1998. The overall goal was to remain consistent with the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) yet reflect the experience gained using ICS at actual oil spills and drills. The group met quarterly over an 18-month period, working collaboratively to reach a consensus on numerous changes. Some of the changes included adding an Environmental Unit to the Planning Section, revising the planning cycle diagram for the oil spill IAP process, and revising the IAP forms as appropriate to reflect the way oil spills are managed. All significant revisions/improvements will be highlighted in this paper and poster.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 675-678
Author(s):  
Robert Cooper

ABSTRACT In a continuous effort to improve oil spill management, the Ninth Coast Guard District is utilizing a Geographic Information System (GIS) to integrate data, coordinate information, and implement actions with incident planning and response. During an incident, initial team goals are to minimize response times in order to more effectively bring resources to bear thus creating a more effective outcome, which reduce impacts and overall costs. The Ninth Coast Guard District's GIS system enables the user to make informed, quick decisions during an incident by diminishing the guesswork of the response action process. During the planning phase, and for specific areas, several objectives can be completed prior to the actual incident in order to assist in decision-making when an incident occurs. Some of these objectives include 1.) The integration of the Incident Command System,2.) Development of an Incident Action Plan, 3.) Pre-approved on-water and shoreline removal strategies, 4.) The use of Shoreline Pre-Impact Assessment Team (SPIAT) information. Finally, the GIS allows effective assimilation of field data and information as it becomes available thus providing the response team efforts with an accurate and up-to-the-minute picture of actual conditions. The Ninth Coast Guard District is continually conforming to and taking advantage of the latest technology offered. Our goal is to meet the ever-changing response methodologies and enhance the multifaceted resources available to the responder. Involvement from all stakeholders including federal, state, tribal, local and from the private sector undoubtedly helps drive a very effective environmental and economical response.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 775-777
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Chuba ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick

ABSTRACT While the sinking of the Tenyo Maru and resultant oil spill off Washington's Olympic Peninsula in July 1991 was tragic, it fostered the birth of a cooperative effort by federal and state agencies to train volunteer responders prior to another oil spill. This effort, under the auspices of an Oregon nonprofit group known as SOLV (Stop Oregon Littering and Vandalism), is known as the SOS (SOLV Oil Spill) Steering committee. The purpose of the group is to train volunteer responders to aid federal, state, and local agencies in future oil spill cleanup activities. For the first time in the nation, governmental agencies have joined with corporations and environmental organizations in coordinating educational programs involving citizens in oil spill remediation efforts before the advent of a major spill that could affect coastal areas or inland waterways. Free classes meeting federal and state hazardous waste training criteria are offered quarterly to citizens interested in either volunteer wildlife rehabilitation or beach cleanup. The four-hour course was developed by the U.S. Coast Guard, Oregon State Department of Environmental Quality, and Oregon OSHA. Topics covered include agency responsibilities, site safety plans, general safety, toxicology, material safety data sheets, personal protective equipment, decontamination, heat stress, helicopter safety, and wildlife safety. In addition to course materials, participants receive a certificate and identification card verifying their training. A 1–800 number, computer data base, and newsletter are used to maintain contact with graduates. So far more than 600 volunteers have been trained and are ready to assist should the need arise.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 311-315
Author(s):  
John Bauer ◽  
Jean Cameron ◽  
Larry Iwamoto

ABSTRACT The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force (Oil Spill Task Force) and the Alaska Regional Response Team (RRT) are collaborating to develop decision-making and planning guidelines which “operationalize” the International Maritime Organization's Places of Refuge guidelines. These guidelines will incorporate the authorities of the US and Canadian Coast Guards, state, provincial, local, and tribal governments, and resource agencies. The decision-making section of the guidelines provides step-by-step procedures and checklists to analyze the risks of allowing a ship in need of assistance to proceed to a place of refuge. The planning section of the guidelines provides a process to pre-identify information necessary for responding to requests for places of refuge and identifying potential places of refuge prior to an incident. The Oil Spill Task Force effort involves a workgroup of regional stakeholders co-chaired by the Task Force agencies and the US Coast Guard, Pacific Area. The separate Alaska initiative is being accomplished by a workgroup of the Alaska RRT co-chaired by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) and US Coast Guard, District 17. Both projects are developing concurrently and include persons serving as liaisons between the two efforts in order to promote consistency and share information. The Oil Spill Task Force Guidelines provide a template for member states and the province to use in developing decisionmaking and pre-incident plans tailored to their area. The Alaska guidelines were drafted concurrently with the Oil Spill Task Force process, and sections of their guidelines were modified to reflect area-wide conditions. The Oil Spill Task Force's final guidelines are to be used as a planning annex to US Area Contingency Plans on the West Coast. Alaska will include their guidelines in the Federal/State Unified Plan and subarea plans. Transport Canada and Canadian Coast Guard authorities will adapt the guidelines as appropriate for Canada.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 743-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael de Bettencourt

ABSTRACT An act of terrorism resulting in an oil spill triggers a unique set of response considerations that bring diverse agencies together under crisis conditions. To manage such incidents effectively, a systematic approach is needed to standardize incident response, command, and control methods and to better define the planning process for these demanding scenarios. The National Interagency Incident Management System-Incident Command System (NIIMS-ICS) is the common denominator that has been adopted by the United States Coast Guard for oil spill response. This paper highlights recommendations to adopt the NIIMS-ICS nationally for combined law enforcement and environmental response incidents to ensure efficient and effective response methods.


2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-152
Author(s):  
Rosalie Arcala Hall

The responses of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Petron, government line agencies, local government authorities and non-government organizations to the 2006 Solar I oil spill were moderated by their relative positions within overlapping and competing disaster-specific frameworks at the agency (PCG), local and regional levels. The regional Task Force Solar I Oil Spill (RTFSOS), once convened, overshadowed the other frameworks owing largely to national calamity funds channeled through its member line agencies. While the task force design allowed for better job delineation and horizontal coordination between a limited number of stakeholders, the framework nevertheless marginalized the PCG, local government authorities and NGOs while endowing Petron a legitimate basis for its involvement in response operations. The absence of a widely-accepted protocol for ameliorating the spill’s environmental and human health impact created tension between line government agencies and academic/research communities. Unlike other disasters, the prospect of financial largesse from the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, either as reimbursements for response activities and compensation for livelihood losses, animated stakeholder and local reactions.


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