SAN JACINTO RIVER INCIDENT: ARMEGEDDON VISITS HOUSTON

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 972-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph J. Leonard
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Ignition Source ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Direct Response ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Southeast Texas ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT In October 1994, southeast Texas experienced some of its worst flooding ever. Near Houston, the raging waters of the San Jacinto River caused a pipeline to rupture, spilling vast quantities of gasoline. When this gasoline found an ignition source, the river became a devastating conflagration. The Coast Guard immediately activated its incident command system (ICS) with a unified command to direct response activities. Lessons learned following the San Jacinto River incident will improve future response activities and serve as the foundation for the adoption of the National Interagency Incident Management System (which includes the ICS) by the Coast Guard and the state of Texas.

ICS CONTRIBUTES TO THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
The North ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.

A Model Grassroots Approach for Incident Command System Implementation1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-431
Author(s):  
Peter Gautier ◽  
Carol McAllister ◽  
Kristy L. Plourde
Keyword(s):  
Training Program ◽  
San Francisco ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Building Relationships ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Implementation Team ◽  
Marine Safety

ABSTRACT Two years ago, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) formally adopted the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) as doctrine for response management to oil and hazardous materials incidents. USCG Marine Safety Office (MSO) San Francisco Bay has aggressively implemented ICS as the way it conducts spill response in addition to how it carries out many of its routine operations. In a comprehensive effort to improve readiness through ICS, the MSO has established an ICS implementation team. This team constructed an ICS-based organization chart, referred to as a Watch Quarter and Station Bill (WQSB), crafted a training program, prepared ICS equipment and supply “go kits” for spill deployment, and developed administrative measures to maintain and track the program. The MSO's training program is two pronged, consisting of ICS classroom training to teach best practices alternating with process tabletop exercises to reinforce lessons learned from responses. Each session is open for attendance by state and federal trustees as well as local USCG operational units. In this way, the MSO reaches out to the local response community to establish ICS expertise and enhance response relationships. The MSO's implementation plan has proven to be extremely valuable in building the knowledge of personnel, building relationships and better preparing everyone for future spills.

M/V TONG CHENG: SAFE ASSURANCE, SAFE HAVEN, SAFE RESULTS

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1051-1055
Author(s):  
K. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Hawaiian Islands ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Safe Haven ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Marine Traffic ◽  
Near Shore ◽  
Environmentally Sensitive ◽  
To Come ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT On January 12, 2007 the MIV TONG CHENG, a 485 ft. Chinese flag break bulk vessel loaded with cargo and 130,000 gallons of oil, en route to the Panama Canal, notified Coast Guard Sector Honolulu that it had suffered damage to its #2 cargo hold and the hold was full of seawater. Located 700 miles from the nearest port (Honolulu), the vessel'S pumps were unable to keep up with the flooding, and with 26 personnel on board, the vessel advised it was diverting to Honolulu for emergency repairs. As the vessel proceeded toward Honolulu, its decreasing speed, the presence of two additional cargo ships in escort and the discovery of an oil sheen trailing the vessel raised significant concerns over the threat this posed to Hawaii. At stake in allowing the vessel a safe haven were the pristine shorelines of the Hawaiian Islands and potential crippling of the port'S vital lifeline to commercial marine traffic, its only source of sustenance. A myriad of issues had to be addressed as the vessel made preparations to come into Honolulu Harbor and a multi-agency, international Unified Command was established. The Unified Command, using the Incident Command System, managed the various contingencies from search and rescue of the crew if the ship were lost, to the potential discharge of 130,000 gallons of fuel. A risk-based decision process was employed to weigh the off-shore response challenges against the near-shore risks while taking into account the remoteness and sensitive marine environment of the Hawaiian Islands. This paper provides insight into the dynamic and complex response and the incident management teams decisions regarding allowing this vessel in distress to enter a critical and environmentally sensitive port. The vessel was successfully repaired and allowed to depart Hawaii. This case is a classic example of proper decision making and risk balancing for a critical safe refuge request.

Unified Command Response To Simultaneous Oil Spills1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 937-932
Author(s):  
Meredith Austin
Keyword(s):  
Pressure Drop ◽  
Gulf Of Mexico ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Level Of Activity ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
Marine Safety ◽  
Responsible Party

ABSTRACT At 10:30 p.m. on January 22, 1998, Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Galveston, Texas received notification of a sudden pressure drop within the High Island Pipeline System (HIPS), indicating a possible break in the pipeline, approximately 55 miles from Galveston in the Gulf of Mexico. The Coast Guard, Responsible Party, and State of Texas established a Unified Command to respond to the incident. At 3:15 p.m. on January 23, the M/V Red Seagull, located approximately 60 miles from Galveston, reported oil around her hull. The Federal Incident Commander established a second Unified Command, using Coast Guard members of the HIPS response, augmented by personnel from other Coast Guard units, the second Responsible Party and the state of Texas. As the level of activity for each of the responses changed, so did the Incident Command structure. The responses were a success due to the Unified Command's understanding of the Incident Command System, and the willingness to bring in additional personnel from other sources as necessary.

Developing a Technological Tool for Managing Complex Environmental Incidents1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 839-842
Author(s):  
Steve Wischmann ◽  
Lome Thomas ◽  
Jim Gynther
Keyword(s):  
Relational Databases ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Management Tools ◽  
Training Requirements ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Technological Tools ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT This paper will discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's response to the need for technological solutions to the incident management challenges posed by oil spills and hazardous material releases. Additionally, this paper will examine some of the difficulties presented by technology itself; that is to say, technological tools come with both implicit and explicit ramifications that must be understood and overcome in order to fully harness the potential contained within such capabilities. With the advent of both the public and Congress demanding increasingly effective spill response and fiscal conservancy, the Coast Guard has sought technological innovations to enhance its ability to coordinate and manage complex, multi-agency response operations. Through the development of the On-Scene Command and Control (OSC2) system, the Coast Guard intends to bring the potential leverage of computer-based technology to the Incident Command System (ICS) by harnessing the advantages of large-screen display, relational databases, and a Geographic Information System (GIS) for mapping response resources and activities. The decision-support and resource tracking advantages produced by OSC2 are expected to contribute mightily to improve performance within the Unified Command/ICS organization. However, the challenges posed by the implementation of OSC2 cannot be ignored. Factors ranging from human resource inhibitions and training requirements to blending individual technical components into a seamless whole must be considered when technological tools are designed, developed, and employed. Technology is not inherently good or bad, but remains always contextual—it is dependent on the intervening factors introduced by the human condition in which it is imagined and then utilized. This paper will discuss these issues and describe the key elements in achieving the success of OSC2 as one of the Coast Guard's spill response management tools.

ICS: Can it Be a National Incident Management System?1

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1179-1183
Author(s):  
Duane Michael Smith
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Fire Service ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
National Incident Management System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
National Model ◽  
System 1 ◽  
And Control

ABSTRACT There are likely few that would argue with the proposal that a national incident management system would be of benefit. Numerous articles have been put forward over time, both for and against the adoption of an incident command system (ICS) as the model for a national incident management system. Those in favor of its adoption point out to its many successes, from major wildfires to the 2002 Olympics. Many seem to view ICS as simply another way of expressing the term command and control. In reality, ICS is not another way to say command and control; rather it is a specific of command and control system. The question then is whether ICS, and in particular the National Inter-agency Incident Management System – Incident Command System (NIIMS-ICS) is the model upon which this national system should be based. Most of the studies and papers regarding the use and adoption of ICS have focused on its use within the fire service community. This may be somewhat intuitive, given the origins of the system; however, if we are to truly gauge the applicability of this system to all risks, we must begin to exam it in those other events. It was a series of disasters that led to the development of the initial ICS system. It has been a subsequent series of disasters or national emergencies that have led to the continued evolution of ICS toward a national model. The question now before us is whether we need another disaster to take that final step to a truly national incident management system or are we willing to go there now. In this time of heightened national security we owe it to ourselves to have the best incident management system in the world.

Limitations of the Swedish coordination capacity for large oil spills

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017040
Author(s):  
Jonas Pålsson ◽  
Lawrence Hildebrand ◽  
Olof Lindén
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Forest Fires ◽  
Management System ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Advisory Service ◽  
National Emergency

The inadequacy of the Swedish national emergency management system has been highlighted during several large-scale national emergencies, including forest fires (Västmanland 2014) and storms (Gudrun 2005, Dagmar 2011, and Ivar 2013). The Swedish oil spill preparedness is part of the national emergency response system and was tested under real conditions during the 2003 Fu Shan Hai and 2011 Golden Trader oil spills. Fu Shan Hai spilled 1,200 tonnes of oil on the shorelines of southern Sweden and Golden Trader spilled 500 tonnes on the island of Tjörn. Lessons learned from these incidents and national exercises highlight problems with understanding and cooperation between the organisations responsible during the emergency phase. Complications in the decision-making process lead to confusing, conflicting, or delayed orders, impeding the effectiveness of the response. These difficulties were evident at local, regional, and national levels during the oil spill response. The Swedish oil spill preparedness system does not have a hierarchical structure. Network analysis and surveys of all coastal municipalities, County Administrative Boards and interviews with national oil spill experts were used to examine the characteristics of the oil spill network. This study shows that 80% of the involved organisations have explicit mandates for oil spill preparedness. An established management network exists, covering 83% of the maximum theoretical connections for contingency planning and 88% for response. The Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Oil Spill Advisory Service are central organisations. The roles of the Swedish Coast Guard are clear to the respondents, but the roles of the Swedish Transport Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, and Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management are less clear. For planning, the municipalities, County Administrative Boards, Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Oil Spill Equipment Depots are considered the most valuable. For response, the municipalities, Swedish Coast Guard, Oil Spill Equipment Depots, County Administrative Boards, Oil Spill Advisory Service, and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency are considered the most valuable. The few connections between the counties and sometimes between neighbouring municipalities in the network, suggests a need to establish an Incident Management System for national cross-organisational emergencies, such as large oil spills. Most importantly, more cross-organisational exercises are needed to build capacity and the necessary inter-organisational relationships. The authors recommend the formation of an Incident Management System in Sweden in order to improve the management of large oil spills.

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