Pre-Planning for an Oil Spill Response: Segmenting the San Francisco Bay and Delta Shorelines

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. abs46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Haffner ◽  
J. Curtis ◽  
J. Dayton ◽  
K. Jennings ◽  
D. Price ◽  
...  
2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 685-691
Author(s):  
Heather Parker Hall ◽  
Christopher Barker ◽  
Peter Gautier ◽  
Tim Holmes ◽  
James Hardwick

ABSTRACT The National Contingency Plan (NCP) requires that Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) be adequate to address the removal of a worst case discharge from a vessel or facility operating in or near the area. The U.S. Coast Guard took this requirement further by issuing guidance in 1992 that ACPs address response to worst case, maximum most probable, and most probable discharges. As a result, many ACPs include area-specific scenarios applying these discharge quantities. However, there remains very little guidance about including trajectories in the ACPs. For example, only three of California's six ACPs include trajectories from computer models; the remaining three contain only oil spill scenarios that incorporate committee-selected environmental conditions to help estimate where oil might go. The 2000 revision of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP includes a new type of trajectory using the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP II). TAP II is a statistical model rather than a single scenario-based deterministic model. It generates statistics that describe oil spill behavior using an ensemble modeling approach. These statistics are generated from an ensemble of thousands of possible trajectories resulting from hundreds of oil spill scenarios computed within a given location. This approach is designed specifically for planning purposes, and not response. A statistics-based approach facilitates the planning process by providing key information, including which shorelines have the highest probability of being impacted, the size of the area that might be affected, how quickly a response should be mounted, what quantity of oil could impact a shoreline location, which resources will be oiled, which assets will be affected, and the most threatening origin of possible oil discharge. The authors describe how the TAP II model employs ensemble modeling, detail its application in the 2000 version of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP, and discuss possibilities for future applications.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 445-449
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
CAPT Harlan

ABSTRACT On September 24, 1998, the T/V Command had a small spill in San Francisco Bay, California while taking on bunkers in Anchorage Nine. The cause was determined to be due to a small crack in the outer hull plating of the tank. The T/V Command departed on the evening of September 26 after completing temporary repairs required by the Captain of the Port (COTP)/Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The next morning, a large 10-mile by 2-mile oil slick was discovered just south of the entrance to San Francisco Bay. This triggered one of the largest, most far-reaching oil spill investigations ever. Since no one took responsibility for this spill, the U.S. Coast Guard accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and established a Unified Command with the state of California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to begin immediate cleanup. The Coast Guard and OSPR also began an aggressive joint investigation to track down the spiller. Hundreds of vessels had entered or departed San Francisco Bay during the 5-day window before the spill was discovered. The investigators were able to narrow the search and sample vessels. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Lab (MSL) and OSPR's lab were able to match the spilled oil to the T/V Command,. The Coast Guard tracked down the location of the T/V Command and began the first ever request for high seas boarding of a vessel for an environmental crime. A Coast Guard team from the USCGC Boutwell boarded the T/V Command 200 miles off Guatemala to begin the investigation. A follow-on multiagency team of investigators, led by the Coast Guard again, boarded the vessel in Panama. In a plea bargain agreement, the T/V Command's operator, master, and chief engineer pled guilty in federal court to criminal charges stemming from the spill on September 27, 1998, remarkably 1 year from the date of the original spill. The operator agreed to pay over $9.4 million dollars in criminal and civil penalties. This paper and presentation discusses the complexities of this international spill response investigation and events leading up to the settlement.


2011 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. E51-E58 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Incardona ◽  
C. A. Vines ◽  
B. F. Anulacion ◽  
D. H. Baldwin ◽  
H. L. Day ◽  
...  

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 936-937
Author(s):  
Roberto Desimone ◽  
John Mark Agosta

ABSTRACT We have developed a prototype oil spill response configuration system to help U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) planners determine the appropriate response equipment and personnel for major spills. Advanced artificial intelligence planning techniques, as well as other software tools, have been applied to spill trajectory modeling, plan evaluation, and map display. We have successfully demonstrated the initial prototype system to various USCG personnel at the regional and national levels on a specific major spill scenario from the San Francisco Bay area.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1317-1325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Schmidt Etkin ◽  
Deborah French-McCoy ◽  
Jill Jennings ◽  
Nicole Whittier ◽  
Sankar Subbayya ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT This study provides a comprehensive examination of the use of trajectory modeling to estimate financial impacts of oil spills, including natural resource damages, response costs, and socioeconomic costs, as well as an opportunity to examine how spill size, oil type, response strategy, and probabilistic trajectory factors impact costs. The inclusion of NRDA, response, and socioeconomic costs in the modeling allows for an assessment of the relative proportion of NRDA costs to response and socioeconomic costs to further support the findings of past studies that refute the myth that NRDA costs are the overriding factors in most spill cases. The study demonstrates the overall financial and NRDA benefits of dispersant use. Estimated total bio-economic costs for oil spill scenarios involving four oil types and three spill sizes for two locations in San Francisco Bay, were modeled. Assuming present-day mechanical-only response, total costs range from $30 to $520 million. Estimated total bioeconomic costs would be reduced to $11 to $113 million if dispersants were used with high effectiveness. Dispersant use would reduce response costs, and if used effectively, could reduce NRDA and socioeconomic damages substantially, as both of these costs are driven by the amount of surface and shoreline oiling.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don V. Aurand ◽  
Gina M. Coelho ◽  
Robert G. Pond ◽  
Buzz Martin ◽  
John Caplis ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT This paper summarizes the results of two cooperative ecological risk assessments (ERAs) that examined the potential environmental consequences of oil spill scenarios, two in the vicinity of San Francisco Bay, California and one in Galveston Bay, Texas. The goal of the evaluation was to identify the optimum mix of response options for reducing injury to the environment. For these specific scenarios, the participants concluded that only dispersant use, assuming high effectiveness, had the potential to significantly reduce environmental impact when compared to natural recovery. While water-column effects increased with dispersant use, they were not long term and judged to be of less ecological significance than shoreline or water-surface impacts. Aside from dispersant use, only shoreline cleanup was effective in clearly mitigating impacts, and obviously would not prevent the immediate consequences of the spills. The optimum response was viewed as involving some combination of the various response options. There were some issues with data adequacy in both locations, but both groups felt the information was adequate for the analysis. In both ERAs, participants emphasized that the conclusions were scenario specific, and that additional analyses would be necessary before any significant generalizations could be made.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1281-1289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Schmidt Etkin

ABSTRACT This study reviews three alternative oil spill response cost estimation methodologies as applied to hypothetical spill scenarios in the Gulf of Mexico and San Francisco Bay, California: (1) a model derived from historical data on various spill factors that drive overall cleanup costs; (2) a method using U.S. Area Contingency Plan (ACP) spill scenario plans to estimate costs for mechanical containment and recovery costs to be extrapolated to other hypothetical spill scenarios; and (3) a method that estimates the labor and equipment required for mechanical containment and recovery operations and the resulting costs. A method for estimating dispersant costs is also discussed. The easy-to-use model derived from historical data is shown to be a good cost estimation tool.


1973 ◽  
Vol 1973 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Forrest M. Smith

ABSTRACT This is an 18-month progress report on the development of a total capability for rapid cleanup of oil spills in the Greater San Francisco Bay Area and 340 miles of ocean coastline outside the Bay by Clean Bay Inc., a ten-member, non-profit corporation formed on July 1, 1971. In the time span covered by this report, CBI:Devised a three-phase Master Plan for completion by July 1, 1974.Evolved an oil spill contingency plan through testing and revision.Developed first aid capability available to each member facility for small spill cleanup.Fostered closer working relationships with other West Coast oil spill cooperatives.Implemented a concerted approach to working with governmental agencies and environmental and wildlife organizations. Major emphasis has been placed on preparedness for massive spills, with a supporting role in minor incidents in conjunction with the first aid capability of member companies. Clean Bay's Master Plan is geared to cleaning up a 100,000-barrel spill in seven days, with tanker lightering capability of up to 400,000 barrels.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300025
Author(s):  
Christopher H. Barker

Over the last decade, there have been more and more oil spill responses effected by subsurface waves in the coastal zone. These have ranged from oil leaking from sunken ships to heavy oils that have sunk to the bottom. A primary example is the DBL 152 incident on the Gulf of Mexico coast in November, 2006. The incident resulted in approximately 70,000 barrels of Slurry Oil (API 4) being released and sinking to the bottom. Waves played a significant role in the mobilization of the oil on the bottom, in addition to effecting sediment loading in the subsurface, often restricting visibility and making ROV operations difficult. Waves can also play a major role disturbing sunken ships, and evidenced by the SS Jacob Luckenbach, sunken off San Francisco during WWII. The ship was a source of occasional incidents of oiled birds washing ashore after certain winter storms. The oil on the ship was removed as part of a major remediation effort in the summer of 2002.The oil spill response community will be more effective, particularly with subsurface oils, with a better understanding of the role of waves on the mobilization of sediment and other deposited substances (such as subsurface oil). This paper provides an overview of wave mechanics and the implications for subsurface oil movement and spill response activities, using examples from the DBL 152, SS Jacob Luckenbach, and other recent incidents. Shortcomings of current understanding will be highlighted, with suggestions for future research offered.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document