Do Trajectories Belong in Area Plans? A New Approach in California Using the Trajectory Analysis Planner (Tap II)1

ABSTRACT The National Contingency Plan (NCP) requires that Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) be adequate to address the removal of a worst case discharge from a vessel or facility operating in or near the area. The U.S. Coast Guard took this requirement further by issuing guidance in 1992 that ACPs address response to worst case, maximum most probable, and most probable discharges. As a result, many ACPs include area-specific scenarios applying these discharge quantities. However, there remains very little guidance about including trajectories in the ACPs. For example, only three of California's six ACPs include trajectories from computer models; the remaining three contain only oil spill scenarios that incorporate committee-selected environmental conditions to help estimate where oil might go. The 2000 revision of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP includes a new type of trajectory using the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP II). TAP II is a statistical model rather than a single scenario-based deterministic model. It generates statistics that describe oil spill behavior using an ensemble modeling approach. These statistics are generated from an ensemble of thousands of possible trajectories resulting from hundreds of oil spill scenarios computed within a given location. This approach is designed specifically for planning purposes, and not response. A statistics-based approach facilitates the planning process by providing key information, including which shorelines have the highest probability of being impacted, the size of the area that might be affected, how quickly a response should be mounted, what quantity of oil could impact a shoreline location, which resources will be oiled, which assets will be affected, and the most threatening origin of possible oil discharge. The authors describe how the TAP II model employs ensemble modeling, detail its application in the 2000 version of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP, and discuss possibilities for future applications.

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The Southern Traffic Lane Spill (T/V Command): A Case Study of Spiller Accountability1

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-2001-1-445 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 2001 (1) ◽

pp. 445-449

Author(s):

Kristy Plourde ◽

CAPT Harlan

Keyword(s):

San Francisco ◽

Oil Spill ◽

San Francisco Bay ◽

Federal Court ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Plea Bargain ◽

California Department ◽

Traffic Lane ◽

Joint Investigation ◽

Unified Command

ABSTRACT On September 24, 1998, the T/V Command had a small spill in San Francisco Bay, California while taking on bunkers in Anchorage Nine. The cause was determined to be due to a small crack in the outer hull plating of the tank. The T/V Command departed on the evening of September 26 after completing temporary repairs required by the Captain of the Port (COTP)/Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The next morning, a large 10-mile by 2-mile oil slick was discovered just south of the entrance to San Francisco Bay. This triggered one of the largest, most far-reaching oil spill investigations ever. Since no one took responsibility for this spill, the U.S. Coast Guard accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and established a Unified Command with the state of California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to begin immediate cleanup. The Coast Guard and OSPR also began an aggressive joint investigation to track down the spiller. Hundreds of vessels had entered or departed San Francisco Bay during the 5-day window before the spill was discovered. The investigators were able to narrow the search and sample vessels. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Lab (MSL) and OSPR's lab were able to match the spilled oil to the T/V Command,. The Coast Guard tracked down the location of the T/V Command and began the first ever request for high seas boarding of a vessel for an environmental crime. A Coast Guard team from the USCGC Boutwell boarded the T/V Command 200 miles off Guatemala to begin the investigation. A follow-on multiagency team of investigators, led by the Coast Guard again, boarded the vessel in Panama. In a plea bargain agreement, the T/V Command's operator, master, and chief engineer pled guilty in federal court to criminal charges stemming from the spill on September 27, 1998, remarkably 1 year from the date of the original spill. The operator agreed to pay over $9.4 million dollars in criminal and civil penalties. This paper and presentation discusses the complexities of this international spill response investigation and events leading up to the settlement.

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Organizational and Financial Considerations of Wildlife Operations During Two Orphan Spills Off California1

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-1999-1-989 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 1999 (1) ◽

pp. 989-992

Author(s):

Peter Gautier ◽

Kent Bauer ◽

John Tarpley

Keyword(s):

San Francisco ◽

Oil Spill ◽

Large Scale ◽

Primary Source ◽

Coast Guard ◽

California Department ◽

Incident Command ◽

Park Service ◽

Point Reyes ◽

The Difference

ABSTRACT In November 1997 and again in January 1998, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office San Francisco Bay, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), the National Park Service, and the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary responded to “mystery” oil spill incidents in the Point Reyes National Seashore, California area. These spill responses were unique because they were primarily wildlife recovery and rehabilitation operations; very little oil was sighted despite wildlife impacts that rank the event as the fourth worst in California history. A large-scale investigation including the use of multiple laboratories to identify the source of the oil has established a connection between the two spills, but no responsible party has been identified to defray the response costs. As a result of the spills, a significant effort is underway in Northern California to better define the role of wildlife operations within the incident command system and to rethink its organization and protocols. Other lessons to apply to future responses involve the funding issues revolving around the difference between response efforts and natural resource damage assessment when the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) is the primary source of funding.

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Unexpectedly high mortality in Pacific herring embryos exposed to the 2007 Cosco Busan oil spill in San Francisco Bay

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ◽

10.1073/pnas.1108884109 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 109 (2) ◽

pp. E51-E58 ◽

Cited By ~ 81

Author(s):

J. P. Incardona ◽

C. A. Vines ◽

B. F. Anulacion ◽

D. H. Baldwin ◽

H. L. Day ◽

...

Keyword(s):

San Francisco ◽

Oil Spill ◽

High Mortality ◽

San Francisco Bay ◽

Pacific Herring

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DECISION SUPPORT FOR OIL SPILL RESPONSE CONFIGURATION PLANNING

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-1995-1-936 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 1995 (1) ◽

pp. 936-937

Author(s):

Roberto Desimone ◽

John Mark Agosta

Keyword(s):

San Francisco ◽

Oil Spill ◽

San Francisco Bay Area ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Prototype System ◽

Planning Techniques ◽

Plan Evaluation ◽

Bay Area ◽

Oil Spill Response ◽

Configuration System

ABSTRACT We have developed a prototype oil spill response configuration system to help U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) planners determine the appropriate response equipment and personnel for major spills. Advanced artificial intelligence planning techniques, as well as other software tools, have been applied to spill trajectory modeling, plan evaluation, and map display. We have successfully demonstrated the initial prototype system to various USCG personnel at the regional and national levels on a specific major spill scenario from the San Francisco Bay area.

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Financial Implications of Hypothetical San Francisco Bay Oil Spill Scenarios: Response, Socioeconomic, and Natural Resource Damage Costs

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-2003-1-1317 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 2003 (1) ◽

pp. 1317-1325 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Dagmar Schmidt Etkin ◽

Deborah French-McCoy ◽

Jill Jennings ◽

Nicole Whittier ◽

Sankar Subbayya ◽

...

Keyword(s):

San Francisco ◽

Oil Spill ◽

Natural Resource ◽

Oil Spills ◽

San Francisco Bay ◽

Relative Proportion ◽

Response Strategy ◽

Damage Costs ◽

Financial Impacts ◽

Type Response

ABSTRACT This study provides a comprehensive examination of the use of trajectory modeling to estimate financial impacts of oil spills, including natural resource damages, response costs, and socioeconomic costs, as well as an opportunity to examine how spill size, oil type, response strategy, and probabilistic trajectory factors impact costs. The inclusion of NRDA, response, and socioeconomic costs in the modeling allows for an assessment of the relative proportion of NRDA costs to response and socioeconomic costs to further support the findings of past studies that refute the myth that NRDA costs are the overriding factors in most spill cases. The study demonstrates the overall financial and NRDA benefits of dispersant use. Estimated total bio-economic costs for oil spill scenarios involving four oil types and three spill sizes for two locations in San Francisco Bay, were modeled. Assuming present-day mechanical-only response, total costs range from $30 to $520 million. Estimated total bioeconomic costs would be reduced to $11 to $113 million if dispersants were used with high effectiveness. Dispersant use would reduce response costs, and if used effectively, could reduce NRDA and socioeconomic damages substantially, as both of these costs are driven by the amount of surface and shoreline oiling.

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UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY “THEN” AND “NOW”

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-2008-1-459 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 2008 (1) ◽

pp. 459-461

Author(s):

Leonard Rich

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Emergency Response ◽

Oil Spill ◽

Oil Recovery ◽

Oil Pollution ◽

The United States ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Security Measures ◽

Worst Case ◽

Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.

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URBAN STRUCTURE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA IN THE CONTEXT OF FORMATION OF A NEW TYPE OF URBAN FABRIC

World Science ◽

10.31435/rsglobal_ws/31102018/6170 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 1 (10(38)) ◽

pp. 4-9

Author(s):

Andriy Pavliv

Keyword(s):

San Francisco ◽

Urban Areas ◽

San Francisco Bay ◽

San Francisco Bay Area ◽

Rapid Development ◽

Urban Structure ◽

Urban Forms ◽

Bay Area ◽

New Type ◽

Post Industrial

The purpose of this article is to outline the changes and phenomena within the urban planning structure of the San Francisco bay area, which can be interpreted as impulses associated with the emergence of new post-industrial urban forms. Formation of the theory of impulse modeling of an urban organism requires not only theoretical generalizations and study of the material relating to the peculiarities of the post-industrial (informational) era, but also the search for practical phenomena associated with the rapid development of certain urban areas. At the same time, such development should not be confused with the concept of polycentrism, which was formed during the period of modernism.

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A WORKSHOP FOR DEFINING THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN OIL SPILL RESPONSE

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-1977-1-125 ◽

1977 ◽

Vol 1977 (1) ◽

pp. 125-127 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

W. H. Putnam

Keyword(s):

Oil Spill ◽

Local Governments ◽

Planning Process ◽

Petroleum Industry ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Hazardous Substance ◽

Santa Barbara ◽

California Department ◽

Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT In 1970, the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan was introduced. This plan, which imposed a planning sequence that flowed downward from the federal government, caused considerable confusion at local levels because of its failure to fully explain how local governments were to participate. To amplify the plan and overcome this shortcoming, the California Department of Fish and Game, the U.S. Coast Guard and the petroleum industry joined in 1974-75 to sponsor a series of oil spill workshops for local governments. The goal was to define the role of local jurisdictions in the planning process and illustrate through simulated problems how this role was to be carried out. The workshop described in this paper and a subsequent workshop in Santa Barbara dispelled the confusion of local governments over their roles in oil spill action and resulted in enthusiastic acceptance of the plan itself. A similar technique could be used in any other broadscale planning effort that is committed to seeking knowledgeable local participation.

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Coast Guard Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS), Past, Present and Future of meeting Service spill response needs (containment, skimming, and pumping)

International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings ◽

10.7901/2169-3358-2017.1.000023 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 2017 (1) ◽

pp. 2017023

Author(s):

Mike Crickard ◽

Tim Gunter

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Private Sector ◽

Oil Spill ◽

Deepwater Horizon ◽

Lessons Learned ◽

Coast Guard ◽

Worst Case ◽

The Future ◽

Vessel Response ◽

History Of

The Coast Guard Vessel of Opportunity Skimming (VOSS) has recently gone through a consolidation of pollution response equipment to modernize its spill equipment capability for oil spill (containment, skimming, and pumping) to meet the response needs of the future. This paper will review the history of Coast Guard VOSS implementation, deployment during Deep Water Horizon, VOSS consolidation of 15 sites in 2014–2015, and challenges facing Coast Guard VOSS capability gaps in the future. In the aftermath of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill in 1989, the Coast Guard assessed gaps and deficiencies in the ability of government and private sector resources to fully and adequately respond to major oil spill events. At the time, major gaps were found in the private sector's ability to deliver emergency first response equipment in major port areas. These gaps were addressed by Coast Guard acquisition, pre-positioning and on-going maintenance of VOSS systems & other equipment. Regulatory regimes were created and the Coast Guard created a system for determining the ability of the private sector to respond to a worst case discharge (WCD) including Title 33 CFR Parts 154 and 155 requiring facility and vessel response plan holders to have plans and contracts for privately owned pollution response equipment sufficient to respond to a WCD. The regulations have resulted in the increased capacity of Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) in the coastal areas of the continental United States. The Deepwater Horizon response in 2010 was the largest pollution response equipment deployment by private and government resources in the nation's history. Most Coast Guard VOSS systems were deployed in response to Deepwater Horizon. The growth of spill response equipment by the private sector and lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon VOSS spill deployment were utilized to support the consolidation of VOSS equipment in the continental United States while maintaining VOSS capacity in remote areas.

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