The Southern Traffic Lane Spill (T/V Command): A Case Study of Spiller Accountability1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 445-449
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
CAPT Harlan
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
San Francisco Bay ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Plea Bargain ◽  
California Department ◽  
Traffic Lane ◽  
Joint Investigation ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT On September 24, 1998, the T/V Command had a small spill in San Francisco Bay, California while taking on bunkers in Anchorage Nine. The cause was determined to be due to a small crack in the outer hull plating of the tank. The T/V Command departed on the evening of September 26 after completing temporary repairs required by the Captain of the Port (COTP)/Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The next morning, a large 10-mile by 2-mile oil slick was discovered just south of the entrance to San Francisco Bay. This triggered one of the largest, most far-reaching oil spill investigations ever. Since no one took responsibility for this spill, the U.S. Coast Guard accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and established a Unified Command with the state of California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to begin immediate cleanup. The Coast Guard and OSPR also began an aggressive joint investigation to track down the spiller. Hundreds of vessels had entered or departed San Francisco Bay during the 5-day window before the spill was discovered. The investigators were able to narrow the search and sample vessels. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Lab (MSL) and OSPR's lab were able to match the spilled oil to the T/V Command,. The Coast Guard tracked down the location of the T/V Command and began the first ever request for high seas boarding of a vessel for an environmental crime. A Coast Guard team from the USCGC Boutwell boarded the T/V Command 200 miles off Guatemala to begin the investigation. A follow-on multiagency team of investigators, led by the Coast Guard again, boarded the vessel in Panama. In a plea bargain agreement, the T/V Command's operator, master, and chief engineer pled guilty in federal court to criminal charges stemming from the spill on September 27, 1998, remarkably 1 year from the date of the original spill. The operator agreed to pay over $9.4 million dollars in criminal and civil penalties. This paper and presentation discusses the complexities of this international spill response investigation and events leading up to the settlement.

Integrating Trustee Issues into a Balanced Response: Working Toward a Common Goal1

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-661
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Steve Hampton ◽  
James Haas
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pollution Source ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
California Department ◽  
Cooperative Effort ◽  
Advanced Planning ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT In February 2002, a Unified Command (UC) comprised of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), and other state and federal agencies tested a sample of oil taken from the water near the wreck SS Jacob Luckenbach. Oil from this fifty-year-old wreck, submerged in 176 feet of water 17 miles off San Francisco, matched oil that had impacted thousands of birds and miles of shoreline since November 2001. It also matched oil from mystery spills in this area dating back to 1992. Now that the source of this extensive pollution was found, the next step seemed simple: remove the oil from the vessel. Yet there were many issues surrounding this vessel and its location that required significant cooperation with many agencies and trustees. The Luckenbach is an historic property, protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). It is submerged in the Gulf of Farallones National Marine Sanctuary - one of the most biologically productive regions off the California coast and home to many sensitive resources including several listed species. The UC realized that dialogue with and among the natural resource trustee agencies was crucial to planning balanced operations that would remove the pollution source while providing the utmost protection available to the resources at risk A task force was formed that allowed trustees to engage in discussions about the tradeoffs of initiating removal as quickly as possible while balancing the risk of harm that any incidental release during operations may cause to their resources of concern. One of the most exciting benefits of this cooperative effort was the shift in thinking beyond just responding to the incident to advanced planning of a response that would best enhance restoration and long-term recovery. In many responses, it is not always clear that everyone has the same priorities: the USCG may focus on recovering oil and mitigating damage, the responsible party wants to minimize costs, and the trustees want to protect and restore their resources. In this case, the trustees and USCG were clearly working together toward common goals: removing a source of chronic oil pollution while minimizing environmental impacts from the response.

Organizational and Financial Considerations of Wildlife Operations During Two Orphan Spills Off California1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 989-992
Author(s):  
Peter Gautier ◽  
Kent Bauer ◽  
John Tarpley
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
California Department ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Park Service ◽  
Point Reyes ◽  
The Difference

ABSTRACT In November 1997 and again in January 1998, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office San Francisco Bay, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), the National Park Service, and the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary responded to “mystery” oil spill incidents in the Point Reyes National Seashore, California area. These spill responses were unique because they were primarily wildlife recovery and rehabilitation operations; very little oil was sighted despite wildlife impacts that rank the event as the fourth worst in California history. A large-scale investigation including the use of multiple laboratories to identify the source of the oil has established a connection between the two spills, but no responsible party has been identified to defray the response costs. As a result of the spills, a significant effort is underway in Northern California to better define the role of wildlife operations within the incident command system and to rethink its organization and protocols. Other lessons to apply to future responses involve the funding issues revolving around the difference between response efforts and natural resource damage assessment when the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) is the primary source of funding.

Do Trajectories Belong in Area Plans? A New Approach in California Using the Trajectory Analysis Planner (Tap II)1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 685-691
Author(s):  
Heather Parker Hall ◽  
Christopher Barker ◽  
Peter Gautier ◽  
Tim Holmes ◽  
James Hardwick
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Trajectory Analysis ◽  
Planning Process ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
San Francisco Bay ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Ensemble Modeling ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
New Type

ABSTRACT The National Contingency Plan (NCP) requires that Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) be adequate to address the removal of a worst case discharge from a vessel or facility operating in or near the area. The U.S. Coast Guard took this requirement further by issuing guidance in 1992 that ACPs address response to worst case, maximum most probable, and most probable discharges. As a result, many ACPs include area-specific scenarios applying these discharge quantities. However, there remains very little guidance about including trajectories in the ACPs. For example, only three of California's six ACPs include trajectories from computer models; the remaining three contain only oil spill scenarios that incorporate committee-selected environmental conditions to help estimate where oil might go. The 2000 revision of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP includes a new type of trajectory using the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP II). TAP II is a statistical model rather than a single scenario-based deterministic model. It generates statistics that describe oil spill behavior using an ensemble modeling approach. These statistics are generated from an ensemble of thousands of possible trajectories resulting from hundreds of oil spill scenarios computed within a given location. This approach is designed specifically for planning purposes, and not response. A statistics-based approach facilitates the planning process by providing key information, including which shorelines have the highest probability of being impacted, the size of the area that might be affected, how quickly a response should be mounted, what quantity of oil could impact a shoreline location, which resources will be oiled, which assets will be affected, and the most threatening origin of possible oil discharge. The authors describe how the TAP II model employs ensemble modeling, detail its application in the 2000 version of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP, and discuss possibilities for future applications.

scholarly journals The SS Jacob Luckenbach: Integration of NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) Trust Issues into the Response1

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 649-653
Author(s):  
Lisa Symons ◽  
Heather A. Parker-Hall
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Biologically Active ◽  
California Department ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
War Effort ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
National Historic Preservation Act

ABSTRACT Since at least 1992, state and federal trustees have struggled to deal with episodic “mystery” spills that have impacted thousands of seabirds and compromised hundreds of miles of California coastline. In November 2001, another of these mystery events spurred the United States Coast Guard (USCG), state, and federal trustees to initiate a cooperative response and investigation. As impacts from the same oil type continued into January, it soon became evident that this oil most probably stemmed from a submerged source and not transient vessels. By February 2002, a source was identified for this and many of the previous mystery spills —the 1953 wreck of the cargo ship SS Jacob Luckenbach, fully fuelled and laden with materials for the Korean War effort. The vessel now sits in 176 feet of water, 17 miles off San Francisco Bay in the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary. The Luckenbach itself is an historic resource, protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 16 U.S.C.470 et seq and the National Marine Sanctuary Act (NMSA) 16 U.S.C. 1431 et seq. as amended by Public Law 106–513. The wreck rests in one of the most biologically productive regions of California, home to countless sensitive resources including several listed species, and is within a series of marine protected areas. The Unified Command (UC) comprised of USCG, California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) and other state and federal agencies, were faced with an unusual set of challenges. First, finding accurate historical information about the vessel and its cargo, determining liability, and coordinating salvage and recovery operations complicated by both historical and ecological trustee issues during the Sanctuary's most biologically active and sensitive season. NOAA's National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP) played a particularly strong role in this response. Linked closely to the UC through NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinator, NMSP provided invaluable support in determining possible sources - engaged knowledgeable local divers in the process, located key historical documentation about the wreck, tracked down original owners and hull insurers, and assisted in the coordination of input from all trustees. Closely integrated coordination was a key factor in preparing for and determining the outcome of this response.

Bedrock knobs, San Francisco Bay; do navigation hazards outweigh other environmental problems?

2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul R. Carlson ◽  
John L. Chin ◽  
Florence L. Wong
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
San Francisco Bay ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Traffic Lane ◽  
Traffic Area ◽  
Unconsolidated Sediment ◽  
Game Fish ◽  
Acoustic Profiling ◽  
Local Habitat

Abstract Three bedrock knobs (Arch, Harding, and Shag rocks) rise above the unconsolidated sediment of central San Francisco Bay to a water depth of less than -12 m (<-39.4 ft MLLW). These rocks are within the westbound vessel traffic area, and the northernmost, Harding Rock, is approximately 300 m (984 ft) from the two-way deep water traffic lane. The rocks pose a hazard to deep-draft vessels. Large ships with drafts deeper than -17 m (-55.8 ft) cross central San Francisco Bay bound for and returning from major port cities of the Bay estuary. Acoustic profiling data show that bedrock extends at a gentle to moderate slope away from the knobs. These data also show that two of the knobs, Harding and Shag, may be part of a bedrock ridge that extends to Alcatraz Island and perhaps southeast to Blossom Rock. The tops of these rocks should be lowered to a depth of -17 m (-55.8 ft), with a total volume of as much as 245,000 m 3 (320,460 yd 3 ), at an estimated cost of nearly 27 million dollars, to eliminate the possibility that a tanker would strike one and rupture. A resulting large oil spill would likely cost many times more than the 10 million dollars needed to clean up a small 1996 spill. If the rocks were removed, local habitat for striped bass and other game fish would be altered, with potential negative impact on sport fishing. Currently, public officials are studying the benefits to the Bay environment of lowering the rock knobs.

scholarly journals Evolution of Contingency Planning in California – a Federal and State Coordinated Effort

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Anna Burkholder
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Contingency Planning ◽  
California Department ◽  
Joint Preparation ◽  
New Process ◽  
Contingency Plans ◽  
Sensitive Site

ABSTRACT U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), and California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) agreed to the joint preparation of oil spill contingency plans following the enactment of California and federal laws in 1990. With little guidance initially, six Area Committees embarked on a new process to create the first coastal Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) in 1992. In 2015, when emergency regulations to expand OSPR's jurisdiction statewide became effective, developing inland Geographic Response Plans (GRPs) became a top priority. Over the last 30 years, the ACPs have evolved into robust, nationally recognized planning documents, and response plans have expanded into inland environments. This paper will describe in detail the contributions and advancements in California oil spill contingency planning over 30 years. It will highlight OSPR's approaches for statewide consistency and coverage, interoperability between various state and federal plans, tools (including Geographic Information System (GIS) and various databases), improved sensitive site contacts and management, and lessons learned. It will also cover goals for future improvements in both marine and inland contingency plans.

scholarly journals Unexpectedly high mortality in Pacific herring embryos exposed to the 2007 Cosco Busan oil spill in San Francisco Bay

2011 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. E51-E58 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Incardona ◽  
C. A. Vines ◽  
B. F. Anulacion ◽  
D. H. Baldwin ◽  
H. L. Day ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
High Mortality ◽  
San Francisco Bay ◽  
Pacific Herring

DECISION SUPPORT FOR OIL SPILL RESPONSE CONFIGURATION PLANNING

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 936-937
Author(s):  
Roberto Desimone ◽  
John Mark Agosta
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
San Francisco Bay Area ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Prototype System ◽  
Planning Techniques ◽  
Plan Evaluation ◽  
Bay Area ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Configuration System

ABSTRACT We have developed a prototype oil spill response configuration system to help U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) planners determine the appropriate response equipment and personnel for major spills. Advanced artificial intelligence planning techniques, as well as other software tools, have been applied to spill trajectory modeling, plan evaluation, and map display. We have successfully demonstrated the initial prototype system to various USCG personnel at the regional and national levels on a specific major spill scenario from the San Francisco Bay area.

CALIFORNIA OIL SPILL DISPERSANT PLAN-ACHIEVEMENT THROUGH COOPERATION

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 433-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Ellen Faurot-Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Decision Tool ◽  
Operational Window ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
National Significance ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The use of dispersants in marine waters off California requires detailed foresight and planning. In an effort to expedite a decision to use dispersants and reduce first strike response time, the Region IX Regional Response Team tasked Californias Marine Area Committees to recommend dispersant approval zones. Each Area Committee conducted Net Environmental Benefit Analyses for their areas of responsibility, and from those analyses recommended dispersant zone designations to the U.S. Coast Guard and the Regional Response Team (RRT). All zone recommendations were approved by the RRT in July 2002, and development of the remaining elements of the dispersant plan began. Using primarily a model developed in New Zealand, the authors drafted a comprehensive dispersant use plan for the waters off California. The U.S. Coast Guard Captains of the Port in California reviewed the draft plan, and tested it during the April, 2004 Spill of National Significance (SONS) drill in southern California. The streamlined decision flowcharts, imbedded “Decision Boxes” and operational appendices with further instructions, forms and resource contact information, proved the California Dispersant Plan was a very intuitive and workable response decision tool. During the SONS drill, this greatly improved the ability of the Unified Command to make a decision regarding dispersant use, get the resources in place, and begin dispersant sorties within the operational “window” for dispersant use. It is expected that the same expedited and informed response process will serve California well during an actual oil spill response.

Financial Implications of Hypothetical San Francisco Bay Oil Spill Scenarios: Response, Socioeconomic, and Natural Resource Damage Costs

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1317-1325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Schmidt Etkin ◽  
Deborah French-McCoy ◽  
Jill Jennings ◽  
Nicole Whittier ◽  
Sankar Subbayya ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
San Francisco Bay ◽  
Relative Proportion ◽  
Response Strategy ◽  
Damage Costs ◽  
Financial Impacts ◽  
Type Response

ABSTRACT This study provides a comprehensive examination of the use of trajectory modeling to estimate financial impacts of oil spills, including natural resource damages, response costs, and socioeconomic costs, as well as an opportunity to examine how spill size, oil type, response strategy, and probabilistic trajectory factors impact costs. The inclusion of NRDA, response, and socioeconomic costs in the modeling allows for an assessment of the relative proportion of NRDA costs to response and socioeconomic costs to further support the findings of past studies that refute the myth that NRDA costs are the overriding factors in most spill cases. The study demonstrates the overall financial and NRDA benefits of dispersant use. Estimated total bio-economic costs for oil spill scenarios involving four oil types and three spill sizes for two locations in San Francisco Bay, were modeled. Assuming present-day mechanical-only response, total costs range from $30 to $520 million. Estimated total bioeconomic costs would be reduced to $11 to $113 million if dispersants were used with high effectiveness. Dispersant use would reduce response costs, and if used effectively, could reduce NRDA and socioeconomic damages substantially, as both of these costs are driven by the amount of surface and shoreline oiling.

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