International Posturing amidst Domestic Neglect: India's Agricultural Policy Examined

India has actively tried to shape the WTO agricultural negotiations by submitting detailed proposals, building coalitions, and even taking hard stands (veto) at critical junctures. However, this aggressive posturing presents a sharp contrast with India's domestic agricultural space, where the situation highlights policy neglect, manifesting in agrarian distress and farmer suicides. This paper analyzes contradictions between India's internationally espoused negotiating positions and its domestic policy goals. It argues that India's core focus has been to preserve status quo in the domestic food markets, driven by the political need to provide food-based consumption subsidies and manage an assured price and supply protection to its vulnerable consumers. As a result, India's interests are divergent from most of its developing country coalition partners in the G-20 as well as the G-33 groups. Our discussion has significant implications for both the domestic policy, as well as the sustainability of India's strategy in global agricultural trade negotiations.

Agriculture and Its Discontents: Coalitional Politics at the wto with Special Reference to India’s Food Security Interests

The demise of the Doha round of trade negotiations is often attributed to deadlocks in agricultural negotiations between the developed and the developing world. Why has agriculture been so difficult to negotiate? This article explains North-South agricultural negotiations through the lens of coalition politics, especially the shift from bloc to issue-based diplomacy from the developing world. We argue against the proposition in the negotiation literature that multiple coalitions at the international level allow negotiators room to maneuver. Our study shows that bloc coalitions in fact allowed for compromise more than issue-based coalitions in agriculture, which are often supported by strong domestic constituencies. Empirically, the article focuses on the Uruguay Round when the North and South struck an agreement on agriculture and the Doha Round, which remains deadlocked. The article also provides an in-depth case study of India’s agricultural interests and its food security program in the context of thewto.

Cooperation in the Shadow of WTO Law: Why Litigate When You Can Negotiate

In the current multilateral trade regime, members often negotiate under the shadow of WTO law. This article develops a formal explanation of the way in which the credible threat to resort to and the actual use of WTO litigation can influence multilateral trade negotiations. We contend that the ability to impose costs on a defendant by way of litigation increases the complainant's bargaining power, opening a bargaining window and ultimately increasing the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. On the other hand, the complainant's preference for loss-mitigation over gains from retaliation and its expectations about the likelihood that the defendant will not comply with an adverse ruling can augment the defendant's bargaining leverage. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, increased enforcement does not necessarily make actors shy away from further cooperation, although the credibility of the defendant's non-compliant threats crucially affects the location of any potential negotiated agreement. Empirically, we show that the argument can account for how Brazil, a potential complainant, and the EU and the US, two potential defendants, approached and bargained agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round.