Conceptualizing the Cost of COVID Policy: The Role of Institutional Trade-Offs

In this short article, I summarize recent research in economic history that suggests long-run institutional trade-offs in public health that affect both health and economic outcomes. These trade-offs suggest that a long timespan is necessary to fully measure the consequences of heavy-handed public health interventions. This timespan means that those who have declared “victory” or “defeat” in the wake of COVID policy are premature. Modesty in terms of policy evaluation and prescription is still warranted.

STUDI KELEMBAGAAN PERDAGANGAN SINGKONG DI KECAMATAN GUMUKMAS, KABUPATEN JEMBER

Cassava is one of the commodities in the agricultural sector that has theopportunity to be cultivated and marketed on a larger scale. However, the threatwerefound that involved cassava trading institutions so the cassava distribution channelwas also constrained. This study aims to (1) identify institutional patterns managecassava farming, namely related stakeholder relations patterns, related rules andtransaction costs in managing cassava farming; (2) implement and evaluate thebusiness development model and the cassava farming business institutions. Themethod used is quantitative and qualitative in the form of existing data and tabulationof perceptual data through in-depth interview techniques. The analytical techniquesused are quantitative descriptive, qualitative approaches and Value Chain Analysis.Institutional phenomena are also examined in the cassava commodity trade chain,namely social capital, and transaction costs. The results showed that the cassavatrading chain in Gumukmas District involved 6 economic actors, namely (1) purefarmers; (2) industrial farmers; (3) Traders, (4) small industries; (5) large industries;(6) and consumers. The institutional trade in cassava is not intervened bygovernment policies or farmer groups. The Institutions produced strong social capitalthat can decreasedthe transaction costs.Keywords: Value Chain, institutional, Cassava Farmer BusinessAbstrak: Singkong merupakan salah satu komoditas di sektor pertanian yangmemiliki peluang untuk dibudidayakan dan dipasarkan dalam skala yang lebih besar.Namun, ditemukan hambatan yang melibatkan kelembagaan perdagangan singkongsehingga alur pendistribusian singkong mempunyai hambatan. Penelitian inibertujuan untuk (1) mengidentifikasi pola kelembagaan dalam pengelolaan usahatani singkong yaitu pola hubungan stakeholder terkait, aturan terkait dan biayatransaksi dalam pengelolaan usaha tani singkong; (2) melakukan implementasi danevaluasi terhadap model pengembangan usaha dan kelembagaan usaha tanisingkong. Metode yang digunakan adalah kuantitatif dan kualitatif berupa existingdata dan tabulasi data persepsi melalui teknik in depth interview. Teknik analisisyang digunakan adalah deskriptif kuantitatif, pendekatan kualitatif dan Analisis RantaiNilai (Value Chain Analysis). Fenomena kelembagaan turut dikaji dalam rantaiperdagangan komoditas singkong yaitu modal sosial dan biaya transaksi. Hasilpenelitian menunjukan bahwa rantai perdagangan singkong di KecamatanGumukmas melibatkan 6 pelaku ekonomi yaitu (1) petani murni; (2) petani industri;(3) Pedagang, (4) industri kecil; (5) industri besar; (6) konsumen akhir. Kelembagaanperdagangan singkong tidak diintervensi oleh kebijakan pemerintah maupunkelompok tani. Kelembagaan menghasilkan modal sosial yang kuat yang dapatmeminimalisir keberadaan biaya transaksi.Kata Kunci: Rantai Nilai, kelembagaan, Usaha Tani Singkong

Lost in the Ocean of Deregulation?

The 2008 financial crisis had a tremendous impact on the Greek economy and society. Since 2010, widespread popular mobilizations have emerged against the austerity measures that were part of the bail-out package proposed to the Greek governments by the Troika of creditors (EU-ECB-IMF). Yet the institutional trade unions have failed to impede the reduction of wage earners’ income, which, by 2013, had dropped by 50% compared to 2008 levels. These unions have also been largely unable to confirm their leading role in mobilizing the working population. This article examines the reasons for the failure of the institutional trade unions to adequately address the austerity challenge. We consider that the explanation of their shortcomings lies in the generic challenges and problems contemporary trade unions are facing, as documented in the relevant international literature, as well as the specific particularities and traits of the Greek socio-political context. We also investigate the alternatives proposed by militant, grassroots labour organizations, such as neighbourhood-based workers’ clubs, industry sector or company-based unions populated by precarious workers, and occupied, self-managed companies. After identifying the strong points of the latter’s contributions, as well as the problems and challenges they are facing, we conclude that a diversified and innovative approach is required on the part of the labour movement in order to simultaneously address and exploit all sources of workers’ power. The article concludes that a process of strategic rapprochement between mainstream and radical unions in Greece is necessary.

The Cabals of a Few or the Confusion of a Multitude: The Institutional Trade-off Between Representation and Governance

Our model illustrates how political institutions trade off between the competing goals of representation and governance, where governance is the responsiveness of an institution to a single pivotal voter. We use exogenous variation from the 30-year history of the federal Community Development Block Grant program to identify this trade-off. Cities with more representative governments—those with larger city councils—use more grant funds to supplement city revenues rather than implementing tax cuts, thereby moving policy further away from the governance ideal. In sum, more representative government is not without cost. (JEL D72, H71, R50)