Religion, Religions and J.Rawls’ Political Project

The essay explores the relationship between religion and Rawls from the perspective of some issues that are central to his political project: political autonomy, public reason and the implications of the fact of pluralism for the development of the idea of decent peoples. Religion has a dual dimension in political liberalism, plural and singular. The problem of the liberal political transition is to allow these two dimensions to coexist harmoniously within the liberal political project.

Tolerating the Conditionally Tolerant

How can a tolerant, liberal political culture tolerate the presence of only conditionally tolerant illiberal sub-cultures while remaining true to its principles of tolerance? The problem falls within the intersection of two developments in the thinking of two of the leading anglophone philosophers of the last half-century, Bernard Williams and John Rawls. Rawls, particularly, struggled with the problem of how a liberal society might stably survive the clash of plural sub-cultures that a liberal society – unless it is oppressively coercive – must itself foster and allow to flourish. And he separately struggled with the problem of how liberal peoples might peacefully share the planet with illiberal, but “decent” peoples elsewhere. This article shows that Rawls’s two solutions do not easily mix, and argues that state-approved early education must do more than merely to inform children that losing their faith will not land them in jail.

The classical cosmopolitanian idea: Arguments for the world government

The Cosmopolitan idea of the World Government is quite rarely proposed in theory of international relations. Kant already claimed that this idea oscillates between anarchy and brute despotism. This is the reason why he described this standpoint as naive. The author tries to show that alternative theories, such as realism, Kantian and Rawlsian versions of statism and the conception of multilayered scheme of sovereignty, lead to more serious problems. The first one is rejected for the reason of the 'prisoner's dilemma' it implies. It is also argued that the Kantian version of statism is either inconsistent, or allows for totalitarian states if they have peaceful international politics. Many liberals reject Rawls's position because of his tolerant attitude towards 'decent peoples'. On the other hand, the conception of multilayered scheme of sovereignty is dismissed because of the non-existence of a unified decision-making procedure in global politics. At the end of the paper, the author defends Classical Cosmopolitanism theory from Kant's objections and indicates the main obstacles to its realization.

International Toleration: Rawlsian versus Cosmopolitan

How should liberal societies respond to nonliberal ones? In this paper I examine John Rawls's conception of international toleration against what is sometimes called a cosmopolitan one. Rawls holds that a just international order should recognize certain nonliberal societies, to which he refers as decent peoples, as equal members in good standing in a just society of peoples. It would be a violation of liberalism's own principle of toleration to deny the international legitimacy of decent peoples who, among other things, affirm human rights and accept peaceful coexistence with other societies. According to the cosmopolitan idea of international toleration, on the contrary, only societies that are liberal in character meet the criteria for toleration. I suggest that, against the Rawlsian conception of international toleration, the cosmopolitan idea is more consistent with the fundamentals of liberal political morality. I then clarify the ways in which cosmopolitan toleration is not worryingly interventionist even as it is not altogether toothless; and I end with some reflections on why cosmopolitism is not morally imperialistic.

The construction of a ‘realistic utopia’: John Rawls and international political theory

‘The limits of the possible in moral matters are less narrow than we think. It is our weaknesses, our vices, our prejudices that shrink them.’Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract Book II, Chapter 12.2 [cited from John Rawls The Law of Peoples, p. 7]After presenting a brief sketch of John Rawls's theory of justice, his international political theory is outlined and evaluated. Rawls develops a classification of ‘peoples’ based on whether or not they are ‘well-ordered’. The Law of Peoples covers ‘liberal’ and ‘decent’ peoples who adhere to minimum standards of human rights and are not aggressive in their international relations. This is in the realm of ‘ideal’ theory; ‘non-ideal’ theory must cope also with societies that are not well-ordered, such as outlaw states and burdened societies. The long-term aim is that all should be part of a confederation of decent peoples. Rawls's theory has been criticized by cosmopolitan liberals for its communitarian tendencies, but has much to offer scholars of international relations, including a systematic basis for classifying states, a helpful discussion of the distinction between reasonableness and rationality, and a powerful restatement of the importance of utopian thinking in international relations.