Presence and participation in a virtual court

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an increase in the use of video-mediated justice practices. However, such developments have already been transforming justice over the course of the previous 20 years. Scholars and legal professinals have expressed concerns over how remote appearance in court impacts perceptions of the accused. In this article, we consider some of these concerns and explore the concept of the ‘distributed court’ as a potential remedy. Unlike traditional video appearance in court, where a defendant participates remotely while all other players are co-located in the same courtroom, in a distributed court all participants meet in a shared virtual space. Such a configuration is similar to the virtual courts developed worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic. We draw on a reimagining of co-presence from scholars in the sociology of technology to elaborate the concept of the distributed court. We then present the results of a mock jury study that examines how jurors respond to variations in court technology configurations. We find that appearing by video does not impact the likelihood of a guilty verdict. Rather, a defendant appearing alone in a dock seems to be the most prejudicial location. We find that a distributed court can communicate equality and produce a shared experience of remote participation. We conclude with a discussion of how this research can inform best practice in a future where a significant number of criminal hearings are likely to continue in a virtual format.

Liminal technologies: Exploring the temporalities and struggles in efforts to develop a Belgrade metro

The sociology of technology needs more nuanced conceptualizations of the temporal aspects of sociotechnical change. In this article, we propose liminality as a useful analytical entry-point to study technologies that seemingly remain in a ‘no man’s land’ – what we call liminal technologies. Drawing on anthropological accounts and technology studies literature, we propose a framework to be used as a sensitizing device that includes four ways of understanding liminal technologies: (1) technologies in shielded transition, (2) technologies under construction through negotiation, (3) technologies that are morphing between worlds, and (4) technologies remaining in an in-between space. We use the Belgrade metro effort – an infrastructure project that has been in development for almost a century – as an extreme case through which to explore the achievements of this framework. The analysis shows that the liminality of the metro was characterized by a combination of spiral, multi-linear and halted temporality. Despite severely dis-aligned expectations, liminality persisted due to a shared belief that a metro would benefit Belgrade. We conclude that using liminal technology as a sensitizing device may in particular be relevant to technologies with prolonged liminality because it highlights temporal patterns that may prevent technological development from being either completed or terminated.

Bedouins of Silicon Valley: A neo-Khaldunian approach to sociology of technology

The standard narrative of the emergence, rise and decline of Silicon Valley companies focuses on the evolution of institutions and technological waves, not the mentality of the innovators and entrepreneurs. This article argues that this type of explanation of the rise and decline of the Silicon Valley firms and institutions can hardly be sufficient. The suggestion is that a neo-Khaldunian theory could shed light on the issue. This article is an attempt to, first, distinguish between the medieval and modern aspects of Ibn Khaldun’s theory and second, to use the latter to examine Silicon Valley as a social phenomenon. It will be argued that Ibn Khaldun’s theory is of most contemporary relevance when we read it as a general account of a cyclical replacement of the untrained with the trained, while over and above the specific, environmentally deterministic cycle he identifies between ‘city-dwellers’ and ‘Bedouins’. In the case of Silicon Valley, these could be read as metaphors for, respectively, the established tech firms versus the garage-based start-up ‘geeks’.

Artifacts as Rules

My goal in this article is to explore the extent to which the conception of rule-following which emerges from Wittgenstein’s later works can also yield important insights concerning the nature of technological practices. In particular, this article aims to examine how two interrelated themes of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations can be applied in the philosophical analysis of technology. Our first theme concerns linguistic practice; broadly construed, it is the claim that the use of language cannot be understood as determined by a system of context independent rules. The second, interrelated theme emerges as a consequence of the first; that the meaning of language is rendered indeterminate when analyzed in isolation from contexts of practice. Following the common tendency in the sociology of technology to draw analogies between language and technology, I aim to show how the arguments that Wittgenstein makes for these two claims concerning language can also help us to understand the relation between technical artifacts and technological practices. For, similar to Wittgenstein’s account of rules, it will be shown how artifacts cannot be adequately understood in isolation from a wider background of skillful practice and interpretation. To illustrate this idea, we will examine the case of the Geiger counter, with a view towards illustrating how important aspects of the function of the device are rendered indeterminate when assessed on the basis of physical design alone.